From Dawes to Locarno

GEORGE GLASGOW

The Reis Library
Allegheny College

The Elbert Smith
Library

B341.1 G462f

WITHDRAWN

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/fromdawestolocar0000geor_w5n1

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE MINOANS

RONALD BURROWS

MACDONALD AS DIPLOMATIST

FROM DAWES TO LOCARNO

341.1
G462f

Being a Critical Record of an Important Achievement in European Diplomacy

1924-1925

By GEORGE GLASGOW

WITH A FOREWORD BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, P.C., M.P.
SOMETIME PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
1926

Printed in United States
of America

A-A

Dedicated to those who
worked for and produced
the spirit of Locarno
and in particular

to

Mr. Austen Chamberlain
M. Aristide Briand
Dr. Luther
Dr. Stresemann
Dr. Edouard Benesh
M. Émile Vandervelde
Count Skrzynski

and to

Signor Mussolini

over whom more tears
have been shed in heaven
than over the others

55987

FOREWORD

In its last act of foreign policy, the negotiation of the Locarno Pact, the British Government has done something which deserves a welcome. At Geneva, it is true, they did about as badly as any important Government could do; and the effect of Geneva upon Europe was only too apparent. But after Geneva came Locarno. I know what can be said against Locarno, and what can be said against it must be said. It is important that we should understand it.

Locarno does not face any of the problems that could be, in the widest stretch of imagination, an immediate cause of a European war. I have never met anybody yet—and I think I know most of them—who sits in a European Foreign Office and who believes that in our lifetime, or in anybody's lifetime, there is going to be a war between France and Germany directly and specifically caused over the Rhine frontier. That is not how the war will come in Europe. If anybody thinks that by getting agreement on the Rhine frontier we have made European war impossible, he should think again. If there should be another European war, it is perfectly true that the Rhine frontier will be an element in it, but it will be raised only after war has broken out. Therefore it is true from one point of view that the Locarno Treaty, by settling the Rhine frontier, has dealt with something that never could become a prime cause of a European war. Moreover, if war breaks out, and if the conditions have been prepared for Germany to have her revenge on France, as France had her revenge on Germany between 1872 and 1914—if that should be the evil fate of the next generation or of the generation that is to follow, then the Locarno Treaty will not prevent

Germany from fighting France over other people's quarrels, and, when that has begun, from fighting it over its own.

It is perfectly true that Locarno has not stopped up all the gaps and the back doors through which war may come ; that there are loopholes in the Locarno Treaty ; that Locarno has gone back to the old mistake of making machinery for peace in Europe by individual agreements between little groups of nations ; that the moment we come to the Danubian problem we find it impossible to draft pacts on the same principle as Locarno and ask this country to guarantee them ; that Locarno methods are not altogether a strengthening of the moral authority of the League of Nations. It is equally true that nine-tenths of the objections that Mr. Chamberlain took to the Protocol appear also in the Pact.

There are, however, three things about the Locarno Pact to which I should like to draw attention. The first thing it has done is to get Germany into the League of Nations. I do not care which party has got Germany into the League ; I say to them 'Thank you and bless you for having done it.' The second point is that arbitration is enshrined there, though imperfectly ; and the third that Locarno, apart from its substance, and apart from its merits, has given Europe new hope.

It has been the most magnificent example of mass Couéism that I have ever known. From the day when the Locarno treaties were intialled, the nations of Europe, after their morning prayers—I hope they indulged in them ; there was much need of them—got up and said 'I am good ; I am getting better day by day.' Locarno may not be great as an accomplished

achievement; but Locarno does give a magnificent opportunity. It is the opportunity of Locarno that I welcome, and Locarno is going to be fruitful for peace only in so far as that opportunity is taken.

Under Locarno our people have undertaken a tremendous responsibility. They have taken risks upon themselves which are greater actually, although they appear to be less on paper, than they were willing to take under the Protocol.

We have no business to put our signature to Locarno unless we intend to carry out the spirit of the thing – the spirit we communicated to the people who initialled with us. We must remember what we led them to expect, not the ways open to us, in accordance with the imperfect letter, to get out of our responsibilities, We have handed over the British Army and the British Navy to other Powers under Locarno, if we did it under the Protocol, and to the extent we did it under the Protocol. There is no mistake about it. The Couéism of Locarno must be supplemented by a real building up of peace. The Rhineland must be subject to a new agreement. The Ambassadors' Conference in Paris ought to be disbanded. That Disarmament Conference must be held, and we must strive to make it a success. We could reduce our armed forces enormously if we had the moral courage. The spirit of Locarno must be used up to its maximum.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

November, 1925.

Mr. Shaw's idea of hell is to be put on an eternal pedestal and to be made to live up to it. If in the following pages I appear to place Mr. Austen Chamberlain and his Locarno colleagues on a pedestal, I can at least plead, for their comfort, that no reasonable person will expect them to live up to it for eternity. Nor will it be necessary. Those who were in Locarno, as was the author of this book, on October 16, 1925, were conscious that a big and historic event was taking place. The chief statesmen of Europe solemnly undertook to keep the peace in Europe. Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann met the statesmen of their former enemies on an equal footing; the vow of pacifism was voluntary and palpably sincere; and for the first time in diplomatic history the representatives of Great Powers surrendered their historic 'right to make war.' Unless the world is irretrievably mad, it ought to be easy to keep the nations' representatives on so healthy a pedestal for the rest of our time. The object of this book is two-fold: in the first place to record the stages in the diplomacy which led to Locarno, and in the second place to throw a strong light on the pedestal, so that the grateful peoples can see to it that their governments do not climb down.

I am grateful to the *Contemporary Review* for allowing me to use again some of the material which has appeared during the year in the Foreign Affairs Section of that journal; and in doing so I profoundly hope, in common with thousands of others, that the distinguished Editor of the *Contemporary Review*, Dr. G. P. Gooch, will soon

be restored to full health after his long illness. I should like also to take this opportunity of thanking Mr. J. L. Garvin for the help and advice which he generously and constantly gives me in my work on foreign policy.

GEORGE GLASGOW

57, Chancery Lane,
London.
November 1925.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	FOREWORD	ix
	PREFACE	xiii
CHAPTER ONE	AN UNPROMISING START	1
„ TWO	THE MANURE THAT NURTURED THE PLANT	4
„ THREE	THE BIRTH OF AN IDEA	12
„ FOUR	SUSPENSE	33
„ FIVE	THE EASTERN POWERS AND THE PACT	45
„ SIX	THE MIST IN THE WEST	48
„ SEVEN	HAZY DISCUSSIONS	56
„ EIGHT	THE BENEFICENT WHITSUNTIDE	58
„ NINE	THE ALLIED DISARMAMENT NOTE	70
„ TEN	PUBLICATION OF THE PAPERS	76
„ ELEVEN	THE GLOOM BEFORE THE LIGHT	85
„ TWELVE	M. BRIAND COMES TO LONDON	94
„ THIRTEEN	THE DIPLOMATIC TANGLE	101
„ FOURTEEN	THE JURISTS' CONFERENCE	109
„ FIFTEEN	THE TRIUMPH OF LOCARNO	117

CONTENTS

		PAGE
Chapter Sixteen	Mr. Chamberlain's Share of the Glory	127
„ Seventeen	The Future - - - -	130
Appendix One	The Preliminary Texts - -	141
„ Two	The Locarno Treaties - - -	168
Index - -	- - - - - - -	183

Mr. Austen Chamberlain took possession of the Minister of State's room at the Foreign Office on November 7, 1924, and began his first experiment in the handling of British interests abroad. Diplomacy is like cricket in its uncertainty and in its elements of chance: and in the unpitiful criterion whereby success is judged by results alone. Mr. Chamberlain's public career had been hidden under a cloud for some years, and he was now a novice, just as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had been ten months earlier, in the business of foreign policy. Few people in November, 1924, would have been incautious enough to prophesy big things for Mr. Chamberlain's first period of office as Foreign Minister, especially as a confluence of circumstances made the first months of his new experience anything but a bed of roses. In retrospect, however, there will no doubt be many who agree that the bad time he had in the beginning probably contributed to the remarkable determination, courage and single-eyed endeavour with which he soon conceived and then pursued through some seven difficult months a plan for saving Europe from itself, from the suspicions, fears, hatreds which are the breeding ground of war, and for substituting confidence and peace. His deliberate policy was to brush everything else aside and to tackle the problem of security. He decided to do it in two stages, first by allaying French fears, secondly by bringing Germany back into the European family of nations.

Therein he completed a process which had been started by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. Mr. MacDonald had killed the Poincaré spirit in France by friendship for France, and at the Dawes Conference of August, 1924, had brought the Germans and the French together in

a friendly spirit. The Dawes settlement of the five-years' old problem of reparations was the first step to European peace. The second step, in Mr. MacDonald's, as in Mr. Chamberlain's philosophy, was the solving of the problem of security against future war. Mr. MacDonald's method of approach to such a solution was through the Geneva Protocol of September, 1924. In the following month, however, the British General Election broke the back of the attempt, and it was to Mr. Chamberlain that fell the new opportunity.

For five months Mr. Chamberlain fought a losing battle against odds. Everything went wrong. In the first place the deplorable and stupid Zinoviev affair had to be disposed of, and it gave the *coup de grâce* to all hope of Mr. Chamberlain's adopting a progressive policy towards Russia. The Die-hards of his party, already irretrievably incapable of commonsense in their attitude to Russia, were given by Mr. Zinoviev a long lease of life, especially as Mr. Chamberlain's Government was committed by its election extravagance to a retrograde Russian policy. Then there came the Egyptian bomb-shell, the murder of Sir Lee Stack, which threw Anglo-Egyptian relations into desperate confusion, and which from Mr. Chamberlain's point of view was the very climax of bad luck. Even in the one field in which Mr. Chamberlain might have expected a clear path, he found confusion, for the exigencies of party politics made it impossible for him to follow precisely in Mr. MacDonald's footsteps in the pursuit of security, no matter how much he would have liked to do so.

The impression, therefore, that Mr. Chamberlain gave at the beginning of his office, was that of a negative and

destructive conduct of affairs. He wiped out by dint of a few snappy sentences the whole of 1924 so far as Russia was concerned. He suspended Mr. MacDonald's work for peace by writing to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations requesting that the question of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes be eliminated from the agenda of the Council Meeting of the League which was arranged to be held in Rome in December, 1924. His immediate pretext for the taking of that step was that the Government must consult the Dominions before making up its mind on the questions of principle involved in the Protocol.

All negative. Even then, however, Mr. Chamberlain partly countered the bad impression thereby made, by deciding to attend the Rome Council meeting in person and thereafter to continue to represent Great Britain before the League. That decision was singularly important. Mr. MacDonald had been the first British Foreign Secretary to appear at Geneva at all. Mr. Chamberlain was the first British Foreign Secretary to represent Great Britain on the Council of the League. Nor was such an event an undeserved tribute to the new British Government. It was, on the contrary, a true symptom of the contribution which British Conservatism has made to the prestige of the League; and the Baldwin Government certainly took the League as seriously as any since the War. Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Rome in December, 1924, was the beginning of a big adventure, although at the time he himself was probably unaware of its full implication.

CHAPTER TWO–THE MANURE THAT NURTURED THE PLANT

Some account is necessary of the dark times through which Mr. Chamberlain passed in the weeks immediately after he became Foreign Secretary; for as the manure is an essential factor in the early development of many good things that grow, so the very rottenness of Mr. Chamberlain's early experiences no doubt inspired him with the crusading zeal for peace and goodwill which was destined to fructify at Locarno. The worst of those experiences was undoubtedly that for which, in the truly Shakesperian way of tragedy, Mr. Chamberlain himself was partly to blame, namely the rapid worsening of Anglo-Russian relations. The exact stages whereby the new government in London smashed Mr. MacDonald's delicate and difficult work of making an agreement with Russia, and inaugurated a dead season in Anglo-Russian relations may be recorded in a few lines. Demolition, whether of houses or of diplomacy, is quick and easy work by contrast with building. On November 21 Mr. Chamberlain wrote a short Note to Mr. Rakovsky: 'Sir – His Majesty's Government have had under review the treaties negotiated by their predecessors with the Government of the U.S.S.R. and signed on August 8 last. I have the honour to inform you that after due deliberation His Majesty's Government find themselves unable to recommend the treaties in question to the consideration of Parliament or to submit them to the King for His Majesty's ratification.' That was all. How easy! But what a monument of diplomacy! The worst feature of it was the palpable impression it gave of self-satisfaction over an achievement comparable to that of a street urchin who upsets a coster's barrow.

One must suppose that Mr. Chamberlain's negative and destructive policy towards Russia soon became distasteful to him, as such policies always must be to serious men, but the bill had to be paid for election extravagance, and the electorate had to be given time to forget. What apparently had not been forseen by the Government was that in politics, as in love, there is no standing still, and one either moves forwards or backwards. In the case of Russia the government moved backwards, and the violent Russian propaganda which began to inflame China and other inflammable areas in the East was as much the result, as the cause, of the British Government's policy. When it comes to a trial of destructiveness the present Russian government is worth backing against any in the world. The danger of Bolshevism is that, as Miss Emma Goldman, the anarchist, has said, it takes few to destroy. When Mr. Chamberlain adopted a forbidding attitude towards Russia, he played into the hands of Bolshevism; for Bolshevism thrives on international misunderstanding. The acting War Commissar, who took Mr. Trotsky's place when the latter fell ill, commented on Mr. Chamberlain's policy thus: 'Now, more than ever, we need a firm Red Army. We must not forget possible battles with the bourgeoisie.'

The next of Mr. Chamberlain's distressing experiences was a stroke of sheer bad luck. On November 12, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, was murdered in a street in Cairo. It was inevitable that the news should put an end to all immediate hope of a friendly agreement between Egypt and Great Britain. The British Government did indeed hold the Egyptian Government to be

responsible for the murder, abandoned the hope of a friendly agreement with Egypt on the reserved points (namely, the Sudan, the security of British communications through the Suez Canal, the protection of foreign interests and of minorities, and the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression or interference) and decided to take steps to settle some of them without Egyptian collaboration.

As if, moreover, the Egyptian affair had not been enough to make a sad and a wise Mr. Chamberlain, there followed a serious straining of relations between Germany and the Allies as a result of the Allied decision to prolong the occupation of Cologne. German opinion immediately misunderstood the British policy in Cologne, as it had a general habit, not wholly surprising, of misunderstanding British policy. When Mr. MacDonald gave up his seals, Germany was moving fast in the right direction: towards a sincere carrying out of the Dawes Plan, admission to the League of Nations and general good behaviour. By January, 1925, she was in a ferment of indignation, against, not France, but Great Britain. Why? The mere prolongation of the British occupation of Cologne was not the reason. Germany would have had no violent objection to that, if her point of view had been considered with tact and with courtesy, especially as the alternative to a British occupation would probably have been a French occupation. It was the impression of an anti-German bias underlying British foreign policy which created the effect. Experience has often shown how easily the balance is upset in these matters. There is no mentality so self-conscious and sensitive as that of post-war Germany, or so capable of committing appalling

'gaffe' from emotional touchiness. Witness Cannes or Genoa; or the first three days of the London conference of August, 1924, when Mr. MacDonald hobnobbed with all his determination and abandon to overcome the timidity of the German delegation, with results which are a monument of what can be done by the right methods. Mr. Chamberlain did not make enough allowance for German opinion. His touch in the the Cologne affair was heavy, and the immediate result was a crash of the whole delicate structure of German confidence – a structure, which, however, as we shall see, was to be built again.

It was known in the last fortnight of 1924 that the Allied Governments had decided among themselves not to evacuate the Cologne zone on January 10, the decision being formally adopted on December 27 by the Ambassadors' Conference. On January 5 Lord D'Abernon, as senior Allied Ambassador in Berlin, handed to the German Chancellor, Herr Marx, at the Palace in the Wilhelmstrasse, a collective Note of the Allied Governments intimating the decision, and the reasons for it. At the same time Lord D'Abernon explained that a further communication would be addressed to the German Government when the final Report of the Allied Commission of Control had been received. Article 428 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridge-heads, should be occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers during a period of fifteen years, running from the entry into force of the treaty, as a guarantee for the execution of the said Treaty by Germany. Article 429 of the Treaty stipulated that

if the conditions imposed by the Treaty had been faithfully carried out by Germany, the occupation forseen in Article 428 should be successively restricted at the expiration of the first five, and then of the first ten, years. The Allied Note of January 5 therefore kept within the letter of the Treaty when it declared :

'The Allied Governments are already in a position to inform the German Government, without awaiting the 10th January, 1925, that they have obtained proof showing that Germany has not yet fulfilled and cannot possibly have fulfilled by that date the conditions laid down in Article 429 so as to enable her to benefit by the clause relating to the partial evacuation anticipated. Thus, by merely referring to Part V of the Treaty, a sufficient ground for the decision of the Allied Governments is to be found in the information collected by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, in spite of some obstruction, in regard to the extent to which the military clauses have been carried out.

For example, to mention only some essential points among the facts already known, the following facts have been ascertained :—

"In violation of Article 160, the Great General Staff of the Army has been reconstituted in another form.

In violation of Article 174, short-service volunteers have been recruited and trained.

Contrary to Article 168, the transformation of factories for the manufacture of war material is far from being complete.

Contrary to Articles 164 to 169, a surplus of every kind has been found to exist beyond the amounts of military material allowed, and considerable illicit stocks of war material have been discovered.

Contrary to Article 162 and to the decision taken by the Boulogne Conference on June 19, 1920, the reorganization of the State police has not been begun.

Contrary to Article 211, the German Government is far from having taken all the legislative and administrative measures demanded by the Allied Governments in their Note of September 29, 1922."

The Allied Governments, moreover, expect to receive shortly the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control giving the full results of the present general inspection. This report will enable them to determine what still remains to be done by Germany for her obligations in military matters to be considered, in the terms of Article 429, as having been faithfully carried out, a further communication will be addressed to the German Government on this subject.'

The Allies were technically correct: an achievement

which, however, had precisely no value whatever. These juridical vendettas could go on for ever in complete harmony with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and in complete discord with every prompting of common sense. It was surprising that the men who wielded power in the Allied countries should still be acting under the delusion that it was possible to subject Germany to such forms of control. It was surprising that Mr. Chamberlain should have shared the responsibility for the almost incredible folly of the Allied Note of January 5.

It is easy enough to find legal excuses for any policy, no matter how unfair or how stupid. No doubt Germany had failed to carry out fully the disarmament clauses of the Treaty. Germany was not and never had been any higher in the moral scale than any other nation in Europe. And what, in common sense, did it matter, in comparison with the spirit of goodwill which was growing up in the last half of 1924? German propagandists now asked openly whether the Allied Governments really expected Germany to be disarmed, when she was surrounded on all sides by fully armed and openly hostile nations? I heard a highly-placed German diplomatist declare that if the present situation was allowed to continue, the German people might be driven into a war of despair, even knowing that they would lose, merely because, in their view, nothing could be more intolerable than the continued occupation of the Rhinelands on flimsy excuses and the continued attempt to keep Germany in bondage. One may heavily discount such propaganda and acquit Germany of being quite so stupid as that: but there was no denying that German opinion had suddenly become more hostile to the Allied Governments

and more restive than it had been since the armistice. Mr. Chamberlain was understood to be anxious to evacuate Cologne at the earliest opportunity. Why then did he miss the obvious opportunity, January 10, and by that very fact make future opportunity less likely?

The most likely explanation is that he deliberately sacrificed everything to the need of pacifying France. By postponing the evacuation of Cologne he merely wanted to gain time for further consideration of the question of security. As a result of his six weeks' study of the problems confronting him he had made up his mind to devote his first energies towards solving that question. When he came back from Rome, in December, he allowed it to be known that he had developed an increased respect for the League, an increased confidence in its efficacy, and a high opinion of its machinery. Mr. Chamberlain is a man who, when he makes a positive statement, means it. It was unfortunate, therefore, from his point of view, that he was unable to make up his mind about the Geneva Protocol before the issue of January 10 arose. To his mind the evacuation of Cologne was a side issue in the big problem of security, and he regarded it as impossible to take the small step before deciding on the bigger step. He therefore played for time, with the unfortunate results that have been alluded to above.

The final misfortune which clouded Mr. Chamberlain's early days as Foreign Secretary was the Government's attitude to the Geneva Protocol. Here, too, Mr. Chamberlain had bad luck. He studied the Protocol hard and decided that it could neither be accepted nor rejected, but could see no solution to the dilemma. He therefore

took refuge in a Dominion consultation. Soon after he assumed office he had begun telegraphic exchanges of view with the Dominion capitals on this subject, but had found the method totally inadequate to its importance. It was, therefore, decided to invite Dominion delegations to a Conference in London. Telegraphic invitations were sent out in the last week of December, and it was hoped that a special Imperial Conference might meet in London in March, that is to say early enough to enable Mr. Chamberlain to report the British decision on the Protocol to the March Meeting of the League Council. Even in that event it would have been necessary for the Disarmament Conference, which had been provisionally fixed for July, 1925, to be postponed till October; for Mr. Chamberlain made it clear, when he asked for the deletion of the question of the Protocol from the Agenda of the Rome Session of the Council, that in his view it would necessarily follow that the general time-table of the League's plan for security and disarmament should be adjusted accordingly. It was, however, found impracticable for the Dominions to accept the invitation to a special conference in London, and the method of telegraphic consultation had again to be resorted to. The general prospect therefore became more obscure than ever. On every hand there was a confusion and a lack of constructive progress such as had not been known for twelve months. It was from the depths of such blackness that Mr. Chamberlain rose and triumphed.

CHAPTER THREE–THE BIRTH OF AN IDEA

'Of immense, of overwhelming importance' were the words with which Mr. Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons on March 5, described the question of security. It was already clear that the European diplomacy of 1925 would be mainly concerned with that question. Mr. Chamberlain himself, on assuming office nearly half a year earlier, had left no doubt in the minds of those who observed him that his diplomacy would be primarily dominated by the problem of European security, and he remained true to his first impression. Since that time, he and other members of the Government had been doing some new thinking on old lines. Mr. Chamberlain had taken several months in travelling the preliminary road of education which each successive Foreign Minister, or each Prime Minister who concerns himself with foreign affairs, has to travel. Mr. MacDonald got there quickly, for he was working with the sword of Damocles suspended over him; Mr. Chamberlain, who had four leisurely years before him, took longer.

At the beginning of March, however, that is, on the eve of Mr. Chamberlain's second journey abroad as responsible British Foreign Minister, a certain state of mind had been reached by the Government which must be analysed in some detail before the important events then pending can be chronicled.

Europe was regarded by them as an entity of three elements, the ex-allies, the ex-enemies, and Russia. Russia was left aside for the purpose of evolving a policy on security, on the ground that Russia, for the moment, belonged to the sphere of Asiatic rather than European politics – a surprising hypothesis. The only bearing

which, it was conceded, Russia had on the European problem was that she vaguely contributed to the sense of insecurity and uncertainty which had for so long undermined the work of Western European pacification. Had they so quickly forgotten the work of Mr. MacDonald, which had, in fact, for the first time since the armistice, produced a feeling of harmony between Great Britain, France, and Germany? But no matter.

Western Europe was certainly unsettled again during the first two months and a half of the present year. Germany was resentful of the losses she sustained at the end of the War, especially on her eastern frontier; France was afraid of Germany's winning something back. Discontent on one side and fear on the other prevented the harmonising of Europe. It was the old vicious circle in which fear had prompted armaments, secret alliances, a challenging and suspicious policy, the ill-treatment of minorities, and in which those manifestations of fear increased the restiveness of the aggrieved side. So far as Germany's smaller ex-allies were concerned, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, they were helpless in the face of powerful neighbours and were not an active danger, Austria's desire for union with Germany being a smothered aspiration rather than a policy. Germany, at the moment impotent, had potential resources in arms, fighting power, and chemical equipment which in the long run, unless she were appeased, would make of her a renewed danger to European peace. The immediate concentration of sensible Germans on economic revival, to be achieved through a loyal execution of the Dawes plan and of the Treaty of Versailles, was regarded as not

incompatible with the distant danger. And even such Germans never concealed their disinclination to accept for ever the injustices of the peace settlement, especially those of the Polish corridor and the partition of Upper Silesia.

France on her side was more afraid of Germany than ever. The two countries were neighbours. France had been invaded twice within fifty years. Her birth-rate was declining. At present her population numbers 40 millions; it may be halved during the next fifty years. Germany, by contrast, whose population in 1922 amounted to 61½ millions may in the same period increase to 80 millions. Such were the main elements of the European problem as seen by important sections of Government opinion at the beginning of March.

The stages through which the disastrous unsettlement of the post-war period had passed threw some light on the phase of the problem which was presented to Mr. Chamberlain.

In 1919, Marshal Foch, who had played his part in the fictitious Allied victory over Germany, advanced certain theories about the reaping of the harvest. It was an unconscious irony on his part that made him, flushed with 'victory' over Germany, give way to an unreasoning fear which still obsessed him. He insisted on a political safeguard for future security. There could be no security for France, he said, no peace for Europe, unless the German frontier ceased at the Rhine. He explained that France did not want to annex the territory which lay between the French frontier and the Rhine, but only to detach it from Germany and thus to make of the Rhine an effective barrier between the two countries.

The first fruits of victory were a refusal of the Allies of France to grant to France what Marshal Foch wanted. The war was over. Mr. Lloyd George had changed his tone, had ceased beating drums and stirring up war feeling, and had become a pacifist. He was full of the analogy of 1870. He showed how a German policy of *Vae Victis* in 1871 had fomented the spirit of revenge which waited till 1914 to find its opportunity; how the annexation of Alsace and of Lorraine had constituted an irritant *irredenta* which, after forty-four years, had split the peace, or helped to split the peace, of Europe. If France, he argued, sowed German seed, she would reap a German harvest. Partly, however, as a sop to France, he and President Wilson offered a treaty of guarantee whereby Great Britain and the United States were to pledge themselves to leap to the assistance of France (simultaneously in this case) in the event of an unprovoked attack on France by Germany. Mr. Lloyd George also agreed to an Allied occupation of the Rhinelands for an extended period, to the imposition of disarmament on Germany under the supervision of an Allied Commission, and to Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the effect of which was to give an assurance that any violation of the provisions for the demilitarization of the Rhinelands would be considered by the Allies of France as an act of war. Article 42 read:

'Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

and Article 43:

'In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.'

That elaborate edifice naturally began to crumble as soon as it was finished. President Wilson was repudiated by his country; the tripartite pledge fell to the ground: and it happened to be the only part of the edifice that French opinion had placed any faith in. The occupation of the Rhinelands and the disarmament of Germany were regarded by the realist spirit of France as ephemeral, not as perpetual safeguards, while the assurance that a violation of the demilitarized Rhinelands would be considered an act of war was simply not believed in.

France, therefore, having sacrificed two millions of her best men out of her small and dwindling population, had precisely nothing to show on the other side. Marshal Foch had been refused his Rhine barrier, and the next best thing for France had been ruled out by the American scuttle from the European inferno which America had played her part in producing. Mr. Lloyd George was left with a difficult situation in hand. He had to deal with a snarling, suspicious, discontented France. He talked pacifism, commonsense, idealism. He might as well have apostrophized the moon. For the simple and obvious truth was that France had started to make her own arrangements for security. She had, with her accustomed agility and lack of sentimentality, dropped all her Allies at once, except in so far as they could serve her new purpose. The talk one heard at the time about France clinging to the war spirit and Great Britain wanting to forget the War was ignorant trash. France had forgotten the War. Great Britain pathetically went on sacrificing her vital interests out of loyalty to a France which she persisted in regarding as the ally of 1914-8. Mr. Lloyd George lectured France, cajoled her, argued

with her. She did not even hear. She was engaged in fresh woods and pastures new.

What did she set about doing? In the first place she began, logically enough, to repair the French army. The flower of French manhood having been wiped out under the brilliant leadership of Marshal Foch (what shall it benefit a nation if it win the Great War and lose its manhood?) she started calling in the savages. Large numbers of coloured troops were enlisted in the French army, and at the beginning of 1925 there were still large numbers of North African and French colonial coloured troops stationed in France and on the Rhine.

Next, France set about encircling Germany and courting new allies for the peace-time offensive against Germany. In the philosophy of the Quai d'Orsay the Little Entente, especially its chief constituent member, Czechoslovakia, was exclusively valuable as a potential enemy of Germany. Czechoslavakia, Poland, and the rest were, according to Paris, to be welded together into a compact body, united among themselves by an anti-German motive and tied to the chariot wheels of France by a complicated system of alliances, military missions, and financial subsidies. The debts of France to Great Britain and to the United States were long ago dropped, as it were, into the waste-paper basket, for Great Britain and the United States had ceased to exist in the eyes of the Quai d'Orsay. All the better: there was the more money to spend on the more profitable project of arming the Poles. By such means France hoped to have at her disposal Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Austria (who on December 16, 1921, concluded an agreement with Czechoslovakia) Italy (who had agreements with both

Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia), and Greece (who had an agreement with Jugoslavia, dated May 19, 1913, which was not to expire till December, 1925). It happened later on that France began to distrust the efficacy of this complicated political network in Central and South-Eastern Europe, caught, as it were, between the two fires of Germany and Russia; and therefore France, in 1924, adopted the device of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which, according to the French view, would create a general guarantee of peace and engage the prestige of the League of Nations in the guarantee, while safeguarding the *status quo* in the East of Europe. Now that the Protocol had fallen through, France in 1925 reverted to the 1919 thesis of Marshal Foch.

So far as Mr. Lloyd George was concerned he had to deal with a France which was in the first throes of reaction from Great Britain and in the first optimism of the alternative entente in the East of Europe. Between the years 1919 and 1922 there seemed only one thing lacking to complete French satisfaction. The Polish corridor was an accomplished fact. There remained the problem of detaching Silesia from Germany.

By the Treaty of Versailles, Poland was reconstructed a free and independent nation, and was also, at the expense of Germany, given access to the sea and the use of the port of Danzig. As a result of this arrangement East Prussia was completely cut off from the rest of Germany by the narrow strip of territory which is known as the Polish corridor. At the same time the city of Danzig, originally a German town-colony planted on conquered Polish territory, was declared a free city under

the protection of the League of Nations. In it special rights were granted to Poland, including the control of foreign affairs, customs, and external railway communications, and the port was placed under separate administration ensuring facilities for Polish trade and shipping. The French game was therefore going well on Germany's eastern frontier.

There remained the question of Silesia. Mr. Lloyd George became involved in a prolonged struggle with France, who wanted to detach the whole of Silesia from Germany for the obvious purpose of crippling Germany. Mr. Lloyd George was, of course, unsympathetic to such a purpose, and again began talking about 1870. The conflict came to a head at a conference held in Paris in August, 1921, when M. Briand stuck to his guns and Mr. Lloyd George to his principles, with the result that it was decided to hand over the decision to the League of Nations. That was the first occasion when the countries agreed to differ openly. The scene of the discord was the Hotel de Crillon situated, ironically, in the Place de la Concorde. In Upper Silesia, therefore, a plebiscite was held in conditions of frantic uproar and excitement. Poland, to the chagrin of France, received only forty per cent. of the votes, which made it difficult for French diplomacy to work. It worked none the less, and the League's decision was to hand over to Poland a big slice of territory containing at least eighty per cent. of the developed and eighty-five per cent. of the undeveloped mineral wealth of Silesia and large enclaves inhabited by clear German majorities.

Germany, a nation of sixty million people, was thus deprived, by the combined efforts of megalomaniac

Poland, terrified France, and a cowed League of Nations, of the mineral resources on which her national prosperity had been largely based. So far as the East of Europe was concerned, France had succeeded in surrounding Germany, cutting off her wealthy districts, dismembering her of East Prussia, and organizing on her border the armies of several small nations backed by France and trained by the French military staff.

Mr. Lloyd George none the less prosecuted his gallant fight for decency. He appeared to be genuinely persuaded that he could carry the French with him. In December, 1921, he flew the first kite for an Anglo-French-German understanding, to be achieved by means of a Western European tripartite pact – the kite which has been fashionable ever since. M. Briand came to London that month to discuss the plan, the central principle of which was to reassure France in the first place, then to win German approval, and thence to harmonize the whole of Europe. M. Briand showed himself to be so far prepared to talk about it (as he was about most things) that the arrangements for the Cannes Conference were immediately pushed forward.

Mr. Lloyd George, therefore, travelled to Cannes at the opening of 1922 and propounded his big plan for the pacification of Europe. Exactly three years before, in January, 1919, when the Peace Conference had only just started its work, a flash of inspiration made the same Lloyd George propose that the Russians should be invited to an economic conference on the Island of Prinkipo, so outlandish a rendezvous being prompted by French fastidiousness. Even so, however, French fastidiousness counted, and Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was howled

down by the French politicians on moral grounds and by the French bondholders on financial grounds – for Frenchmen were averse from having any dealings with odd people who did not pay their debts. At Cannes Mr. Lloyd George pleaded for disarmament, trade revival, and peace. He was prepared to pay for them at the price of a British pact of guarantee for French security (badly conceived and fortunately refused),* a cancellation of the French debt to Great Britain, and a British acquiescence in France's reaping of the fruits of the Rathenau-Loucheur agreement made at Wiesbaden. But the central point in Mr. Lloyd George's scheme was that which he stated in his Point Six: 'All countries should join in an undertaking to refrain from aggression against their neighbours.' M. Briand proved himself to be slightly susceptible to the personal jam with which Mr. Lloyd George gilded the pill. He was hauled back to Paris, met a stormy Chamber, resigned, and gave way for M. Poincaré. M. Briand's fall illustrated the depth of France's infatuation with her new friends in the East of Europe. The whole hypothesis of French policy was hostility to both Germany and Russia, to be effected through the new nations which were situated between the two. Mr. Lloyd George wanted to reabsorb Russia and Germany into the European system, and M. Briand had entertained the proposal, thereby committing political suicide.

There is little need to recapitulate the precise stages whereby M. Poincaré undermined the whole security of

* Mr. Lloyd George made his pact conditional on a precedent settlement of outstanding problems, thereby putting the cart before the horse. Mr. Chamberlain later benefited by that mistake.

Europe in the sacred name of security itself. It says much for the power of Mr. Lloyd George's diplomacy that he was able to hold the Genoa Conference at all after the accession of M. Poincaré to the French Prime Ministership. M. Poincaré began by writing long and clever fighting memoranda designed to postpone the Genoa Conference for three months, postponement being in M. Poincaré's opportunist eyes the same thing as abolition, or at any rate a step towards it. One remembers the brilliant success with which Mr. Lloyd George, one Saturday afternoon in February, 1922, coaxed M. Poincaré to meet him half way between Paris and London and to hold a personal conference in the house of the sub-prefect of Boulogne; how Mr. Lloyd George asked M. Poincaré point blank whether France would or would not go to Genoa, and go there on the Cannes programme; and how M. Poincaré, after three hours' debate, said yes. Genoa was saved. M. Poincaré, however, having accepted the conference on behalf of France, refused to go to Genoa himself. That was not all. M. Barthou was sent to Genoa not as a plenipotentiary, but as a marionette, the strings of which were held in M. Poincaré's hands in Paris. Genoa failed. France, helped by Germany and Russia, who turned Mr. Lloyd George into a French laughing stock by their Rapallo intrigue, defeated Mr. Lloyd George's wholly admirable purpose. But the interesting thing, from the point of view of European security, was this. At one stage in the Genoa Conference Mr. Lloyd George could have broken the Entente with France, could have carried through the Conference with Italian, German, Russian, Czechoslovak, and even Belgian support. He refused. Why? Because to bring

Germany into the European family by driving France out was simply to jump from the frying-pan into the fire. Harmony, security, and pacification were the objects, and they could not be achieved through a rupture with France any more than through continued hostility to Germany. It is the fashion to revile Mr. Lloyd George. The good he did was interred with the official bones of his Prime Ministership.

When Mr. Bonar Law became Prime Minister and attempted the same feat, he failed at the first hurdle – which was not entirely surprising, because in January, 1923, M. Poincaré was a million times more impossible than he had been twelve months before. At the short Paris Conference of January, 1923, Mr. Bonar Law, realizing that France and Germany would not mix, accepted the fact, and came home. M. Poincaré rushed into the Ruhr and the whole work of European pacification was torpedoed. In the summer of that year Lord Curzon launched into a bitter quarrel with France, and in the autumn Mr. Baldwin tried by one afternoon's work to recapture the psychological entente. He failed. Then in 1924 came Mr. MacDonald who, in more favouring circumstances than those of Mr. Lloyd George– for, among other lucky events, M. Poincaré gave way to M. Herriot – had the satisfaction of real achievement, as a result of which, for the first time since the Armistice, France, Germany, and Great Britain were brought harmoniously together. Mr. MacDonald was turned out of office before he had completed the work; but he gave Mr. Chamberlain his opportunity.

Unfortunately, Western Europe slipped back into a condition of confusion which has been analysed above.

Whether or not Mr. Chamberlain be regarded as responsible for that retrogression, no criticism can be made on the thoroughness with which he examined the resultant situation. The Government came to certain conclusions, which constituted Mr. Chamberlain's equipment when he left London for Paris and Geneva on March 6. They may be summarised as follows.

The League of Nations could not, in their view, be relied on as an effective instrument for pacifying Europe and guaranteeing her security. It had done good work as a clearing house for international disputes and in certain minor disputes had averted serious trouble; but it had not yet acquired, and probably would not for many years acquire, the authority necessary for the restraining of any Great Power which regarded its interests at stake in given circumstances. Witness the Corfu incident of the autumn of 1923. Therefore Geneva could not be expected to provide for European security, no matter what the machinery it employed. The Protocol must therefore be killed.

What was Mr. Chamberlain's alternative? Certain premises were clearly fixed. Russia was for the moment out of the picture; France had to be given sooner or later the sense of security which she lacked if her diplomacy was to become constructive; Germany might reasonably be expected sooner or later to attempt a readjustment of the settlement on her Eastern frontier by destroying the Polish corridor and reclaiming the lost portion of Upper Silesia.

The British Government examined the problem on the criterion of British interests. Two main schools of thought emerged. One was the so-called 'isolationist' school, the

other what may be called the European school. The latter argued that in present conditions, any attempt at isolation, even if it were possible, would expose Great Britain to certain dangers and could be made effective only at the price of Great Britain's influence abroad, but that in any case it is not possible, for the developments in aeronautics have, according to most military experts, reduced the Channel to a ditch. Both schools agreed in ruling out the Geneva Protocol. It was inadvisable, they thought, to commit Great Britain and the Dominions to responsibilities which would not be approved by the Dominions and which could not be accepted by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry as essential to Imperial Defence.

The Government had not as yet thought the matter out fully, but was working on the hypothesis that the first essential object was to restore confidence and security to Europe and to that end it would be best perhaps to make restricted and special commitments, as, for instance, a Western European pact, on the execution of which both France and Germany could rely. Having hit on the idea of a Western pact, the Government proceeded to examine how far it might serve the purpose of British defence, which *ex hypothesi* was the ultimate object. One argument was that it was necessary for the defence of Great Britain that no single Power should ever be in a position to occupy or to dominate all the channel and the North Sea ports, that therefore the hostility of France or Belgium in the first place and of Holland, Germany and Denmark in the second place, should be avoided; further, that no third Power at war with France or Belgium should ever be in a position either to invade French or

Belgian territories and to seize their ports, or occupy enough of those territories to serve as an air base against England. Therefore, concluded that argument, it is a requisite of English security that an understanding be reached with France and Belgium such as would make it impossible for any third Power to invade their territories.

The argument continued that, given the necessity of a guarantee for France and Belgium, such a guarantee could be made to serve the general purpose of European security. It would bring with it certain political advantages. The whole of Europe would know what to expect; the mistake of 1914, when Great Britain refrained from declaring her policy till it was too late, would be avoided, and by the same token, knowing that, if France were invaded, Great Britain would fight, Germany would be the more likely to refrain from invading France. The effect on France would be to induce her to abandon her present anti-German policy, which is due to fear of Germany ; to agree willingly to an evacuation of the Rhinelands; to stop arming the Eastern European nations; to turn her attention to financial reform and the payment of debts. The small European countries would realize that they could henceforth devote their whole energies to peaceful ends. The basis of security, thus established, could be extended, and first Germany, then Italy, then Czechoslovakia and Poland could be drawn into the guarantee pact. Then, and not till then, there would be a chance of revising by common consent some of the Versailles injustices, particularly those of the Polish corridor and the partition of Upper Silesia. The concert of Europe (with Russia excluded) would thus be

assured, French fears would be allayed and Great Britain would as an ally have an influence over France which now she lacked.

That was the position reached by the beginning of March, that is, on the eve of Mr. Chamberlain's new journey abroad. He was presumably fortified by a communication which had been made to him by the German Ambassador in London at the end of January. It was a proposal from the German Government which had been kept secret, but of which the main lines were known. It amounted to a German offer to enter into a pact with France, Belgium and Great Britain to guarantee the *status quo* in the West of Europe, it being at the same time made clear that no Western pact would be countenanced to which Germany was not a party. The offer to guarantee the Western frontiers was made conditional on a French abandonment of the objections raised at the time of Dr. Cuno's pact proposal of 1923. Those objections were that any security pact must apply equally to the Eastern and to the Western frontiers of Germany. They had been maintained by France ever since. The advance made in the German proposal of January of this year was to offer not to attempt any revision of the Polish clauses of the Treaty of Versailles by military means, but to try first a direct understanding with Poland and in case of failure to submit the dispute to peaceful arbitration, preferably to arbitration set up by the League of Nations.*

That proposal was important. It suited the British purpose admirably. The question was: would France agree?

Mr. Chamberlain left London on March 6 *en route* to

*For text of German proposal *see* Appendix One.

Paris. On the 7th he had his conversations with M. Herriot and proceeded to Geneva, where the League Council was to begin its session on the 9th. It was clear that Mr. Chamberlain's main object on the 7th was to find out from M. Herriot whether France would agree to the differentiation between the problem of Western Europe and that of Eastern Europe, a differentiation which was common ground between German and British policy. The German Ambassador had been told by M. Herriot, before Mr. Chamberlain reached Paris, that the French Government regarded the German proposal (which had been communicated to Paris, Brussels and Rome as well as to London) as a possible basis of discussion. The prospect therefore seemed hopeful.

On the eve of Mr. Chamberlain's arrival in Paris Count Skrzynski, the Polish Foreign Minister, arrived in Paris, a stormy petrel, fed on French food and demanding further sustenance. It was as well that the facts should be faced; for it was clear that Poland would have to be considered. It is a fact in diplomacy, as in everyday life, that the principle of compromise generally operates; and one of its incidental results is that the disgorging of ill-gotten gains is generally rewarded in other ways. If France had not bound up her prestige with Polish prestige, if she had not lent large sums to Poland, if she held the same view about the payment of debts owed to her as she holds about the debt she owes to Great Britain – if any of these 'ifs' were facts, then Poland would simply have to accept the verdict of justice and restore to Germany what rightly belongs to Germany. She would be a stronger Poland, if reduced to national

solidity, than she is in her present distended condition, undermined by foreign and hostile elements within, and surrounded by enemies without. But the fact of the Franco-Polish alliance made it expedient to produce some opportunist *quid pro quo* for Poland. What could it be? It is illustrative of the state of affairs in March, 1925, that some serious people began to speculate on the following lines: Would it not be possible to encompass German, French, British and Polish agreement to an arrangement whereby the Western European pact, with Germany as a partner, be extended to include Poland, on the express understanding that the present Polish-German frontiers were to be safeguarded until such time, say ten years hence, as Germany can pay a substantial compensation in cash to Poland for the return to Germany of the present Polish corridor and the present Polish part of Upper Silesia? Poland, even with her reconstructed finances, can hardly despise money. There is no more reason in equity why Germany should buy back her own territory than Lithuania should buy back Vilna: but if money will serve, is it not worth the price? Lithuania is solvent, with a currency which holds its exchange against the dollar. Germany is potentially rich. If Poland gave up the corridor, Upper Silesia and Vilna, and abandoned her unwise claims in Danzig – claims, which, as manifested in the monstrous affair of the pillar-boxes, came before the March meeting of the League Council – and if in return she were given substantial sums which could be used for internal improvements, the gain would be entirely hers. She would have gained money on the one hand, and national security on the other. The German payment might perhaps take

the form of a German payment to France of the Polish debt to France – an arrangement which might make it more generally agreeable. Moreover, at a time when Germany was capturing some British trade, there might be no objection from the British point of view to the payment of a German indemnity, direct or indirect, to Poland.

So far as the record of events goes, it only remains to be added that Mr. Chamberlain duly appeared before the Geneva Council on March 12 and made his funeral oration over the Geneva Protocol. He delivered some 4,000 words explaining why Great Britain could not accept the Protocol. His arguments cannot be summarized here, but the speech has been published in full for those who want to read it. Its importance, so far as its actual argument was concerned, was slight. So far as its effect, its simple rejection of the Protocol by Great Britain, was concerned, it was, to use Mr. Chamberlain's epithets of another occasion, 'of immense, of overwhelming importance.'

In a few sentences at the end of his statement he just glanced at the alternative to the Protocol which the British, as yet vaguely, contemplated. He said: 'His Majesty's Government conclude that the best way of dealing with the situation is, with the co-operation of the League, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs. That these arrangements should be purely defensive in character, that they should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance, is manifest. And in the opinion of His Majesty's Government these objects can best be attained

by knitting together the nations most immediately concerned, and whose differences might lead to a renewal of strife by means of treaties framed with the sole object of maintaining, as between themselves, an unbroken peace. Within its limits no quicker remedy for our present ills can easily be found, nor any surer safeguard against future calamities.'

Tactically the effect of Mr. Chamberlain's speech was bad. M. Briand and Dr. Benesh at once assumed the rôle of disappointed idealists and drove home the contrast with Great Britain's desertion from a League scheme for disarmament, arbitration, peace, etc. Mr. Chamberlain, on March 13, therefore made a supplementary statement designed to checkmate the propaganda which immediately started and of which the object was to place Great Britain in a bad light. He said that he wished to repeat the statement in which he had proclaimed the British Government's attachment to the principles of arbitration and disarmament and its keen anxiety to contribute to the peace and security of the world. He added that the British Government had rejected the Protocol only because the Covenant, in present circumstances, was the better instrument of the two for the purpose of the League, and that Great Britain wholeheartedly stood by the Covenant—a statement which certainly undermined a good deal of the anti-British propaganda.

The Council formally decided to refer back the question of the Protocol to the next meeting of the Assembly, which was the proper body to bury it. Dr. Benesh proposed and it was unanimously decided by the Council, that the Protocol should be included in the agenda of the next Assembly. There for the moment the matter rested.

Mr. Chamberlain had taken the first big step of his career as Foreign Minister. It remained for the Government's general lines of policy, as interpreted in considerable detail in the preceding pages, to be carried through to practical achievement.

The falling leaves of European diplomacy were an interesting sight to watch during the last half of March and the first half of April, but there was little satisfaction to be got from the watching. The diplomatists were perverse enough to take to their falling in the spring. Their main business since the opening of the year had been a concentrated attempt to find a basis for a pact of security such as would in the first place reassure France, in the second place Germany, and then the rest. Negotiations were proceeding, as it seemed, with some buds of promise. And then the French Government, which was essential to the negotiations, plunged into a crisis of its own, and by Easter the negotiations were at a standstill. First M. Herriot's Finance Minister, M. Clémentel, found himself in difficulties and resigned. Within a week M. Herriot himself and his whole Cabinet had resigned. The exchanges of view about a Western European Security pact were suspended. M. Theunis announced his decision to retire from politics. By all appearances still another wave of new things was coming over the face of Europe, and Mr. Chamberlain, who during the first six months of his office had met as much bad luck as his post-war predecessors in office put together, was presented by way of climax with an unpalatable Easter egg.

The seekers after security suffered indeed a set-back, which it is easier to record than it was to remedy. On his return from Geneva Mr. Chamberlain broke his journey in Paris, had further conversations with M. Herriot, reached London on March 17 and reported on his mission to the Cabinet on the following day. It was already apparent that the business of finding a

formula for security would be long and difficult. Mr. Chamberlain had based his diplomacy on the axiom that France must be satisfied first. His attitude to M. Herriot was like Mr. MacDonald's attitude to M. Poincaré in 1924, Mr. Baldwin's to M. Poincaré in 1923, Mr. Lloyd George's to M. Briand in 1922 and 1921. His initial disappointment must have been equally great. There is no firm ground on which to assess the exact nature of the Chamberlain-Herriot interview of March 16, for neither the one nor the other helped their friends to understand; but the evidence goes to indicate that their secrecy, as often, was dictated by their difficulties. It was, indeed, apparent that M. Herriot had been less enthusiastic than Mr. Chamberlain had had a right to expect about the British policy of a Western European pact.

The British Cabinet meeting of March 18, in so far as it dealt with foreign affairs, had ample ground for gloom. Mr. Churchill had had no answer, beyond a short acknowledgment from M. Clémentel, to his memorandum of February 6 on the French debt, and he was within a few weeks of his budget statement. Clearly it would be impossible to reduce income tax on the strength of any French move for funding the debt. Mr. Chamberlain was almost equally empty-handed in his report of the French reception of his security proposals.

The outlook for Franco-British relations was indeed so black that the French Ambassador in London, M. de Fleuriau, who had already earned for himself the reputation of being an enthusiastic advocate of a Franco-British Entente, decided to act. He personally interviewed Mr. Chamberlain on March 19, and Mr. Baldwin on

the following day, crossed over to Paris immediately after seeing Mr. Baldwin, spent the week-end interviewing M. Herriot and other politicians in Paris and returned to London early in the following week. His immediate purpose was to explain to the French Government certain aspects of British policy which had not been fully understood in Paris in spite of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Paris. He was understood to have urged on M. Clémentel the tactical advisability of making some gesture about the French debt and on M. Herriot the advisability of adopting a less chilling attitude to the pact proposal. M. de Fleuriau made a gallant attempt to build a bridge across the divergences of Paris and London, working on the foundation of the German offer of February 9. M. Herriot had already, some weeks earlier, informed the German Ambassador in Paris that the French Government regarded that offer as a fair basis of discussion, and M. de Fleuriau was able to interpret the favourable view which the British Government took of it, and to hint that the British Government would favour the holding of some sort of conference at which to discuss it.

As a result of M. de Fleuriau's intervention there emerged the promise of at any rate a serious examination of the German and British proposals by the French Government. The position was that Great Britain was committed by Articles 42, 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles to regard a German violation of the demilitarization of the Rhinelands as a 'hostile act' and as 'calculated to disturb the peace of the world.' Now Germany had offered to guarantee the *status quo* in the West. Great Britain was prepared to reaffirm her Treaty obligation by means of a special pact, in which it was to

be presumed the vague formula 'hostile act' would be changed to the vital formula '*casus belli*.' France wanted the pact. What then were the difficulties? At that time they appeared to be as follows:–

(1) France so far had insisted on a security pact which should safeguard the Polish-German frontier as well as the Franco-German frontier, whereas neither British nor German opinion was prepared to uphold indefinitely the integrity, either of the Polish corridor or of the Polish part of Upper Silesia.

(2) France was committed to Poland by Treaty.

(3) Germany made her proposed guarantee of the Western frontier conditional on a future arbitral revision of the Eastern frontier.

(4) Great Britain, on the whole, regarded the Eastern frontier as an ultimate danger to the peace and could not guarantee that as well as the Western frontier.

M. de Fleuriau was therefore eliciting from the British Government on one side and from the French Government on the other, their views on how to meet this dilemma. Two main lines of approach were open. The first was that a German application for membership of the League, which would be automatically accepted if made unconditionally, would at once give Germany the right to act under Article 19 of the Covenant, which stipulated that

> 'the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.'

The Covenant being an integral part of the Treaty, already signed by France, France would, of course, abide by that;

and the German and British uneasiness about the Polish clauses of the Treaty might reasonably be allayed thereby. The second line of approach was the question of a *quid pro quo* for Poland, or, in other words, the finding of a formula which would enable France to satisfy her conscience about Poland. It was clear that if League action at any future date revised the Polish clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921 would have to be modified accordingly. France could not by treaty undertake to defend frontiers which no longer existed, when she was at the same time a signatory of the treaty which made the revision. It rapidly became obvious that the main chance of success in the negotiations depended on the reconciliation of Franco-Polish relations in the East of Europe with Anglo-Franco-German relations in the West.

Clearly, therefore, no progress could be made until the exact nature of Franco-Polish relations, as then effective, were grasped. Considerable emphasis had already been laid by French opinion on the binding nature of existing French commitments to Poland, and it was protested that France could not abandon honourable obligations for the selfish purpose of safeguarding French security. The question whether such a point of view was reasonable was beside the point. The important question was: What were French commitments to Poland? There was a quite definite Franco-Polish Treaty, dated February 19, 1921, by the terms of which France was committed to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the East. The third clause, which was the crucial one, stipulated that if the two contracting parties 'or one of the two found themselves attacked without provocation on their part, the

two Governments would concert together with a view to the defence of their territory and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests, within the limits prescribed in the preamble.' Nothing could be clearer or more categoric.

The next move was made by the German Ambassador in London, who in a letter to *The Times*, published on March 23, denied that the German pact proposal contained any mention of the German-Polish frontier. The text of the German memorandum of February 9 had been kept secret, and it had been supplemented, explained, and generally elaborated, in verbal messages on various later dates. The original written memorandum did not contain the actual words German-Polish frontier, and to that extent the German Ambassador had literal justification for his admirable attempt to smooth down Polish apprehensions. Herr Stresemann, however, in an interview which he gave to the *Cologne Gazette*, confirmed the general impression that by implication the German offer did reserve the question of the Polish frontier; and Mr. Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons on March 24, made the following statement:

'The German proposals were put in a somewhat liquid shape. They have not been the subject of any precise or rigid definition. They are put forward as a possible basis for discussion, not as a thing to be taken or left. They did not come to me fully in the first instance. They came to me under circumstances of attempted secrecy which I have always admitted caused me a feeling of some suspicion, but I am convinced from what has passed since that the German Government are making a sincere and honest attempt to lead to a better state of things, and it is in the hope that we may assist to carry that effort to a fruitful conclusion that we have engaged in a serious discussion of their proposals.

I will outline the German proposals broadly as follows: Germany's interest is in the establishment of a special treaty as a foundation for the peaceful understanding with France. Germany is prepared to consider a

comprehensive arbitration treaty and to enter into a mutual pact with the Powers interested in the Rhine. Similar arbitration treaties might be concluded with other States which have common boundaries with Germany if those States desire. Further, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status on the Rhine would be acceptable to Germany, and a pact might further guarantee the fulfilment of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

I think the House will agree with the Government that it is a signal advance that such proposals should have reached us, even in a vague form, and on her own motion, from Germany. They amount, if I understand them rightly, to this: that Germany is prepared to guarantee voluntarily what hitherto she has only accepted under compulsion of the Treaty, the *status quo* in the West, that she is prepared to eliminate war not merely from the West, but from the East, as an engine by which any alteration in that treaty position is to be obtained not only in the West but in the East. She is prepared to disavow and abandon any idea of recourse to war for the purpose of changing the treaty boundaries of Europe. She may be unwilling or unable to make the same renunciation of all hopes and aspirations that some day by friendly arrangement and mutual agreement, a modification may be introduced in the East which she is prepared to make in regard to any modifications in the West.'

Mr. Lloyd George at that point inserted the observation:

'This is most important. This is the first time that we have had any official account of this significant offer. Am I to understand that Germany is prepared to accept voluntarily the boundaries in the West, that she does not demand any reconsideration or revision of those boundaries? Do I understand that she makes the same declaration with regard to the East, or is that subject to arbitration?'

'No, sir, my right hon. friend rightly understands, that is, if I rightly understood, what Germany is prepared to do in regard to the West. She is prepared to renounce all desire of change and to enter into a mutual pact to guarantee the existing situation. In suggesting arbitration in the East she does not propose or suggest that the Eastern frontiers should become the subject of such treaties or arbitration. She is prepared to say that she renounces the idea of recourse to war to change the frontiers in the East, but she is not prepared to say in regard to those frontiers that she renounces the hope of some day modifying some of their provisions by friendly negotiations, by diplomatic procedure, or, it may be, for aught I know, by the good offices of the League of Nations.'

The German Ambassador was listening to Mr. Chamberlain's speech from the gallery. He was so disturbed

by what he regarded as Mr. Chamberlain's misrepresentation of what the German proposal contemplated that he there and then went to see Mr. Chamberlain to warn him of his supposed misapprehension. It was, however, subsequently established that it was the German Ambassador himself who had not been fully instructed from Berlin about the exact implications of the German proposal, and that Mr. Chamberlain was right in every detail.

Mr. Chamberlain's statement of March 24 was a full and frank exposition of the British Government's attitude at that time, and some passages deserve to be quoted here:

'I told M. Herriot and the other Ministers that H.M. Government were not able to sign the Protocol. I had to add that whilst we appreciated all that was involved for France in the failure through American abstention of the Anglo-American pact of guarantee after what had occurred at Cannes and after what had occurred in the troublous years that followed, it was not within the power of a British Government to offer to the French Government or to the Belgian Government a one-sided pact of guarantee of their frontiers directly pointed against Germany. But I told them and I told others that we attached the highest importance to these German suggestions, that we thought they should be examined most carefully in order to see whether they did not open the door to a new and better state of things and close the door not merely on actual military operations, but on that war-like atmosphere which has endured ever since the Treaty of Versailles.

Any arrangement that we might make should be, in the words of the declaration which I read at Geneva, "purely defensive in character, that it should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League of Nations and under its guidance, if possible." It is equally obvious that our obligations could not be extended in respect of every frontier. That is the main reason why we rejected the Protocol. It was because it was a universal extension of our obligations of a most serious character.

But we thought that what we could not do in every sphere we might properly undertake and advise our people to undertake in that sphere with which we were most closely connected, while it must be made clear that in trying to underpin the Covenant and to stabilize peace in the West, we

were not licensing or legitimizing war elsewhere, and that to enter into fresh engagements of a mutual character, turning into a friendly agreement voluntarily made on both sides what was now peace imposed by the victors on the vanquished – that that must not be held to be an encouragement to those who were defeated yesterday to try to reopen conclusions in another sphere. On the contrary, I hold that by the mere fact of stabilizing peace in the West you would give an additional guarantee to the frontiers of the East, and, after all, whose interest was it to disturb these frontiers? No country has a profounder interest in stabilizing peace or in promoting good relations with her great neighbour than Poland, and no impartial person who could judge Germany's interests with a clear mind unclouded by prejudice or passion can fail to see that Germany can get no advantage and no additional security by attacking her eastern neighbour. Time and friendly adjustment, the force of economic ties and obligations, and the freedom of commercial interests should lead these two great nations to cultivate an ever growing, an ever closer friendship once they can get away from the atmosphere of yesterday and turn to what should be the attitude of the future. The essence of such an agreement is that Germany should enter the League of Nations and take her place, as she would assuredly do, in the counsels of the League on a footing of equality both of obligation and of rights. I know that Germany has raised objections to the article we discussed the other day at the Council of the League, but the real answer is that it is of the essence of the League that all nations within it are equal in rights and obligations, and that if you begin to make exceptions to the obligations you would of course at the same time make exceptions in respect of the rights of equality which lie at the root of the League, which would be paralysed and defeated.

No fruitful issue can come of it unless we can deal successfully and expeditiously with one side or the other with the remaining obligations of disarmament and the evacuation of the Cologne area. But it is not a part of the German proposals, and no condition, that the period of occupation fixed for the remaining zone by the Treaty of Versailles should be shortened or altered in any way. I venture to put to the House the choice which I believe lies before them. Ever since the peace was signed no less than whilst the war was still being waged, Europe has been ranged in two camps, divided as were the combatants in the war. Fear haunts the councils of every nation and warps the judgment of almost every Continental people. This leads to irritating acts of fresh provocation, it renews day by day the bitterness of war, and, if this is continued, sooner or later Europe will march to a new Armageddon. It may not be in my time, but unless you can get away from the atmosphere of fear and suspicion, this attitude of armed camps, then not in my time or perhaps in my children's or my grandchildren's time, Europe will be given up to a new struggle, and the generation which has to pay the penalty will judge

harshly of the statesmen of to-day who failed to take in time measures by which it might have been prevented.

Our policy, not wholly through our own fault, has been wavering and inconsistent. Our influence has lost something by our hesitation and inconsistency, but a new chance is given to us. I see in these proposals the possible dawn of a better day. . . . . Without our help nothing will be done. Without our help we shall march surely, though slowly, to a new disaster. With our help the war chapter may be brought to a close, and the real triumph of peace may begin. The British Empire, detached from Europe by its dominions, linked to Europe by these islands, can do what no other nation on the face of the earth can do, and from east and west alike there comes to me the cry—"After all, it is in the hands of the British Empire. If they will that there shall be no war, there will be no war." '

By the end of March, largely as a result of M. de Fleuriau's offices, advances had been made in two directions in the clearing of the ground. The most important was that the British Government had stated its case for accepting the basis of the German offer and for trusting Germany's good faith. The French Government had hesitated in placing its confidence in a German signature. What, however, was likely to have an effect on the French Government was the British argument that in 1914 it was the German violation of a treaty commitment which brought a united British Empire to the support of France. While, therefore, the British Government proposed to rely on the German offer as a sincere offer and on a German signature as an honourable one, the practical consideration was held out to France that, if French fears proved to be founded, and Germany at any time dishonoured her signature, there would be the more likelihood of a united Britain going to the assistance of France than if the pact of security had been signed only by France and Great Britain and not by Germany as well.

The second important advance concerned the exchanges

of view about the merits of the phrase, 'a hostile act,' in Article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, and of the phrase '*casus belli*,' which meant so much more to French opinion. By Article 44 Great Britain was committed to regard a German violation of the demilitarized Rhinelands merely as a hostile act (which might or might not mean war), whereas by the abortive Treaties of Assistance to France, signed in identical terms by Great Britain and the United States in 1919, but not ratified, those two countries would have been committed 'to come immediately to her (France's) assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.' The question, therefore, which M. de Fleuriau was understood to have put to the British Government was whether the latter would agree to the formula of the unratified Treaty of Assistance of 1919.

Prague, the home of the post-war policy of regional pacts, naturally took a keen interest in the Chamberlain initiative for a Western European regional pact. On April 1 Dr. Benesh made a long and admirable statement to the Foreign Committee of the Czechoslovak Senate, which has been republished as a pamphlet ('Orbis' Publishing Co., Praha, 1925). In it he gave a detailed survey of the efforts already made during the past six years to achieve security in Europe, and recapitulated the Czechoslovak standpoint, as explained by himself at Geneva:

'I communicated to Mr. Chamberlain the standpoint of our Government: as far as we were concerned, we considered that the Geneva Protocol was the best solution of the problem of security, but we agreed in principle to examine the German proposals and arbitration treaties as a certain advance in the universal work for peace. Previous, however, to taking any important step, we desired (*a*) to know the exact meaning of the pact in

question and of the proposed arbitration treaties. Further we wished to make it clear that (*b*) we regarded it as inadmissible for the guarantee pact to be drawn up in any way such as to encroach upon or weaken the rights guaranteed to us by the Peace Treaties, whether of Versailles, Saint Germain or Trianon; and that (*c*) we considered it necessary for the guarantee pact which is intended to inaugurate a new period of stabilized peace and peace treaties in Europe, to be supplemented by the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, which country would thus take over the mutual rights and duties arising from the signature of the Pact of the League of Nations; finally (*d*) that the pact in question would be only the first step and that it would necessarily lead under the ægis of the League of Nations to further guarantee pacts which at length might lead, just as was indicated by the German memorandum, to a guarantee pact which would be universal or at least European in scope, *i.e.*, in the long run to the principles of the Geneva Protocol. The German memorandum – if I understand it rightly – is penetrated to a much greater extent with these principles than it seems to be at first sight.'

Dr. Benesh, for all his youth, is one of the best informed, hardest-working and most consistent diplomats in Europe to-day. Czechoslovakia, the child of France and Great Britain, has performed valuable services to her parents, and has been largely concerned for their reconciliation. Owing to geographical and political circumstances, her orientation is inevitably more French than British, but the remarkable thing has been, not her dependence on France, but her independent statesmanship and courage. Dr. Benesh has much to teach us, if we would but listen.

An illuminating comment on the failure of the Western diplomatists to arrive at an understanding could be read into the important events which took place in Warsaw in April. It may be safely assumed that the initiative in the movement for a Czechoslovak-Polish *rapprochement* came from Czechoslovakia, and that its guiding mind was that of Dr. Benesh. Dr. Benesh once said to me that negative policies can never be justified in diplomacy; that, in short, it is 'better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.' It follows from the whole history of Dr. Benesh as a diplomatist that he can never lie fallow, that he would prefer to follow in the wake of an operative Franco-British Entente, but that in default of such a lead, he will invariably take a line of his own. Hence the formation and the intensive cultivation of the Little Entente, inspired primarily by the instinct of self-preservation against a possible German or a possible Hungarian menace; hence also the more recent attempt to extend the process of Central European consolidation.

On April 20 Dr. Benesh arrived in Warsaw to sign certain agreements which had just been negotiated between the two Governments. Before that time there had been no formal understanding between the two, either in their economic or in their diplomatic affairs. In 1921 Mr. Skirmunt, then Polish Foreign Minister, went to Prague to try and negotiate a 'treaty of friendship' – as the fashionable cliché runs on the Continent to-day – but the necessary friendship being too far to seek, the treaty could not be formulated. Four years passed. In 1924 Mr. MacDonald was moving the mountains; Germany, France and Great Britain were

coming together; reparations were buried as a diplomatic hatchet; Geneva drew up a Protocol, and in the drawing-up Dr. Benesh took an enthusiastic part. But we were now in 1925, not 1924. Mr. MacDonald had gone; Field-Marshal von Hindenburg had come back to refute Louis Blanc's epigram that 'none but the dead come back'; security was as insecure as ever; the Western triangle as obstinately refused to be squared as ever it refused. And Dr. Benesh turned from Geneva and the Western capitals and went instead to Warsaw. The *Central European Observer*, a Prague newspaper, on the occasion of Dr. Benesh's visit, wrote :

'There is little doubt that the general international situation has accelerated this favourable development of affairs. In Germany the idea of a reversal of the *status quo* is steadily gaining ground, and the aims of German politicians tend in the direction of the union of all Germans in one great empire. The candidature of Hindenburg, too, for the Presidency, must be regarded as a manifestation of the German desire for revenge and a growth of Pan-German nationalism.'

Whether that diagnosis was sound or not, did not matter. What mattered was that the diagnosis was made. Dr. Benesh was received in Warsaw with unrestrained acclamation, and the talk was all of Czechoslovak-Polish security. On April 21, the final session of the Conference took place in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the delegates being Dr. Benesh, Count Skrzynski and Mr. Kiedron, the Polish Minister of Commerce. The texts of the agreements were then revised, and on the following afternoon the conventions were signed. There were three of them. The first arranged for the liquidation of economic, political and minority questions arising out of the partition of the former Teschen; the second was a treaty of conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of

all future disputes between the two countries; the third a commercial treaty which dealt with trade relations, transit, communication, railway questions and the like.

The most important of the three was the treaty of conciliation and arbitration, a document of twenty-five articles and a protocol, which merely provided for a Commission of conciliation to regulate future differences. The first words of Article I stipulated that

'the high contracting parties undertake to submit to the process of conciliation or of arbitration all differences which may arise between them and which may prove insoluble by diplomatic procedure within a reasonable time limit.'

There was nothing startling in the thing itself. Its importance lay in the fact that Czechoslovakia was now linked with Poland. Dr. Benesh wrote an article in a special Polish supplement to the *Prager Presse* in which he declared

'It is the duty of both states to continue quietly and soberly the policy of co-operation. Above all it is necessary for us to know each other well. Further it is necessary to show the international public that our co-operation is guided by the idea of peace and is conducted in the name of good faith.'

The Poles were elated. Count Lasocki, Polish Minister in Prague, gave an interview to the *Echo Warszawskie* in which he went so far as to say that

'the treaties recently concluded between the two countries will form the basis of permanent friendly co-operation between the two peoples and States.'

CHAPTER SIX – THE MIST IN THE WEST

During March, April and May the big diplomacy of Western Europe was enveloped in mist. A confluence of mutually incompatible currents, some of them personal, some of them arising from domestic muddle, produced an atmosphere in which the diplomatists did not see clearly ahead. The main events of that period were the formation of a new Government in France, and the election of a new President in Germany.

In France, M. Herriot was defeated. His short period of office, starting from the uninformed mess left behind by M. Poincaré, and beset with all the difficulties of minority Government in France – where minority Governments have a rougher time than in England – none the less left behind a good record. M. Herriot held office from June 14 of 1924 till April 10 of 1925. The Labour Government in France, therefore, had a longer run by one month than the Labour Government in Great Britain. M. Herriot had five main objects in view in his foreign policy: (1) to improve Franco-German relations, the Dawes settlement of Reparations being in his view a means to that end; (2) to enforce a measure of German disarmament such as might enable him to carry the French people with him in handing over the future supervision of German armaments to the League of Nations; (3) to achieve French security through some general arrangement made by the League of Nations; (4) to strengthen and enlarge the competence of the League; (5) to resume, with certain reservations and under certain conditions, normal relations with Russia.

How far did he succeed in attaining his object? The problem of reparations was certainly transferred from the domain of diplomacy to that of finance and book-

keeping; and the 'sacrifice' by which all sections of French opinion alleged that he had had to make to achieve that end, more especially the undertaking to evacuate the Ruhr in August of 1925, were admitted by general French opinion, except that of the extreme Right, as being inevitable; inevitable, that is, after France had missed what was regarded in Paris as the opportunity of a Reparation settlement in the autumn of 1923, after the Dawes and McKenna experts had done their work, and the United States had been involved.

On the other hand M. Herriot was given his share of credit in France for the spirit of international goodwill which was created by the London Reparations Conference of August, 1924, and which enabled him to advocate successfully the Geneva Protocol at the League Assembly in the following month. But Mr. MacDonald fell, and the Protocol received the support neither of British nor of German opinion. As seen from Paris, the failure of the MacDonald régime and the substitution of the Baldwin and Chamberlain régime simply constituted a reassertion of 'British egoism' which made it impossible for Great Britain to accept any obligations abroad. M. Herriot's altruistic idealism was generally contrasted in France with British realism, which first threw out Mr. MacDonald and the Geneva Protocol, and then made it impossible for Mr. Chamberlain to carry through a three-power unilateral pact.

It is the business of diplomatists and of those who study foreign affairs to try and understand dispassionately the point of view of other countries. M. Herriot in the French view was baulked on the one side by British egoism, on the other side by Germany's suspiciousness and

unfriendliness, which were expressed in her alleged refusal to execute her obligations, and thus led to the Cologne affair. On still another side, according to the same view, he was baulked by Russia; for his sending of an ambassador to Moscow failed to elicit from Russia any sympathetic response. The French Right never gave to M. Herriot the support which for instance the British Right gave to Mr. MacDonald; a fact which perhaps illustrates not only the differing political traditions of the two countries but also the comparative mildness and moderation of what corresponds to the 'Right' in Great Britain. The French Right was out for M. Herriot's political blood from the beginning of his Prime Ministership. After the August Conference, when he accepted the evacuation of the Ruhr by France, even with a twelve months' stay of execution, the Poincaréists launched a sustained offensive against him. Apart from them, however, Frenchmen had the good sense and the critical judgment to regard M. Herriot's foreign policy as a partial success. In so far as, in their view, he failed, they regarded him as a glorious failure, because his policy had depended on the goodwill and co-operation of Germany and Great Britain, both of whom refused to follow the gleam. There is another aspect to that story, but such was the moderate French view. British opinion mostly respected M. Herriot, not only because he stood for a French revolt against M. Poincaré, but because he took a European as well as a French view of affairs.

M. Herriot resigned on April 10. Six days later, after some interesting feats of personal reconciliation had been performed, M. Painlevé succeeded in forming a Govern-

ment, of which he himself as Prime Minister, M. Briand as Foreign Minister, and M. Caillaux as Finance Minister monopolized the interest of foreign observers. It certainly was as interesting and as dramatic a trio as we have seen since the War: M. Painlevé, a mathematician and scientist; M. Caillaux, a 'traitor;' M. Briand, an ex-Prime Minister and vagabond.

The most interesting of the three was undoubtedly M. Briand, who is likewise one of the most interesting personalities in Europe. In repose, he looks like a tired tramp, with his unending *cigarette jaune* hanging from his lips. The moment he speaks, his whole temper seems to be transformed, and he becomes an agile and animated orator, and a skilled debater, with a genius for diplomatic rapier-work. At conferences he was match for Mr. Lloyd George in the kind of finesse, *flair*, knack, readiness of repartee for which Mr. Lloyd George was justly famous throughout Europe. He has a better title to the rôle of vagabond than that of his dejected appearance. Was it not soon after giving up the Prime Ministership of France in 1922 that, in the course of his daily life as a private citizen, he wandered about unshaven and alone except for the company of his *cigarettes jaunes*, in a lonely wood in his native Brittany; was arrested by the gendarmes of a small village as a vagrant, and being unable to produce his papers, was detained at the police station for a night pending documentary identification; and, when identified, justified, apologized to and released the next morning, took his captors for a drink at the village café?

He is imperturbable, except under the influence of his own oratory. His famous golf match at Cannes, which I happened to witness, was typical of his humour.

Mr. Lloyd George being a golfer, it was a natural part of the day's work on January 4 (or thereabouts), 1922, that what was virtually a meeting of the conference was held on the terrace of the golf club-house during luncheon. Philippe Millet and myself were having luncheon at the next table, having played a round in the morning. Mr. Lloyd George, in the middle of conference talk and luncheon, gaily challenged M. Briand to a match at 'the golf;' and M. Briand, who had never handled a golf-club in his life, equally gaily, but with his deceptive air of unruffled dejection, accepted. The match started at once after luncheon. M. Briand was matched with Sir Edward Grigg against Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Riddell. M. Briand took the honour and did good 'business'; started with a left-hand grip for a right-hand-stance; was corrected by Mr. Lloyd George; stopped at the top of his swing with the remark '*J'hésite*,' and generally behaved in such a way as to scandalize the normal gravity of his countrymen.

President Ebert died on February 28. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg was elected to succeed him, as a result of two elections. The first was held on March 29, when the figures were indecisive, no candidate securing a clear majority. The figures were:–

Dr. Jarres (Nationalist)	10,387,000
Dr. Braun (Socialist)	7,785,000
Dr. Marx (Centre)	3,883,000
Herr Thaelmann (Communist) ..	1,869,000
Dr. Hellpach (Democrat)	1,565,000
Dr. Held (Bavarian People's Party)..	1,284,000
General Ludendorf (Bavarian Fascists)	211,000
Others	30,000

A second election, therefore, had to be held, an absolute majority in this case being enough for election. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, after a close struggle with Dr. Marx, was returned with nearly a million majority. The three million additional electors who voted on the second occasion (April 26) swelled the Nationalist vote. The figures were:–

Hindenburg (Nationalist)	.. ..	14,639,395
Marx (Republican)	.. ..	13,752,642
Thaelmann (Communist)	.. ..	1,931,951

The new President ceremonially entered Berlin on May 11 to the accompaniment of ritualistic, and, in two senses, appropriate goose steps. Yet it could hardly surprise those who had been watching events in Germany that she should behave like a goose at that particular time. She is normally deficient in political sense. The striking exception recorded when she made her admirable pact proposals early this year was clumsily repelled by the Allied decision not to evacuate Cologne – a decision for which Mr. Chamberlain and the British Cabinet must bear their full share of responsibility. It was known in February and March that German opinion was more restive, as a result of Allied provocation, than it had been since the Armistice; and it was clearly unnecessary to seek an explanation of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg's election in the adoration of German females for uniforms. Women are realists, even if they are not pacifists, and their reactions are mathematical in their precision, even if instinctive in origin.

President Hindenburg was a fact to be dealt with. His exact official scope was of less importance than the psychology of his election. Yet it is worth noting how

exactly his position differs from that of the Kaiser in the old days. It happens that an examination of this question has lately been made. In the summer of 1924, as a result of a question put to the Government in the House of Commons, Mr. Ponsonby undertook to circularize all our diplomatic representatives abroad to ask for a revised analysis of the methods adopted for dealing with international questions in the Parliaments of the respective countries in which they were stationed. The answers of our representatives abroad have since been published in a White Paper (Cmd. 2282. Miscellaneous No. 19 (1924).) I quote the relevant passages in Lord D'Abernon's dispatch, dated Berlin, August 18, 1924:—

'The report on the treatment of international affairs in Germany furnished by Earl Granville on the 29th December, 1911, is completely out-of-date in consequence of the German revolution and the adoption of the new Weimar Constitution.

Since the passage into force of the Weimar Constitution promulgated on the 11th August, 1919, sovereign powers are vested by the German people in the Reichstag and the President of the Reich elected by universal suffrage. The President in turn appoints the Government, that is to say, the Chancellor and Ministers of the Reich, who must enjoy the confidence of the Reichstag during the exercise of their functions.

. . . . The President of the Reich is vested with the usual formal prerogatives which belong to the constitutional head of a State with Parliamentary Government, but the declaration of war and conclusion of peace are effected by legislation in the Reichstag. He has the right to form the Government as well as to exercise supreme command over the armed forces. He exercises certain rights of control *vis-à-vis* the Reichstag by virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. He does not possess the right of veto on legislation. . . . .

Legislation dealing with foreign relations is, according to Article 6 of the Constitution, the exclusive prerogative of the Reich. Similarly, Article 78 ordains that the care and conduct of relations between the Reich and foreign States lies exclusively in the hands of the Reich.

. . . . Article 45 states that the President represents the Reich in international law. He accredits and receives diplomatic representatives. He concludes alliances and treaties with foreign States in the name of the Reich. His authority is limited in the sense that declarations of war or

peace require legislation on the part of the Reichstag; similarly treaties involving legislation for their fulfilment require the assent of the Reichstag. His ordinances require for their validity the counter-signature of the Chancellor or of the competent Minister of the Reich. The practical conduct of foreign affairs lies of course in the hands of the Foreign Minister who controls the Executive and is directly responsible to the Reichstag. The Government are collectively entitled and obliged to lay down the general lines of foreign policy.'

The position of the President to-day is, therefore, vitally different from the position of the Kaiser under the old Constitution. Article 11 of the old Constitution made the conduct of the entire foreign policy of the Reich the direct and exclusive prerogative of the Kaiser, whose executive organ was the Chancellor of the Reich. With the exception that the declaration of war, the conclusion of peace, and the conclusion of treaties needed the consent of the Federal Council or Bundesrat, the Kaiser was completely independent in his conduct of German Foreign policy. The President of the Republic now replaces the Kaiser, but his influence and power are incomparably smaller, for the practical conduct of foreign policy now rests with the Foreign Minister, and by Article 54 of the Weimar Constitution the Reichstag has the power of dismissing the Foreign Minister.

By the middle of May there were indications of a resumption of activity on the part of the German, French and British diplomatists. The two immediate subjects to be dealt with were first the sending of an Allied communication to Germany to inform her of the detailed reasons why four months earlier the Allies had refused to evacuate Cologne; in what respects Germany had failed to carry out the disarmament clauses of the Treaty; what precise measures Germany would have to take before she could be regarded as having fulfilled her obligations in this respect and, therefore, before Cologne could be evacuated: and second, the French answer to the German pact proposals.

As for Cologne, Mr. Chamberlain frankly explained in the House of Commons on May 6 that one of the reasons for the Allied delay in sending the Note to Berlin was that at the last meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference the British representative had not received his instructions from London. Even while Mr. Chamberlain was speaking, those belated instructions were on their way to Paris, and Lord Crewe circulated them, in the form of a memorandum, to his colleagues, to save time when the Ambassadors held their next meeting. Mr. Chamberlain's frankness was a little unfair on himself. The real reason for the delay more probably was that, in spite of the technical British view that the questions of Cologne and disarmament on the one hand, and of the security pact on the other, were separate, they were in practical diplomacy interdependent. Mr. Chamberlain's real excuse for his own contribution to Allied delay in dealing with the question of Cologne was the sound one that the whole problem was in the last resort that of security and friendliness between the three

big nations of Western Europe, and that if the major problem of the pact could be settled, the minor problem of the evacuation of Cologne would automatically disappear.

None the less, presumably for obvious tactical reasons, the British Government instructed Lord Crewe to refuse to link up the evacuation of Cologne either with the French evacuation of the Ruhr or with the pact. The British Government illogically – but Mr. Chamberlain has in more than one of his public and Parliamentary speeches argued the case against logic as a political instrument – maintained that the evacuation of Cologne was a matter arising directly out of the Treaty of Versailles, and one to be dealt with strictly on the basis of the Treaty, whereas the question of the pact was outside the Treaty: in other words that Cologne must be evacuated as soon as Germany had carried out the Treaty. Every baby, however, knows that formal distinctions of such a kind are empty of practical meaning. French opinion, for instance, began to prophecy that the German defaults, especially those requiring German legislation for their acquittance, were such that they could not be made good before the League Assembly met in the autumn; that, therefore, Germany, not having carried out the Treaty, could not be admitted to the League till the autumn of 1926; that the pact proposals, which presupposed German membership of the League, could not take a practical turn till 1926. That estimate, however, was regarded as unnecessarily pessimistic on this side, the British Government clinging to the hope that Germany could satisfy the Allies about disarmament, and that Cologne could be evacuated before the League Assembly met in the autumn.

CHAPTER EIGHT–THE BENEFICENT WHITSUNTIDE

The block was loosened at Whitsuntide. It needed a holiday season and a heat-wave to induce the diplomatists to move. The longer half of May was taken up with a competitive game of time-killing by the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay. Then suddenly, during the hot Whitsuntide week-end, there began a series of events than which we had seen none more interesting or important since Mr. MacDonald's hey-day.

When M. Herriot resigned from the French Prime Ministership on April 10 he left behind a draft French answer to the German security pact proposals. M. Briand was hardly satisfied with the Herriot draft, as few successors in office are satisfied with the work of their predecessors, and, therefore, set about re-writing it. In the meantime, the Ambassadors' Conference continued the congenial business of postponing its business. M. Briand in time finished his draft, sent it on May 14 to London, where it was received by the Foreign Office on the following day. That procedure is explained by the fact that the German proposals had been made separately in the four Allied capitals. While Mr. Chamberlain was content to make a statement in the House of Commons on March 24 accepting the German basis for negotiation, M. Herriot, and, after him, M. Briand, chose to answer Berlin separately in writing. That was a proper course for France to take in view of the method by which the German proposals had been made. True, however, to the usual French principle of creating a unified Allied front – a principle which on the face of things was inconsistent with the sending of a separate French answer to Berlin – M. Briand obtained the consent of

the British Government to read the French draft before it was sent to Berlin.

The draft came before the British Cabinet on May 20, and the British Cabinet at once found itself in a pickle, as, indeed, if Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain had thought about it, might have been foreseen. The Briand draft stated the maximum French case with an insouciance that took the Cabinet by surprise; that is to say, it proposed to accept the German proposal for a Western European pact on condition that the proposal was turned into something wholly different, namely into a new kind of Geneva Protocol guaranteeing all the Treaty frontiers of Germany, including those in the East, with the sanction of the entire military, naval and air strength of the British Empire. It was understood that even Mr. Chamberlain's breath was taken away by the reading of that document. Now the British Cabinet had agreed to read it before it went to Berlin; the whole world would know that the British Cabinet had read it; and the draft was ambiguously worded to suggest that, although in form it was a French Note, in content it was an Allied Note.

What, therefore, was to be done? Clearly, in the first place, the Ambassadors' Conference must be again postponed, and it was postponed; and secondly, M. Briand must be invited to 'elucidate' some of the more startlingly clear points in his draft, and the elucidations were therefore asked for. Thereby a week's time was gained, during which the British Cabinet brooded, and the French Government, whose diplomatic staying power is well known, unconcernedly drew up the 'elucidations' asked for by London.

On May 28 the Cabinet met and considered the 'elucidations,' euphemistically so-called, and decided that the beating about the bush had now been overworked as a diplomatic device. The Cabinet, therefore, took its courage in both hands and sent a renewed statement of British policy to Paris of so categoric a quality that M. Briand understood it. That 'elucidation,' more correctly so-called, was the healthiest thing that had happened so far during 1925. Four months had elapsed since Germany proposed the pact. The prosposal had meant one thing to its author and to the British Government, and a wholly different thing to the French Government. It is only fair to M. Briand's reputation for elasticity and common sense to recognize that his intransigence on this occasion – a trait which had been alien to him up to January, 1922 – was due to his belief, whether well or badly founded, that Mr. Chamberlain, and through him the British Government, could be relied on to dance, if not to an all-French programme, at any rate to an all-French orchestra. That belief died hard in France, but was given the *coup de grâce* by the British Cabinet's action on May 28.

M. Briand, on receiving the British communication, quickly recovered his form as an agile diplomatist, and acted in a manner wholly worthy of his reputation. The British communication this time had taken the form of 'suggestions' to the French Government. Stripped of their sugar, they amounted to one single suggestion, namely that the French Government should, in its answer to Berlin, accept the offer that had been made by Germany and supported by Great Britain, rather than an offer that had neither been made by the one nor could

be supported by the other. To the probable surprise of Mr. Chamberlain, and to the open-eyed interest of the British public, the whole French Press broke out into an enthusiastic chorus of welcome to the British suggestions. What had happened was that M. Briand had invited representatives of the entire French Press to meet him confidentially, and he explained to them the nature of the situation. He explained that the British Government, with no matter what Foreign Secretary, would never agree to any commitment which would enmesh Great Britain in the complicated series of treaties now in force between France, Poland and the Little Entente countries; that France, therefore, had to choose on the one hand, between a peace pact which would guarantee the Franco-German and the Belgian-German frontiers, and on the other hand a French lone-hand policy supported, for what the support might be worth, by military allies in Central Europe; that if France refused the exclusively Western pact, as offered, she would be exposed to the whole world as the power responsible for the failure of the pact, French Diplomacy would suffer badly in prestige, and the catchword about French militarism would be given a new lease of life abroad; the franc would suffer from the loss of British and American support, and France would be bereft of friends in face of the increasingly difficult and dangerous situation in Morocco; that, finally, the French Government in view of these considerations, had decided to fall in with the British suggestions, and to agree to the divorce of the East from the West as a basis of negotiation. He appealed to the French Press for its support in a national emergency.

The French Press always rises to an appeal made on

patriotic grounds, especially if made by the charming personality of M. Briand, and the world was informed from Paris that France and Great Britain were in perfect accord. That happened during the Whitsuntide week-end, and constituted the most important event since the German proposals were made. The French Government was no doubt helped towards its decision by the knowledge that the Belgian Government was unreservedly in favour of the pact, Belgium having no interest in Eastern alliances, but having a lively interest in a guarantee of her frontiers against a repetition of what had happened in 1914.

It was not an accident that the Ambassadors' Conference that same week-end decided to send the long-delayed Allied Note to Berlin about disarmament and Cologne; for it was an open secret that the only reason why the Allies had delayed for four-and-a-half months to explain to the German Government the detailed reasons why Cologne had not been evacuated on January 10 was that there was no prospect of agreement between the French and British Governments about the security pact, and the question of Cologne was in its essence a minor aspect of the general problem of security.

The first seven days of June were as full of important events as any seven consecutive days since the War. In addition to the French acceptance of the British suggestions, and the sending to Berlin of the Allied Disarmament Note (June 4) there was the departure of Mr. Chamberlain for Geneva (June 6), and his meeting there with M. Briand (June 7) at which the final form of the French Note to Berlin was agreed to.* In the

* For full details of official exchanges, *see* Appendix One.

eyes of the public on both sides of the Channel there was a confusion commensurate with the pace at which events were moving. Diplomatic history has a habit of repeating itself. After the first chorus of French agreement with Great Britain there came a second chorus, of which the burden was that the agreement had been reached on French terms. On June 1 it began to be given out semi-officially in Paris that the British memorandum of suggestions (May 28) had conceded the principle that the demilitarized Rhine zone prescribed in Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles and destined to form the basis of the security pact should be unilateral ; that was to say, that while acting as an absolute barrier against any German invasion of France, it should be subject to conditions which would allow France to cross Germany in case of trouble on the Eastern borders. An outcry arose in Great Britain, and the British diplomatists were silent, thinking to help M. Briand by their silence. Of course the British memorandum had said nothing of the kind. The British Government never went beyond the statement of the general principles, namely, that the German offer of a bilateral pact, applicable against either France or Germany, whichever became the aggressor, and confined to the Franco-German and Belgian-German Frontiers, should be accepted, and that the details should be worked out in collaboration with German representatives.

Yet the misunderstanding was not entirely due to the exigencies of party politics in Paris, that is, to the need of silencing the Poincaréists. It was at the same time due to some interpretative work on the part of French thinkers. British official circles succeeded in discouraging the

detailed discussion of general principles so far as the British Press was concerned, but who shall keep Frenchmen from details? A principle means nothing to a Frenchman except as translated into terms of what would happen in a given contingency. The question had presumably been asked of London whether a French acceptance of the British suggestions would make it impossible for France to carry out her treaty obligations to Poland, and the answer naturally was 'of course not.' French opinion interpreted that assurance in its own way and argued that, if France could still honour her treaty obligations to Poland, then France would of course be allowed to cross the Rhine zone without waiting for League of Nations sanction. French deductive reasoning, however, took a false course from sound premises, and therein neatly illustrated Mr. Chamberlain's recently expounded hypothesis that logic is an unreliable guide in political philosophy. What had been implied of course from the British side was that there was no reason why French commitments to Poland should not be merged in the general commitments of the signatories of the League Covenant. The way in which the merging would be effected was naturally a subject for future discussion, but to those who are in the habit of thinking about these things there were two obvious lines of argument:

(1) That Poland is a member of the League, and therefore if she be attacked by either Germany or Russia, whether Germany or Russia be members of the League or not, Article 10 of the Covenant would automatically become operative: 'The members of the League' (it runs) 'undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing

political independence of all members of the League.' The Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921 did no more than particularize a general and already-existent obligation.

(2) That the particular French commitment is to guarantee the Polish frontiers. Now those frontiers were created by the Treaty of Versailles; if they were modified by that same Treaty – that is, through the operation of Article 19 of the Covenant, which is likewise Article 19 of the Treaty – both Poland and France would be part instruments in the modification, and clearly no issue could thereby arise on the score of the Franco-Polish Treaty.

There was some pleasant irony in the fact that the supporters of the pact could make the same argument to reassure British disquiet about the pact as to reassure French disquiet about the Polish commitment. The obvious argument for France was that the Polish Treaty merely particularized the existing obligations of the Treaty. The argument for Great Britain was that the pact would merely particularize the general Covenant obligation and would moreover emend the obligation of Article 44 of the Treaty in a sense favourable to British opinion. This aspect of the case is perhaps worth looking at more closely. The British Government, and indeed the whole British Empire, is committed by the Covenant to defend the existing frontiers in Europe, subject to the modificatory potentiality of Article 19; and by Article 44 of the Treaty is committed to defend, unilaterally against German aggression, the demilitarized zone prescribed in Articles 42 and 43. It is true that the wording of Article 44 of the Treaty is that a violation of the demilitarized zone is to be considered 'a hostile act,' but I believe the international jurists regard that

formula as much more serious than 'an unfriendly act' and as practically equivalent to *casus belli*. Now the proposed pact, in the British view would (1) be concluded under the aegis of the League; (2) merely reaffirm the commitment of Article 10 of the Covenant (which safeguards the frontiers); but (3) would transform the unilateral obligation of Article 44 of the Treaty into a reciprocal obligation, whereby the British Government would defend Germany against a French crossing of the zone as much as France against a German crossing.

Mr. Chamberlain left London for Geneva on June 6, met M. Briand there on the following day, and without further ado they agreed on the final text of the French Note for Berlin. The chorus thereupon broke out again in the French Press, to the effect that Mr. Chamberlain had mortgaged the British Army, Navy, and Air Force for the help of France against Germany. On the contrary, M. Briand had agreed to the vague British formula. There were, indeed, many interests to induce France to accept. France was offered by Germany and by Great Britain a guarantee of her frontiers with Germany. That was all in France's favour, and important sections of British opinion doubted its wisdom from the British point of view. Next the franc was in difficulties, and it was a material consideration in Paris not to create the impression in London and in New York that French policy was the stumbling-block. Then there was the increasing danger in Morocco, where France would be loth to find herself bereft of the moral support of friendly nations. Finally, there was the consideration that Germany offered no danger to France as a friend, but would be a formidable enemy. M. Briand therefore used his

well-known common sense when he plunged in favour of a French acceptance. While distorted accounts of the Briand-Chamberlain agreement came to London from Geneva and Paris – distorted with the usual French distortion – official quarters in London refused for twenty-four hours to correct the mistakes.

Contact with British official quarters is one of the best safeguards against cynicism. Those quarters are as charmingly green in matters of this kind as they were five years ago, and probably as they were fifty years ago. The number of times British diplomats have agreed on a mutual pact of secrecy with foreign diplomats who could as soon jump the moon as keep a secret is unbelievable. It happens every time with the old freshness, it is followed every time by the same result – leakage abroad, uncomfortable silence at home; and it happens again the next time. After the whole world, therefore, had been informed that at the last moment Mr. Chamberlain had agreed with M. Briand that the pact should be unilateral in France's favour, and London had not denied it, out of a tender solicitude for M. Briand's domestic worries, British opinion became restive. The British diplomats had forgotten British opinion, and Mr. Baldwin, therefore, on June 10, had to make a statement in the House of Commons denying that any commitment of the kind had been made. In fairness to the British Government it must be remembered that the problem of bringing France and Germany to the same point at the same time was a six years' old problem, whereas the ultimate reasonableness of British opinion may with historical justification be counted on.

The initiative now shifted to Berlin. It depended on

Berlin to counter the powerful Poincaréist forces in Paris which looked for German 'gaffe' to stultify the negotiations and thus to focus the responsibility on Germany. British diplomats therefore became anxious that the German Government should lose no time in making a strong demonstration of its determination to carry out the disarmament demands of the Allies, to seek admission to the League of Nations, to continue the loyal execution of the Dawes Plan, and generally to leave the would-be wreckers with no handle at their disposal. What the wreckers particularly counted on was the chance of making out a case against Germany on the score of non-fulfilment of the disarmament demands so as to thwart Germany's entry into the League this autumn, and thus to postpone the whole question of the pact for twelve months. That was the main reason why students of diplomacy regarded the Allied disarmament Note as a tactical blunder.

In advance of detailed negotiations between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and possibly Italy, all that the British Government had undertaken was to discuss the German proposal for a mutual Western European pact. British official quarters, however, were not blind to the nature of French commitments to Poland and to Czechoslovakia, and while regarding the Covenant of the League as a full and sufficient instrument for the carrying out of those commitments, could hardly regard it as a perfect instrument. There was, for instance, the nightmare of Article 15 of the Covenant:

'If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the reports of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.'

What would happen in case of a German-Polish war in which the League Council failed to establish the aggressor? That was, perhaps, as seen ahead, the weakest point in the projected pact; but by the time Europe reaches such an impasse, no League, no pact will be worth the ink it was printed with, and we may as well dismiss the nightmare.

One question that will have to be answered is how the pact will affect Dominion opinion. Before knowing the details of the proposed pact, Dominion opinion without exception was vaguely unsympathetic to the principle of it. Could Great Britain incur a limited liability, not shared by the Dominions? Could a pact be left open for voluntary adherence by the Dominions, on the model of the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty of December, 1924? Or must Dominion approval and Dominion participation be fully obtained in advance? Those were questions whose solution would, by the establishment of a precedent, affect the British Empire for all future time. It is true that the Dominions signed the Treaty of Versailles as separate signatories, but they signed the same Treaty. It may be pointed out that the Dominions are already committed by Article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, and that the proposed pact is merely a reaffirmation, on better terms, of the obligation: but it might equally be argued that the Geneva Protocol was merely a reaffirmation and elaboration of the 1919 Covenant, and the Empire as a whole was none the less against it. One of the interesting and important aspects of the pact is bound to be its effect on the relations of Great Britain with the Empire.

CHAPTER NINE–THE ALLIED DISARMAMENT NOTE

THERE was published on June 6 in the form of a British White Paper (Germany No. 2 [1925] Command 2429), and in the Allied and German capitals in corresponding forms, the text of the Allied communication to Berlin about Germany's failure to carry out fully the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the resultant Allied refusal to evacuate Cologne. The document consisted of the Allied Note and four annexes concerned with the details of Germany's defaults, in all an exceedingly bulky volume as heavy in stupidity as in matter. The only hope of minimizing its clumsiness lay in Berlin. If the German Government could avoid being 'drawn,' could make a single-eyed effort to carry out the demands made, and at the same time hold fast to their own pacific proposals of February 9, all might still be well. It was, however, deplorable that such a document should be shot at Berlin at a time when the supreme business of European diplomacy was to get on with the security pact. The French Poincaréists hardly concealed their glee; and the British imprimatur was a puzzle. The most surprising thing in it was that it did, after all one had been led to understand to the contrary, include the report of the minute investigations of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, which had been spread over many years.

British diplomacy, it is fair to record, had fought against presenting this report to Berlin, and it was a British touch which was evident in those passages of the document which separated the most serious defaults from the full list, and which informed the German Government that Cologne would be evacuated as soon

as the selected list of defaults had been seen to by Germany. Even Part 3, however, in which the selected list was given and the detailed demands formulated, was long and serious enough. It involved legislation on the part of the German Government, the text of which was to be approved by the Allied Military Commission of Control, and of which the Commission was to supervise the execution. It was already June, and one could understand the calculation of those European wreckers who first helped to postpone the sending of the Note for five months and then hoped that Germany would not be able to carry out the demands before the League Assembly met in the autumn. If the delay was astonishing, the particular time finally chosen for the event was still more astonishing. There was no reference in the Note to Germany's admirable peace initiative of February; the style of the Note was lacking in grace, and missed, as if deliberately, the opportunity of assuring Germany that the Allies wanted peace. It was in short a severe test for German pacifism and goodwill, and a criticism on the Allied diplomatists. Common sense ought to have counselled them not to throw bombs in the middle of pacific discussions about peace pacts. The irony was that only Germany, by showing superior sense, could now save them from their provocative folly. On the other hand, just as British diplomacy had attempted to humanize the document in the collective making of it, so now British diplomacy was at pains to make it understood in Berlin that, although Cologne could not be evacuated before the demands were fulfilled, there was no reason why Germany should not join the League in the autumn of 1925, even if by September the demands had not been fully met,

provided only that Germany had in the meantime shown goodwill and a reasonable measure of accomplishment in the execution.

The annexes to the Note may be thus summarized: Part 1 takes the military clauses one by one and states how far each clause has been complied with. Part 2 gives a list of 13 points under the military clauses upon which satisfaction has not yet been given. The points are as follows:

I. Organization of the police. II. Factories, depots and workshops. Certain destructions, dispersions and transformations still required. III. Delivery of certain surplus war material. IV. Organization of the German Army as laid down by the Treaty. V. Regulation of recruiting and military training. VI. Import and export of war material. VII. Possession of, traffic in, and illicit manufacture of war material. VIII. Forbidden zones. IX. War requisitions. X. Kōnigsberg Fortress. XI. Fortifications and coast defences. XII. Plans necessary to enable accurate files to be made up with regard to statistical returns respecting fortifications. XIII. Delivery of documents relative to existing stocks of war material and the production of German factories during the War and after the armistice.

Part 3 contains a detailed list of the measures which must be taken by Germany before the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles can be held to have been satisfactorily fulfilled. It is drawn up in two columns, one showing the present situation, the other the points which must be rectified.

I. Police. (Article 162 of the Treaty and the Boulogne Note of June, 1920). The Police must remain a State

and municipal organization. Its effectives, which are now about 180,000 must be reduced to the 150,000 authorized by the Boulogne Note of 1920. The military character presented to-day by the Schutzpolitzei must entirely disappear.

II. Factories, depots and workshops.– (Articles 168 and 169 of the Treaty). Detailed lists are given of the factories, etc., where rectifications are required, and the Control Commission is generally left to indicate what precise measures must be taken. The lists are divided into the following categories : (*a*) Private factories other than authorized factories. (*b*) Former State factories. (*c*) Authorized factories (The most important are Krupps, the Rheinmetall at Düsseldorf, the Dortmunder union and the W.A.S.A.G. at Reinsdorf). (*d*) Military establishments. (*e*) Military workshops with units. (*f*) Police workshops.

III. Delivery of surplus War material.– (Articles 167, 168, and 169 of the Treaty.) All existing material in excess of the scales laid down by the Control Commission must be surrendered, *e.g.*, spare parts for small arms, minenwerfer, machine guns, etc., blank cartridges.

IV. Organization of the German Army in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Treaty.– (Articles 160, 161, 176, 178, 198 and 199 of the Treaty.) The Treaty lays down that the German Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and the control of the frontiers. Consequently (*a*) The High Command. The German decree of August 11, 1920 (which is still in force) had the effect of conferring the powers of a Commander-in-Chief upon the head of the Army directorate and of grouping the

administrative services in a special organization (*Heeresverwaltung*) under a Secretary of State directly responsible to the Minister for War. This has created an organ of executive command (in fact a Commander-in-Chief with a Great General Staff) contrary to Article 160 of the Treaty. The decree must, therefore, be abolished and fresh measures promulgated in its place after the approval of the Commission of Control. (*b*) General Staff. The Heeresleitung includes an organization in many ways similar to the pre-War Great General Staff. This must be suppressed and the necessary measures after approval by the Commission of Control promulgated and put into force. (*c*) Military organization of the railway system. The military organization of the railway system to-day is constituted with a view to mobilization on much the same lines as in 1914. In fact the number of closed trucks prepared for military use is actually greater than in 1914, roughly 200,000 as against 160,000. This must be rectified and the organization made to conform with the Treaty which forbids all measures of mobilization. (*d*) Arms and effectives. It has been proved that divisional staffs include in addition to their regular strength attached officers from units, and that supplementary cadres exist in units. This must be stopped by decree. So also must the co-operation of aeroplanes with the Army. (*e*) Services. The administrative personnel must be reduced to the authorized numbers. Reserve rations for the Reichswehr must be reduced to the scales laid down by the Control Commission. (*f*) Coast artillery school at Wilhelmshaven. This will be authorized provided that all Army personnel are excluded from it.

V. Recruiting and military training.–(Articles 173,

174, 177, and 178 of the Treaty.) The following must be suppressed by legislation: (*a*) Short term enlistment with the Reichswehr. (*b*) The preparation of reserve cadres. (*c*) The military activities of associations.

VI. Import and export of War material.–(Articles 170 and 192 of the Treaty.) The German Government and the Control Commission are already in negotiation for the settlement of this question.

VII. Possession of, traffic in, and illicit manufacture of War material.– (Articles 168 and 169 of the Treaty.) Legislation must be brought into harmony with the Treaty and put into force.

VIII. Forbidden zones.– (Articles 115, 178, 180 and 195.) Legislation must be promulgated and put into force for the suppression of all forbidden zones.

IX. War requisitions.– (Article 178 of the Treaty.) Legislation must be brought into harmony with the Treaty and put into force.

X. Kōnigsberg Fortress.– (Articles 167, 169 and 196.) All the guns must be placed on fixed mountings, and their excess spare parts delivered or destroyed.

XI. Fortifications and coast defences.– (Articles 167, 169 and 196.) The guns must be placed on fixed mountings.

XII. Delivery of the plans necessary for the compilation of accurate returns of fortifications. These must be delivered.

Annex II consists of a letter addressed by the Reparation Commission to the Ambassadors' Conference answering in the affirmative the question whether Germany is at the present moment faithfully fulfilling her reparation obligations as at present fixed.

THE 'Papers respecting the proposals for a Pact of Security made by the German Government on February 9, 1925' were issued as a White Paper on June 18.* They contained the dossier of the chief pronouncements on the subject made by the three Governments, and afforded a starting point for discussion among those people in the three countries who had at heart the pacification of Europe. The main principles which had underlain the attitude of the German, French and British Governments in the exchanges which led up to the publication of the White Paper have already been explained in this Volume. It is arguable that the main value of the discussions about a Security Pact lay in the consideration that so long as men and nations discussed proposals for peace the chances of war diminished. It is possible that in a big international emergency no Security Pact will be worth much more than the ink and paper which record it, but it is equally likely that the existence of a Security Pact would tend to postpone any such emergency. 'Give us this day our daily bread' is sound diplomacy. Moreover, the fact that the statesmen of the three Western nations were engaged on the problem of peace was in itself a good thing; for thought, if it go far enough, must sooner or later lead to a realization that peace is a matter of common sense and common interest. When that realization takes place the problem is solved, for 'where there's a will there's a way.' The particular machinery is unimportant. If Germany, France and Great Britain were genuinely inspired by the belief that there would be no war between them ever, it would not matter whether the pacific law which bound them were provided by a League of Nations

* *See* Appendix One.

Covenant, a Geneva Protocol, a Pact of Security, or even if there were no specific instrument at all. At a time when men of goodwill were weary of continuing disruption – war in Morocco, riots in China, diplomatic tension between Russia and Great Britain, to mention only a few – any opposite tendency was eagerly to be welcomed. It was clearly a healthy thing that the German, French and British Governments should be discussing the possibility of making an arrangement designed to obviate war.

There are certain points of detail arising out of the preliminary negotiations which, however, must be considered. The chief documents contained in the White Paper were the original German offer (then fully disclosed for the first time), the French answer, and a letter from Mr. Chamberlain to M. Briand. Between the time of the original German offer and Mr. Chamberlain's final communication to M. Briand there took place a series of exchanges between the British and French Governments designed to work out a French reply to Berlin such as could be approved by the British Government. The first French draft was transmitted to London on May 13 (document three in the White Paper). It led to the communication of an informal memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain to the French Ambassador on May 19, in which the British Government invited the French Government to 'elucidate' some of the points involved. The chief interest of that communication lies in the following three points:–

(I) 'Mr. Chamberlain notes that the French Government welcome the suggestion of treaties of arbitration guaranteeing the peaceful settlement of juridical and political disputes. But what exactly do the French Government understand by the term "arbitration" in this respect? Is it contem-

plated that there shall be a settlement of a judicial nature in every case, to the exclusion, for instance, of the procedure of settlement by the Council laid down by the Covenant of the League of Nations? Or do the French Government include conciliation in the general term "arbitration" used in their draft? The French draft contains the phrase that the arbitration treaties "should leave no room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated" in their Note of the 12th May; but even in the latter case the French Government can hardly contemplate actual coercive action without a preliminary reference to some procedure for peaceful settlement, such, for example, as the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with the general provisions of the Covenant. This is an important point, and one on which Mr. Chamberlain would be more particularly grateful for further information. (II) What exactly is meant by the phrase "the joint and several guarantee" which under the French draft is to be given to the contemplated arbitration treaties? What actual obligation would devolve upon the guarantor? This is a point on which his Majesty's Government are in great doubt as to what is intended. (III) Does such a guarantee involve an obligation on the guarantors to resort to force, and if so in what circumstances?'

The elucidations asked for were sent to London by M. Briand on May 22. The answers to the points raised by Mr. Chamberlain were as follows: —

(I) 'The French Government have taken the word "arbitration" in the most general sense, meaning by it an attempt to exclude solutions by force. As to the means of attaining this object, it is only during the negotiation of the eventual agreements that it will be possible to define them. In all cases the obligatory nature of settlement by peaceful means must be specially affirmed and enshrined. There is, moreover, no question of encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Council of the League of Nations. The only condition which appears essential to the French Government is that the pacific solution obtained shall have the character of an obligatory decision. It is necessary to distinguish two cases:— (1) Failure to observe the conditions of treaties or agreements other than treaties of arbitration existing between the parties. In this case failure to observe the conditions of these treaties or agreements cannot give rise *ipso facto* to coercive action except in virtue of a special provision of the aforesaid treaties and agreements contemplating such action. (2) Failure to observe arbitration treaties. The object of these is assuredly, as has been said above, to exclude solutions by force, but if such treaties are not observed it is necessary to recognise that their violation appears to be a possible justification for coercive action appropriate to the nature of the violation.

(II and III) 'By "joint and several guarantee" is meant that the guarantee is given by all the signatories, who must in principle act together, but that each individual signatory is nevertheless bound to act even in the case where one or several of the co-signatories default; thus on the occasion of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany in 1914 Austria defaulted, but the other guarantors were bound to act and did not hesitate to honour their signature. A distinction must be drawn between a territorial guarantee and a guarantee given to an arbitration treaty. The first applies in case of the violation of a territory, and necessarily involves resort to force in defence of that territory. The guarantee of an arbitration treaty on the other hand does not necessarily take that form. It infers any means, diplomatic or other, appropriate to the nature of the violation. We have purposely avoided defining its nature or extent. It goes without saying that in such a case each of the guarantors acts in such measure as he is able. If, for example, Germany were to violate the arbitration treaty with Poland, Great Britain could not be automatically drawn in to a greater extent than is involved in the first place by the guarantee which she has given to the arbitration treaty under the conditions laid down above, and in the second place by her capacity as a member of the League of Nations. In return France could not be deemed to violate the Rhineland Pact if she should be called upon to help Poland. This very example demonstrates the necessity of making simultaneous the eventual conclusion of a Rhineland Pact with the conclusion of arbitration treaties between Germany and the neighbouring Allied States, as indeed Germany herself proposes.'

Those 'elucidations' led to the decisive letter of Mr. Chamberlain's (No. 6 in the dossier), in which the British Government re-stated its general policy, and went on to make detailed suggestions for modifications in the French draft. The important passages in the statement of British policy were as follows:—

'The basic principle, then, by which His Majesty's Government are guided in their approach to the matter now under discussion is and must be that any new obligation which they undertake shall be specific and limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of Germany. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Peace Treaties. His Majesty's Government welcome any treaties of arbitration or conciliation which the Continental Powers concerned may be prepared to enter into, provided only that such treaties do not affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the

League of Nations under the Covenant. Nevertheless, though His Majesty's Government are not prepared to go so far as the French Government suggest, yet they are prepared in principle (and, of course, subject to a careful examination of the actual terms ultimately proposed) to give a guarantee, following logically from the territorial guarantee of the Rhineland of arbitration treaties which may be concluded between Germany and her Western neighbours signatories of the pact. The type of guarantee which they have in mind would operate in the event of a failure on the part of one of the parties to refer a dispute to arbitration (using the term in its widest sense to cover both judicial awards and conciliation tribunals) or to carry out an award if such failure were coupled with a resort to hostilities. The guarantee would be, so to speak, defensive. It would not entail upon His Majesty's Government—as they conceive it—any obligation to resort to force elsewhere than in the areas covered by the proposed Rhineland Pact, and would not operate in any event in favour of the party which had refused arbitration or had refused to give effect to an arbitral award. My object has been to produce a statement of general principles without in any way committing either His Majesty's Government or their Allies to exact phraseology, or to particular proposals whose exact shape can only be determined when the time is reached for considering a draft instrument to give effect to these general objects. The agreement would be so framed that it would only become operative on Germany joining the League.'

In the detailed suggestions the important one was the redrafting of the French Article IV as follows:—

'The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing "a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts." France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present Note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to assure that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring the guarantee into immediate operation. In the absence of a resort to hostilities the Council of the League shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.'

Those suggestions were substantially accepted by

M. Briand in a Note which he sent to London on June 4. His most interesting sentences were the following:–

'The French Government consider it essential to preserve their liberty to go to the assistance of States to which they deem it necessary to grant their guarantee without it being possible for the provisions of the proposed Rhineland Pact to block their way and thus to be turned against them. The verbal explanations which have reached them from the British Government have given them a firm assurance of this. France intends in this way to reserve her action in the case of a violation of an eventual arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland, for example, or between Germany and Czechoslovakia.'

The question of the Rhineland Pact was one about which a considerable difference of opinion arose in Great Britain. The Government was in favour of it, but it is an established and universally respected principle of British foreign policy that important commitments of this kind should be backed, not by the support of one party only, even if that party happens to have an overwhelming majority in Parliament, but by the general concensus of opinion in all parties and in all classes. Mr. Chamberlain recently stated that he shared that view. It would be unthinkable that one British Government should sign and ratify a Security Pact, and that a succeeding Government should tear it up. Those who read the official documents which give the text of the negotiations which passed between London and Paris* should, therefore, remember that these communications were not a binding diplomatic instrument. Mr. Chamberlain more than once emphasized the fact that the exchanges of view between the French and British Governments were provisional, and that they committed neither side to any final formula or to any precise interpretation of any principle agreed to. It was clearly impossible, moreover,

* Given in Appendix One.

that any agreement between France and Britain should be reached before negotiations were begun with Germany. At various times during the exchange of view between London and Paris, when the Quai d'Orsay was perhaps a little over-eager and a little too anxious to bind the British Government to a commitment, it was pointed out from London that no binding commitments could be reached except between all the parties concerned, including Germany. In London it was fully recognized that at any moment Germany could refuse the Pact. At any moment, therefore, Germany could bring the negotiations to an end. It was a matter of common sense that both the French and the British diplomatists should hold their hand until the substantive negotiations began.

Provided, however, that it was clearly understood in Berlin that what had been agreed to by Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand was merely a basis of discussion with Germany, it was important for German opinion to realize exactly how far the British Government was prepared to go in meeting what may be called for convenience the French point of view. Although in general the British Government's point of view was that the proposed Rhineland Pact was merely a particularization of a general obligation already existing as a result of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Government was prepared – and this was the sum total of what Great Britain offered – to make a modification in the situation produced by Article 16 of the Covenant. The Covenant in that Article lays it down that

'Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or

financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.'

In other words the immediate obligation imposed on Great Britain by the Covenant in case of a violation of the Rhineland zone (for it was assumed for the purpose of this argument that Germany was to be a member of the League of Nations) was that she should take certain economic and financial retaliatory measures. Article 16 then goes on to stipulate that

'It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.'

That is to say, that under the Covenant, the obligation for war was a remote one, and that there was a buffer period during which the signatory Powers of the Covenant of the League would have to decide whether or not to accept any recommendation for war-like measures which might be made by the Council of the League.

Now, according to the principles of the proposed Rhineland Pact, as laid down in Section 4 of the French Note to Berlin, Great Britain, as one of the guarantors of the Arbitration Treaty in the West, would undertake to engage in immediate action in case the demilitarized zone were violated. In a statement which he made in the House of Commons on June 25, Mr. Chamberlain confirmed the Government's attitude on this point.

'If the wrong-doer' (he said) 'not only refuses to arbitrate or to carry out the award that an arbitral tribunal has pronounced against him, and he also resorts to force, then our guarantee becomes effective to protect the wronged party against the wrong which is done.'

That statement was the first downright explanation we

had from the Government of what was intended by Section 4 of the French Note to Berlin. There was an inconsistency between two passages in that Section, one of which implied that coercive action should be taken only in accordance with existing treaties (that is, with the League Covenant), while in the second it was laid down that the guarantee of the Pact should be brought

'into immediate operation if one of the parties, refusing to submit to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.'

Mr. Chamberlain, on June 25, explained that it was the latter and not the former principle which in the Government's policy was to hold good.

Little was to be gained, however, at that stage by emphasizing particular points involved in the French Note to Berlin or in the exchanges which passed between Paris and London. The whole agreement reached between Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand was conditional on agreement with the German delegates who would take part in the final negotiations for the pact. It must also be remembered that it was the British Government's desire to make the Pact conform as far as possible with the Covenant of the League. In the case, for instance, of a departure from the Covenant which has been alluded to above, it would be necessary for some machinery to be set up to decide whether or not an aggression had been made in the West, and by what party. It was always felt by the British Government that the judicial tribunal for such a purpose should be provided by the League of Nations. As for the Eastern frontiers of Germany, the British Government made no commitment and would never make any commitment, which conflicted with the Treaty of Versailles; and Article 19 of the Covenant is Article 19 of the Treaty.

CHAPTER ELEVEN–THE GLOOM BEFORE THE LIGHT

On July 20, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Minister, which gave new pabulum to the pessimists. Was it possible for an uncivilized Europe which as lately as 1914-8 gave a fair sample of itself to behave as if it were civilized? That was the question raised by what was now happening. The Note just referred to was the German Government's answer to the French Note of June 16, about the proposed Security Pact. For six months the helpless diplomatists, fairly representative of the helpless people they serve, had attempted with little success to agree on an arrangement whereby in the future the grown-up millions of the nations' manhood should not stick bayonets into each others' stomachs, or wipe out whole towns at a swoop. It was an unbelieveable thing. First one government, then another, made difficulties and kept the vicious circle on the move. It would need another Lucian adequately to describe such a situation.

The diplomatists of Germany, France and Great Britain, were doing what the German, French and British people allowed them, or forced them to do. The Note written by the German Government to the French Government on July 20 was written, as British and French diplomatists were quick to recognize, for German home consumption. M. Briand thereupon began to rage for the primary purpose of satisfying French public opinion. The British Government, whose problem is not to satisfy an excited public, but to rouse an apathetic public to take an interest in matters affecting their own life and death, was able to pour oil on troubled waters. In the meantime, however, an opportunity was passing, the

chances of a Pact of Security being signed grew less, and the British people refused to hear anything about it.

It was not a question of eliminating quarrels, misunderstandings, uncharitableness. It was merely a question of eliminating war, or at least of making it less likely. It is clear that human nature being what by experience we know it to be, the only certain thing is that misunderstandings will arise, and the amount of misunderstanding will increase with the number of people who come into contact with each other. In private life we all misunderstand each other, and Pilate's famous question was both a fair jest and a serious comment on life: but in private life, fortunately, we most of us refrain from murdering each other, and we accept the blindness of the law as a harmless substitute. Correspondingly in international affairs, all that is wanted is an agreement not to murder each other. Justice is at best a gamble, and is of no importance compared with the settled prospect of peace. If peace at any price be the ideal in international affairs, as it is in national affairs, in what way did the German Note of July 20 fall short of that ideal? The answer may be put shortly in this way. The three main parties to the proposed security pact, Germany, France and Great Britain, disagreed, of course, on most things, but Germany and Great Britain, at that stage, happened to agree on wanting the pact. France had raised serious difficulties, and Great Britain, in an attempt to carry France, agreed to a formula in the French Note of June 16, which contained two diametrically opposed ideas. Now German opinion sympathized with the idea that had been inspired by Great Britain, and was incensed

by that inspired by France. In the German Note, however, it was the French idea that was taken for comment, not the British, and the comment was hostile. Its main object was to appease the wrath of the German Nationalists against the French Note. The result was a furious France, a disconcerted Great Britain and a general obscuring of the prospect of peace. If the German Note, instead of combatting the French formula, had welcomed the British formula, French opinion would have been disarmed and the pact conference could have been arranged without much delay.

The German Note made its first tactical mistake by referring to the Note of June 16 as having been sent by 'the Allied Governments,' whereas the distinction of its being in form a French Note ought to have been respected in Germany's own interests. Next it was a somewhat clumsy move to draw attention to the delicate point about the sacrosanctity of the treaties, for it was wholly unnecessary to excite French susceptibilities on that subject in view of the fact that Article 19 of the Covenant of the League is likewise Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles, and German opinion knew that in the British view neither the Polish corridor nor the partition of Upper Silesia could be regarded as permanent arrangements. If ever there was occasion for putting the diplomatic blind eye to the telescope, that was the occasion. Mr. Chamberlain has repeatedly put his blind eye to his monocle in order not to see the French point about frontiers. The important thing – and German diplomacy ought to have been astute enough to understand it – was to get the Pact through, and Germany inside the League. The rest would all happen in good time. For the German Govern-

ment to raise the controversial difficulties in advance of the conference showed a lack of tactical sense.

Having once embarked on the unintelligent line of argument the German Government proceeded to elaborate its points and to make them irresistibly provocative to French feeling:

'If the Allied Governments emphasise, for instance (ran a passage in Section One of the Note), that the pact of security must not effect the treaty provisions in force concerning the military occupation of German territories, it is correct that the German memorandum has not made the conclusion of the pact dependent on a modification of those provisions. But should the Allied Governments intend to set those provisions up as sacrosanct for the future, the German Government would, in answer to this, like to point out that the conclusion of a security pact would represent an innovation of such importance that it could not but react on the conditions in the occupied territories and the questions of occupation in general.'

What could be more naïve? The German Note might have been written for the exclusive purpose of answering the question put by crude and short-sighted German Nationalists: 'If we give this guarantee about the Franco-German and the Belgian-German frontiers, what do we get as *quid pro quo*? Will the occupied regions be evacuated?' Now, no serious Englishman wants anything better than the earliest possible evacuation of all the German territories occupied under the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Chamberlain went out of his way in June to express the hope, during the course of a speech which he made in the House of Commons, that Cologne might be evacuated in August, that was to say, at the same time as the French evacuation of the Ruhr. What, however, was the practical effect of Germany's raising the question in that way? M. Briand promptly pointed to that passage of the German Note as an instance of German sabotage

of the Treaty of Versailles, and the British Government was left with no alternative but to agree with the French Government that the occupied territories were a matter of contractual arrangement under the Treaty, agreed to by all the signatories, including Germany, and that there could be no question of making the conclusion of the pact conditional on any such treaty modification as Germany appeared to suggest. The German Note therefore defeated its object in that respect.

Next, a still worse lapse of judgment. In Section 2 of the Note it was stated:

'Under the system outlined by the Allied Governments for the security pact in their note of the 16th June a prominent part is assigned to the treaties of arbitration which Germany would have to conclude with her neighbour States who are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. The construction of the treaties of arbitration within this system leaves room for considerable doubts which need further elucidation. The German Government contemplated treaties of arbitration such as have been concluded during the last few years by Germany as well as by a number of other Powers. Treaties of this kind, modelled on the corresponding terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exhaust, in the opinion of the German Government, the possibilities existing under present conditions of bringing about, with prospects of practical results, the arbitral settlement of conflicts among states. The Allied proposals appear to contemplate a different system. What chiefly attracts attention are the cases of exception provided for by the Allied Governments in which coercive action by one State against another State is to be permitted. In this respect the German Government, judging by the terms of the note of the 16th June and the correspondence published between the French and His Britannic Majesty's Governments, cannot but assume that in those cases, in the opinion of the Allied Governments, coercive action can take place, without any regular procedure laid down in advance either by arbitral or some other international procedure.'

That assumption was unfair so far as the British Government was concerned, although it was sound enough at that time as an interpretation of French ideas. It was based on the Briand phraseology of that sentence of Section 4 of the French Note of June 16 which declared:

'To give full effect to these two treaties, their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.'

Why should the German Government have assumed that the French formula, and not the British formula, would be the decisive one, when German opinion agreed with the latter, and not the former?

The German Note ignored the sentence, inserted on British prompting, in that same section of the French Note, which said:

'But it must be understood that, as between France and Germany, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of the Rhineland Pact or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty by the parties or by any one of them.'

Moreover Lord Balfour and Mr. Baldwin made a special point of emphasizing publicly that the pact should conform to the Covenant of the League, Mr. Chamberlain had made reservations in that sense, and had always maintained that, in the words he used at Geneva on March 12:

'Any arrangement into which we might enter should be purely defensive in character, it should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League, and under its guidance if possible.'

In the course of the correspondence with Paris on the subject of the pact Mr. Chamberlain made the definite reservation, in writing to Lord Crewe on May 28:

'In communicating it [the recast French draft] to M. Briand, I request that your Lordship will lay emphasis on the principles without in any way committing either His Majesty's Government or their Allies to exact phraseology or to particular proposals whose exact shape can only be determined when the time is reached for considering a draft instrument to give effect to these general objects.'

That was published as part of the pact dossier in Berlin as well as in London and in Paris. Yet, unbelievable as it may seem to men of affairs, the German Government in its Note of July 20 chose to assume a precise interpretation of a principle exclusively French, and to assume it to be an Allied principal into the bargain! Moreover, it must have been known informally in Berlin that when the time came for a conference the British delegation would regard it as essential that some judicial body, preferably set up by the League of Nations, should adjudicate and establish the fact of an aggression before the 'immediate action' contemplated even in the French formula of Section 4 of the French Note could arise, unless the aggression were grossly flagrant.

Perversity, however, was not yet exhausted. The German Note, arguing from the unsound assumption exposed above, proceeded to exploit the fear

'that the Allied Governments, for instance, would not wish to subject the decision on the question of the admissibility or inadmissibility of reprisals on account of reparation obligations to a regular procedure, but would leave the decision to their own unilateral discretion.'

Now did the German Government really forget the whole content and purpose of the Dawes scheme which was actually in operation when the German Note of July 20 was written? One of the outstanding merits of the Dawes scheme was the network of safeguards of an arbitral kind (American participation in the safeguards being one of the factors) which put the possibility hinted at in the German Note into the remote background. Why did Germany thus raise a wholly unnecessary and unsubstantial bogey? The question became still more unanswerable when one read the last sentence of the German Note which ran:

'They [the German Government] would heartily welcome an acceleration of these discussions, so that the urgent desire of the nations for reliable guarantees of peace and peaceful development as well as for the restoration of the world's normal economic relations destroyed by the war, may soon be satisfied.'

The practical effect of the German Note was to retard those discussions. Lastly, the fact that the German Note raised the question of Article 16 of the Covenant and hitched it on to the big question of general disarmament – admirable as the thesis was on philosophic grounds – was an obstacle to the speeding-up process postulated in that sentence of the German Note just quoted:

'The note of the Council of the League of Nations (it was stated in Section Three of the German Note) of the 13th March last, mentioned in the French Note, has not removed the objections that have been expressed by Germany against the acceptance of the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant. Even after the explanations by the Council of the League of Nations the danger remains that Germany as a disarmed country, surrounded by strongly armed neighbours, in a central position, having been in history repeatedly the theatre of great wars, would after entering the League of Nations be exposed without limitation to the danger of being involved in the armed conflicts of third countries. Germany, as a member of the League of Nations, can only be considered as enjoying equal rights when her disarmament is followed by the general disarmament provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, if the immediate entrance of Germany into the League of Nations is to be rendered possible, a solution has to be found to tide over the time till general disarmament has become a reality. This solution would have to pay due regard to the special military and economical as well as to the special geographical situation of Germany.'

That important and reasonable argument ought to have been reserved till the time when the delegates would be seated round the conference table. The general effect of the Note was deplorable. M. Briand lost no time in writing a spirited memorandum of French views on it, and M. de Fleuriau, the French Ambassador in London, gave Mr. Chamberlain a copy of it on July 23. The British Government had to acquiesce in the renewed

prospect of Franco-British exchanges designed to discuss French resentment against the unnecessary provocation of the German Note. British official comment on the German Note had to be content with emphasizing the concluding passages of the German Note which indicated German anxiety to get on with the business – even though that anxiety proved to be still-born for reasons given above. What one understood would have been acceptable to German opinion would have been a preliminary talk between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries at which to pave the way for the full conference. That, however, was made impossible by the effect of the Note in Paris, and the general horizon was again clouded over.

CHAPTER TWELVE–M. BRIAND COMES TO LONDON

THREE weeks after the receipt of the German Note about the proposed Security Pact, M. Briand came to London to discuss with Mr. Chamberlain what the French answer should be. He arrived in London on Monday, August 10, and on the following day, which happened to be the twentieth anniversary of the birth of the Entente Cordiale, he began discussions with Mr. Chamberlain at the Foreign Office. He was invited to Buckingham Palace to see the King before going to the Foreign Office, a ceremony which added to the solemnity of the attempt about to be made to inspire life into the moribund Entente. By luncheon of the next day (August 12) the conversations were over and M. Briand returned to Paris on the 13th. The pivot of the conversations had been a difference between the French and British interpretation of the meaning of the word 'immediate' which appeared in Section 4 of the French Note of June 16. Since Mr. Chamberlain had given his approval to that Note it had been realized in London that it was ambiguously capable of bearing a meaning akin to that assigned to it in the German Note of July 20, and therefore Lord Balfour, in the House of Lords, and Mr. Baldwin, at Knowsley Park, had made public statements designed to emphasize that in the British view the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to be superseded by the Pact. Mr. Baldwin went so far as to declare that his Government would incur no new commitment beyond those of the Covenant, a declaration which hardly tallied with Mr. Chamberlain's published communications to the Quai d'Orsay, but which was expressive of one of the Government's vague anxieties. What was made clear

during the Briand-Chamberlain conversations was that the British Government reserved to itself the right to decide whether a flagrant aggression had been made by either France or Germany, and in doubtful cases to refer to the League for a decision. An alleged aggression by Germany against France or by France against Germany would be either flagrantly serious and obvious in origin or would be doubtful in either or both respects. In the case of a flagrant aggression – the *casus fœderis* to be judged by the British Government – Great Britain would declare war on France or Germany, whichever was the aggressor. In doubtful cases the League would decide. M. Briand accepted that limitation of the proposed British commitment under the Pact, and agreement therefore became easy. All appeared now to be plain sailing so far as the Western European Security Pact, the Franco-German and the Belgian-German Arbitration Treaties were concerned, if, as seemed likely, the Belgian, Italian and German Governments agreed with the Briand-Chamberlain formula.

It was obvious, however, that two important difficulties remained in the prospective attempt to conclude the German-Czechoslovak and the German-Polish Arbitration Treaties. One was the probable German objection to what would amount to a virtual French supervision of those treaties. It had been clear for some time that the Wilhelmstrasse was inclined to regard the French treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia as virtually committing France to act as guarantor for a German fulfilment of the Eastern arbitration treaties. If Germany attacked, say, Poland, France would be committed by the Franco-Polish Treaty to defend Poland. If, on the

other hand, Poland attacked Germany, there would be no party to help Germany. To that extent there was a unilateral element in the prospective Eastern Arbitration Treaties, and the natural German anxiety caused thereby had to be allayed. It was not allayed by the argument that the security treaties presupposed German membership of the League and that, therefore, Germany would be defended against aggression by all the states members of the League, for the League safeguard would be common to both Germany and Poland, whereas Poland would have the additional and independent support of France. Moreover, Article 16 of the Covenant prescribes in the first place a Council decision about an aggression (which would involve delay) and secondly a mere recommendation for military action on the part of states members. By contrast the Franco-Polish Treaty prescribes automatic and immediate French support of Poland. The other difficulty was that Article 3 of the Franco-Polish Treaty provided for a French defence of the *status quo* in the East, whereas Article 19 of the Covenant provided for possible revision of any frontier. There was increasing ground to expect, however, that this difficulty would be met by a French undertaking that if Article 19 of the Covenant ever operated and led to a revision of the Polish frontiers, Article 3 of the Franco-Polish Treaty would, in the French view, automatically adjust itself and in that event would refer to the revised frontiers.

The opinion was held during the summer in some sections of the Liberal Party that a pact of the kind suggested would be a danger to British interests. Why, it was asked, should Great Britain guarantee either French territory against Germany or German territory

against France; why should the British Government undertake to engage in war in any contingency whatever, flagrant or other? Would it not, the argument proceeded, be infinitely better for Great Britain to reserve her complete liberty of action in all circumstances? Many felt disposed to answer at once that the precedent of 1914 hardly encouraged such an isolationist philosophy; that the treaty commitment about Belgium was not the decisive factor which brought Great Britain into the war; that Great Britain entered the war because British security demanded such a course in face of a German menace to France and thereby to the Channel ports and to Great Britain herself. It may be that discussion about the particular war origins of 1914 is fruitless, and that the simple explanation of the Great War as of all wars was mutual fear among the nations. Now the object, both of those who favoured the pact and those who opposed it, was the same, in Germany, in France and in Belgium as well as in Great Britain. They wanted to avoid war. The problem of peace has two aspects. The immediate problem is to secure peace in our time: the ultimate object is the cultivating of the spirit of peace – a very practical thing – between the nations. How practical the latter is is best illustrated by the case of Scotland and England. There is now no danger of war between those two countries. Once upon a time they armed themselves (in mutual self-defence, as they thought) and, of course, fought idiotic wars, still in self-defence, against each other. What is the difference now? Merely that no one now thinks of war as a practical thing between England and Scotland. That is security. Between Canada and the United States there is a frontier

of some 5,000 miles unguarded on both sides. There is no danger of war. If that frontier were guarded by soldiers, war would be a certainty. The remote ideal, therefore, is the cultivation of the habit and of the assumption of peace and the complete disarming of the nations. There can be no security until not a soldier, and not a gun remains. That is a remote ideal. Lord Carson hit the nail on the head in 1919 when he said (I forget his exact words) that the potential value of the League of Nations was that it might make peace fashionable. The problem in its remote and ultimate aspect is therefore one of education.

There is, however, the immediate need of staving off trouble. The position is something like this. Imagine twelve men standing in a circle, each armed with loaded revolvers, each suspecting the others and holding his own revolver in readiness. The attitude of each is that of self-defence, just as is the attitude of the nations of Europe. There is probably no such thing as aggressive war. All war is defensive, in the minds of those who wage it. The twelve imaginary men, the symbol of the European nations, stand in fear. Some of them, say, make a pact of security whereby each undertake to shoot if one is attacked. The whole twelve may evolve a League of Nations, all of them undertaking to shoot if the other is attacked. How futile! Someone sooner or later, with or without pacts or leagues, is bound to pull his trigger either from sudden fright or from sheer nervous tension: immediately the rest begin shooting everybody promiscuously in self-defence. Now, if those twelve men had been sitting in a club, or walking in a park, unarmed, would there be the slightest danger of shooting? The

answer is obvious and trite, and everyone agrees. The problem is how to disarm Europe. The best approach to a solution, as it appears to me, is through some immediate, opportunist, possibly even unjust stabilization of the *status quo* as a measure for avoiding the first shot, and, in the respite thus gained, some sustained educational work designed to convince the world of the gross and almost unbelievable stupidity of armaments. The immediate problem is to quieten nerves and avoid the first shot. Agitation for the revision even of admitted injustices ordained by the Treaty of Versailles must necessarily have an irritant effect. It is a frankly opportunist argument in this respect. On November 12, 1918, there was little danger of war. Would it be wise to cut the painter too precipitately? It is possible of course that in one or two respects the injustices are too serious and are themselves more irritant than would be an attempt at revision: but in general the negative and sedative principles of the maintenance of the *status quo* has, I think, its value. To stabilize Europe on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles is not to stabilize it for ever, for there is no such thing as permanence in anything, and one of the admirable features of that Treaty is the integral incorporation in it of the Covenant of the League, in which Article 19 provides the necessary elasticity for future revision of anything that may in experience be proved to be bad. The immediate, the overwhelming, problem is to avoid or postpone to the utmost limit another outbreak. Those who follow the course of foreign affairs closely know how real is the danger of such an outbreak. Once war breaks out it is uncontrollable, and we are all equally involved, as

helplessly as if we were visited by an earthquake. The proposed Pact of Security and its collateral arbitration treaties deserved support simply because they would establish a pacifist principle in the main danger zones. The detailed imperfections of the pact were of small importance by comparison.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN–THE DIPLOMATIC TANGLE

THERE is, in Europe, an existing network of political treaties and understandings of varying degrees of validity which, none the less, had to be considered by those who were attempting to solve the problem of security. They may not be important, but they have an effect which must be faced. There is not only the Treaty of Versailles with its Articles 42 to 44, and the League of Nations which is an integral part of that Treaty. There are regional understandings between nations and groups of nations providing for mutual support in given contingencies. It is well to give an account of these subsidiary arrangements and to explain their implications. The League of Nations is left aside in this survey, partly because its activities in the field of disarmament, arbitration and security against war, would need a whole volume to themselves, and partly because the existing diplomatic tangle is something apart from the League and something which the League itself has to take account of in its own efforts for security.

Perhaps the most important of the European relationships which have a bearing on the problem of European security is that between France, the Little Entente and Poland.

The Little Entente grew out of the post-war conditions of general unrest and danger, and affords an interesting illustration of what can be done in pacific reconstruction by three nations – Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania – in their common interests. Czechoslovak statesmanship has been the guiding spirit of the Little Entente, Dr. Edouard Benesh its leading exponent and craftsman. The Little Entente has been the subject of much misunderstanding in Great Britain. A common

criticism has been that it is a catspaw of French diplomacy. This much is true, that Czechoslovak interests are more immediately bound up with French interests than with British interests and therefore, of course, the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy has been of a more pronounced French complexion than British. It has, however, been proved unsound to regard the Little Entente as a catspaw of France. Czechoslovakia is the offspring of France and Great Britain, and those who have followed Czechoslovak affairs, and especially the work of Dr. Benesh, know that the chief motive behind Czechoslovak policy has been the reconciliation of Czechoslovakia's parents. What more natural? Oddly enough those very critics who have objected to Czechoslovakia's sympathy with France have at the same time objected to Czechoslovakia's 'interfering' efforts to bridge the Franco-British gulf. The composition, policy and behaviour of the Little Entente are easy enough to understand. The component countries have achieved remarkable success in the economic consolidation of Central Europe, where the conditions after the war were desperate and chaotic; in foreign affairs have jointly advocated whatever was commonly desired by each; and for the rest have followed their separate ways.

The French view of the Little Entente is another matter. Can Prague be blamed for what Paris thinks? The Quai d'Orsay certainly has, in the past, wanted Czechoslovakia to be a pawn in the French game of encircling Germany, and, owing to geographical and political circumstances, Czechoslovakia up to a point has necessarily served the purposes of the Quai d'Orsay. The striking thing, however, is that placed as she is, and

small nation as she is, Czechoslovakia has not become in effect a French dependency. She has shown remarkable courage and statesmanship, such as one expected from a country whose President is Dr. Masaryk, in taking an independent line.

The political substructure of the Little Entente consists of a series of diplomatic agreements.

First there is the Czechoslovak-Jugoslav Agreement of August 14, 1920. It provided that in case of an unprovoked attack by Hungary on either party, the other pledged its assistance (Article I) :

'En cas d'une attaque, non-provoquée, de la Hongrie contre l'une des hautes parties contractantes, l'autre partie s'engage à concourir à la défense de la partie attaquée de la façon determinée par l'arrangement prévu dans l'article 2 de la présente convention.' Article 2: 'Les authorités techniques compétentes de la République tchèquoslovaque et du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes fixeront, d'un commun accord, les dispositions nécessaires pour l'exécution de la présente convention.'

It was further provided that neither party should make any diplomatic agreement with a third party without first notifying the other. (Article 3):

'Aucune des hautes parties contractantes ne pourra conclure une alliance avec une tierce Puissance sans avis préalable de l'autre'.

Article 4 provided that the agreement should remain in force for two years, whereafter it could be denounced at six months' notice; Article 5 that this Agreement should be communicated to the League of Nations.

In the following year (April 23, 1921), a corresponding agreement was made between Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Except in two respects this agreement was identical with that between Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. The two exceptions were first, that Article 2 had the added provision that the method of mutual assistance was to be defined 'in a military convention to be concluded

eventually' ('dans une convention militaire à conclure ultérieurement'), and that pending the conclusion of such a convention a protocol making interim arrangements in the same sense should hold good; second, that an additional Article (Article 4) provided that

'in order to co-ordinate their efforts towards peace, the two Governments agree to concert together on questions of foreign policy affecting their relations with Hungary' ('Afin de coordonner leurs efforts pacifiques, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se concerter sur les questions de politique extérieure qui ont trait à leurs rapports avec la Hongrie').

Next there was a Rumanian-Jugoslav Agreement, dated June, 1921, in identical terms with those of the Czechoslovak-Rumanian Agreement.

Such were the diplomatic liens between the three constituent members of the Little Entente. The next step was to rope in by treaty both Poland and Austria. Czechoslovakia concluded an agreement with Poland and with Austria; and Rumania with Poland.

The Czechoslovak-Polish Agreement of November 6, 1921, provided that the two parties should mutually guarantee each other's territory, as based on existing treaties (Article I):

'Les deux États se donnent mutuellement la garantie de l'état de possession, ayant pour base les traités sur lesquels repose l'indépendance et l'organisation d'État de la Polonge et de la Tchècoslovaquie. Les deux États vont se concerter, quand le besoin et l'occasion l'exigeront, sur l'application des traités signés en commun'

By Article 2 it was agreed that in the event of one of the parties being attacked by a third party, the other should adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality and should assure the free transit of war material ('Les deux Etats s'engagent à garder la neutralité bienveillante en cas où l'un d'eux serait attaqué par un de leurs voisins, et particulièrement à assurer le libre transit du materiel

de guerre'). Articles 3 to 9 made other arrangements, less important from the point of view of security, such as that Czechoslovakia should not interfere in Eastern Galicia, should forbid anti-Polish propaganda in or from Czechoslovakia, that Poland should return a similar service to Czechoslovakia, that certain questions should be referred to arbitration, that the agreement should last for five years, but could be denounced after two years at six months' notice.

The Rumanian-Polish Agreement of March, 1921 took the form of 'a defensive alliance against unprovoked attack from the East,' of like duration as the Czechoslovak-Polish Agreement. It provided for the drawing up of military plans against Magyar or Bulgarian aggression; Poland undertook to modify the frontiers of Bukovina and Galicia in return for Rumanian diplomatic support in Eastern Galicia; and the Treaty was not to operate until the Treaty of Riga had defined the frontiers.

The Treaty of Lana, concluded between Czechoslovakia and Austria on December 16, 1921, had a similar object, and need not be detailed. Each party guaranteed the territory of the other, and undertook to resist any attempts to restore the pre-war régime.

There is a further understanding of an indefinite kind between Czechoslovakia and Italy whereby each party pledges itself to resist a Habsburg coup. The understanding was not reduced to the terms of a formal agreement, but was reached by means of correspondence which passed between Dr. Benesh and Count Sforza in February, 1921.

The relations of France with the Little Entente and with Poland are a matter of importance. During 1921

and 1922 the two countries concluded a political treaty (the famous Franco-Polish Treaty of February 19, 1921), a military convention, an oil convention and a commercial convention.

The political treaty went to the full length of a mutual defence of their existing frontiers – one of the great stumbling-blocks that have impeded the security negotiations. The treaty was worded in such a way that it would operate both against Germany and Russia. The two important Articles, 1 and 3, had the effect of pledging France and Poland to defend each other in case of an unprovoked attack by any third party against the existing territorial integrity of the two countries. These Articles should be quoted in full:

Article 1:

'Afin de coordonner leurs efforts pacifiques, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se concerter sur toutes les questions de politique extérieure intéressant les deux États et relatives au règlement des relations internationales dans l'esprit des traités et conformément au Pacte de la Société des Nations.'

Article 3:

'Si, contrairement aux prévisions et aux intentions sincèrement pacifiques des deux États contractants, ceux-ci ou l'un des deux se voyaient attaqués sans provocation de leur part, les deux Gouvernements se concerteraient en vue de la défense de leur territoire et de la sauvegarde de leurs intérets légitimes, dans les limites précisées dans le préambule.'

It is commonly understood that Article 3 has been supplemented by a military convention. The Poles, who have an obvious interest in advertising the existence of such a military convention, have advertised it, but the French have never admitted its existence, and its text is secret. There is, however, good reason for knowing that it exists, that it provides for a French military mission to Poland and for credits for arms and equipment. There

is in fact a French military mission in Poland, and Marshal Foch has ceremonially visited the Chief of the Polish General Staff in Warsaw.

The Treaty 'of Alliance and Friendship' between France and Czechoslovakia (January 25, 1924), is less far-reaching than that between France and Poland. It provides for consultation over matters affecting their common security (Article 1):

'Les Gouvernements de la République francaise et de la République tchècoslovaque s'engagent à se concerter sur les questions extérieures de nature à mettre en danger leur sécurité et à porter atteinte à l'ordre établi par les traités de paix dont ils sont l'un et l'autre signataires.' Article 2: 'Les hautes parties contractantes se mettront d'accord sur les mesures propres à sauvegarder leurs intérets communs dans le cas où ils seraient menacés.'

The particular dangers entertained are specified in Articles 3 to 5, and consist of any attempt to modify the independent status of Austria or to restore the Habsburg or Hohenzollern dynasties. There are further stipulations among which is one for the submission of Franco-Czechoslovak disputes to the League Court of Justice or to other arbitration.

It appears to be conclusively proved that there is no military convention between France and Czechoslovakia, in spite of ill-informed rumours which have made the allegation, but the Czechoslovak army is largely trained by a French military mission.

In addition to the Little Entente treaties and the treaties between France and the countries of Eastern Europe – which are the important factors in the situation – there are certain other treaties of less importance which need not be described here. There is, for instance, a treaty, dated January 27, 1924, between Italy and Jugoslavia

of which the object is to safeguard the *status quo* of the Treaties of Trianon, Saint Germain and Neuilly; a treaty between Italy and Czechoslovakia, dated July 5, 1924, on similar lines; an alliance between Greece and Jugoslavia which was concluded in May, 1913, was denounced by Jugoslavia in December, 1924, and will, therefore, expire in December, 1925. Negotiations recently conducted in Belgrade for a new treaty failed and had to be suspended.

Such then are the arrangements which have been made in Europe between various nations which are afraid for the future. Being sectional and unrelated to any general scheme for immediate security, their value as assets for security was doubtful, and made the proposed Security Pact all the more urgently desirable.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN - THE JURISTS' CONFERENCE

THE month of August kept up its reputation as a season of prolific diplomacy. There is no doubt that when the House of Commons is away, the Diplomatist will play. Certainly no other month can compare, in its record of diplomatic activity, with that of August. This year both M. Briand and M. Caillaux came to London and engaged in important conversations with Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Churchill. Last year there was the important reparations conference which produced the Dawes Scheme. In August, 1923, the alarming Curzon-Poincaré duel took place which culminated in the British White Paper of August 12, and which nearly broke the Anglo-French Entente, or what was left of it. In August, 1922, there was a London conference on reparations which ended in a violent disagreement between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Poincaré, and which was part-precursor to the French occupation of the Ruhr. In August, 1921, there was the Paris Conference on Upper Silesia at which Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand could agree only to disagree and to dump their disagreement on to the League of Nations. In August, 1920, one of the Hythe Conferences took place, and on August 14 of that year the Little Entente was founded.

August, 1925, then lived up to its reputation. M. Briand and M. Caillaux came to London separately and discussed what were technically separate subjects; but there was an interesting interplay between the two. M. Briand, as we have seen, reached an agreement with Mr. Chamberlain on the basis of which he wrote the French Note to Berlin in answer to the German Note of July 20. The answer was communicated to the German Government by the French Ambassador in Berlin on

August 24, and the text of it was issued for publication in all countries in the morning papers of August 27.* One of the striking features of the French Note, and of the stage thereby reached in the relations of Germany, France and Great Britain, was the recapture in some measure of the courtesy and friendliness which had characterized those relations in 1924, and which had been ruffled during the early part of 1925. One remembers, with something of a shock, the tone of the communications which passed between London and Paris in 1923, when the unquiet and unhappy spirit of M. Poincaré hovered over the abyss, and forbade any impulse anywhere towards friendliness or commonsense.

The French Note of August 24 in its first paragraph, revealed a progressive state of mind in its authors:

'The French Government are glad to realise that the German Government are as anxious as they are themselves to see the peace of Europe based upon an understanding.'

The Note, therefore, confined itself to remarks on three essential points raised in the German Note of July 20, and ended with an invitation to the German Government to enter upon the final negotiations.

'Such (ran the last paragraph of the Note) are the preliminary explanations which the French Government have to offer. They are tendered in all sincerity, and their purpose is to remove all possibility of misunderstanding. The French Government, in agreement with their Allies, have now the honour to invite the German Government to enter into negotiations which they for their part earnestly trust will result in the conclusion of a definitive treaty.'

The three points dealt with in the French Note were those which have been commented on above. The first was the too timid anxiety revealed in the German Note lest the proposed Security Pact should stereotype all the

* *See* Appendix One.

Versailles arrangements, and the veiled hint at a bargain over the Rhineland evacuation. It was, however, in a commendably restrained tone that the French Note pointed out the contractual nature of the Rhineland Agreement, and insisted on the binding nature of the whole Treaty of Versailles. Yet these distinctions are a matter of words only. The Versailles Treaty is as binding in that part of it which makes provision for subsequent revision as in any other part, and no doubt the Wilhelmstrasse was fully alive to the two-handed implications of the Treaty and of the Covenant.

The second point was more important, and dealt with the German reservations about entering the League of Nations. What the German Note of July 20 had said was that

'Germany as a member of the League of Nations, can only be considered as enjoying equal rights when her disarmament is followed by the general disarmament provided for by the covenant of the League of Nations and the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, if the immediate entrance of Germany is to be rendered possible, a solution has to be found to tide over the time till general disarmament has become a reality.'

To that contention the French Note, as was to be expected, made the simple answer:

'So far as they are concerned, the Allied Governments can only adhere to their former statements and repeat that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations under the same conditions as are prescribed for everybody, remains in their opinion the basis of any understanding on security;'

and again

'It is not, in fact, from outside that a State can properly express reservations, which would thus assume the character of conditions; it is from within that it can submit its wishes to the Council in the exercise of a right common to all the States members of the League.'

It was, however, a gratifying sign of the times that in the same breath the French Note declared that

'The entry of Germany into the League of Nations is the only solid basis for a mutual guarantee and a European agreement.'

The Note was not signed by any name but there will be no need for the future historian who may quote that sentence to put a footnote explaining that M. Poincaré was no longer the Foreign Minister of France.

The last point answered in the French Note was the German reservation designed to limit the obligatory character of the German-Belgian and the German-French Arbitration Treaties in such a way as to make them conform to the treaties of arbitration which Germany has already concluded with some of her neighbours. Those treaties are worded in such a way as to limit the scope of the arbitration provided to non-political disputes, which are precisely the disputes most likely to lead to war. The Allied answer to this was unavoidable:

'In the opinion of the Allies (ran the French Note), an arbitration convention thus limited, in that it would not apply to all disputes between limitrophe Powers, would not be of sufficient value as a guarantee of peace; it would still leave open certain opportunities for war. Our primary object is to render impossible, under the conditions formulated in the note of the 16th June, any fresh resort to war. We feel that this object can only be attained by means of some obligatory pacific settlement applying to all the issues which may arise. In our opinion, the principle of compulsory arbitration thus conceived is an indispensible condition for any pact of the nature proposed by the German Government in their note of the 9th February.'

Then came by far the most important passage in the French Note, the passage, to wit, which incorporated the agreement reached by M. Briand and Mr. Chamberlain on August 12. What was to be the criterion which would bring the Pact into operation, or, in other words, would produce a state of war between the guarantor, Great Britain, on the one side, and the aggressor against the demilitarized zone, either France or Germany, on the

other? It was known that Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand had on August 11 and 12, agreed on a formula whereby the guarantee would come into immediate operation in case of a 'flagrant' aggression, the judge of the flagrancy to be the guarantor State, namely, Great Britain; but that in doubtful cases the League of Nations should first establish the fact of an aggression. It was a good omen for Allied diplomacy that in the French Note the point of view thus agreed on was expressed somewhat vaguely, no doubt to avoid giving any impression that France and Great Britain had arrived at a common policy in advance of the meeting with Germany. To have given such an impression would, it is true, have been incredibly tactless diplomacy; but one must in these brittle times be thankful for small things. In the relevant passage of the French Note all that was said on this subject was that:

'It would not seem impossible to establish provisions adapting the operation of the guarantee (whoever be the guarantor and whether the guarantee applies to frontiers or to arbitration) to the nature of the violation and to the circumstances and degree of urgency which might necessitate the immediate execution of this guarantee. In this connection an examination might be made whether some means could not be found of safeguarding the impartiality of the decisions come to, without diminishing the immediate and efficacious operation of the guarantee itself.'

It was equally gratifying to find that the French Note tried to allay the unnecessary fear expressed in the German Note of July 20, lest coercive action could take place

'without any regular procedure laid down in advance either by arbitral or some other international procedure.'

To allay the fear thereby expressed the French Note declared:

'The apprehensions which the German Government betrays on the subject of the guarantee of an arbitration convention will scarcely stand objective

criticism. Under the system contemplated, the guarantor does not decide autocratically and unilaterally who is the aggressor. The aggressor defines himself by the very fact that instead of submitting to a pacific solution he resorts to arms, or violates either the frontier, or, in the case of the Rhine, the demilitarised zone. It is obvious that the guarantor, who will have the greatest interest in preventing such violations from whichever side they come, will, at the first sign of danger, be sure to exercise all his influence for that purpose. Moreover it will be the business of the limitrophe states themselves to see to it that this system of guarantee, conceived for their mutual protection, does not work out to their disadvantage.'

The Allies were not content merely to deliver the French Note in Berlin. The French Ambassador suggested verbally to the German Foreign Minister that the legal experts of the four countries, Germany, Belgium, France and Great Britain should meet as soon as possible in London, so that the German experts might fully explore the situation for themselves, find out exactly what was in the minds of the Allies, put questions and generally investigate the legal and technical aspects of the problems which were being discussed. That suggestion fortunately was welcomed in Berlin, and, therefore, the German formal Note in answer to the French Note of August 24 was short and crisp. It was dated August 27 and contained not more than 300 words.* It acknowledged the French Note, declared that the German Government

'entirely share the opinion expressed at the end of the above (*i.e.* the French) Note that a continuation of the correspondence is scarcely calculated to lead to further elucidation of the questions connected with the conclusion of a security pact, and in their note of July 20th they had given expression to the desire that discussions might be expedited as much as possible. The German Government therefore welcome the suggestion made verbally by His Excellency the French Ambassador–'

The Note added that the German Government

'now consider it advisable to refrain from further written elucidation of these matters and from stating their views in regard to the observations made in the French Note.'

* For text *see* Appendix One.

The experts, Dr. Gaus for Germany, Sir Cecil Hurst for Great Britain, M. Fromageot for France, M. Rollin for Belgium, sat in London throughout the first week in September. Signor Mussolini created general pleasure by sending an Italian jurist, Signor Pilotti, to take part in the meetings, thereby raising the hope that Italy would become a signatory of the pact. Signor Pilotti, it is true, took a tentative part in the work, his main object being to collect information for Signor Mussolini, and he went home at the end without being able to say whether Italy would join in. None the less it indicated an improvement in the general prospect of peace in Europe that the nervous, uncertain and harassed 'strong man' of Italy had at last decided to take at least an academic interest in the proposed security Pact. The experts who met at the Foreign Office were jurists. They approached the problems objectively. They were free from the humbug that often hampers the work of politicians, who, in everything they do or say (with few exceptions), have one eye on their electorate. The jurists' atmosphere was frank and friendly. The men were well known to each other, respected each other professionally, and had complete confidence in each other. Questions were asked and answered without any *arrière pensée*, and with no object but to elucidate the business in hand and prepare the way for the unfortunate politicians.

Dr. Gaus, for instance, might put a question about the British attitude at a moment when Sir Cecil Hurst was busy with M. Rollin. Sir Cecil would unhesitatingly leave the answer to M. Fromageot, who knows Sir Cecil Hurst and the British view upside-down and inside-out; just as M. Fromageot would have no hesitation in trusting

Sir Cecil Hurst with an exposition of the French view. Imagine Mr. Chamberlain leaving to M. Briand the job of explaining to Herr Stresemann the British view of the bilateral nature of the proposed pact; or M. Briand allowing Mr. Chamberlain to explain the French attitude to the proposed German-Czechoslovak and German-Polish Arbitration Treaties! Why not? Because they dare not. Jurists dare. That is why the work done in London during the first week of September transformed the whole problem. The jurists saw such principles as that of bilateralism as matters of common sense and common justice and they discussed formulæ for giving effect to the principles without worrying about Nationalist prejudices in any country. At the end of their work they each reported the progress made to their Foreign Ministers, Sir Cecil Hurst and M. Fromageot going to Geneva for the purpose.

The result was that after a quick consultation between Mr. Chamberlain and M. Briand in Geneva a new French Note was drafted which was delivered in Berlin on September 15, the simple purport of which was to invite the German Foreign Minister to take part in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the interested Powers.* It was the hope of the Allied Powers that the meeting would take place somewhere in Switzerland sometime early in October. Whether Signor Mussolini would join the German, Belgian, French and British Foreign Ministers was still unsettled, but the hope that he would, grew apace as a result of rumours current during the League Assembly meeting in Geneva and inspired by himself.

* For text *see* Appendix One.

The Allied invitation to Berlin for a Conference of Foreign Ministers was delivered on September 15. A German Cabinet meeting was held within a week with the result that Herr Sthamer went to the Foreign Office in London on September 26, and the other German Ambassadors did the corresponding thing in the other capitals, to deliver the German Government's answer to the invitation.

Mr. Chamberlain, who had been weeding his Sussex garden as a form of relaxation between Geneva and Locarno, came up to London specially for the purpose. The meeting between Mr. Chamberlain and the German Ambassador was protracted, and according to gossip which later events seemed to confirm, had its rough patches. On the following Tuesday night the Foreign Office issued the text of the German Note that had been delivered by the German Ambassador, in which the invitation to the Locarno Conference – thus called here for convenience, the exact place of meeting not having at that time been decided on – and the British answer to it. The British answer had been handed to the German Ambassador that same afternoon (September 29). Some interesting currents of diplomatic finesse preceded the decision to publish the Notes. When the German Ambassador gave the German Note to Mr. Chamberlain on September 26 he made a verbal statement (which, none the less, was written out in full as an *aide-mémoire*) expressing the German desire to raise at the Conference certain cognate subjects, or subjects regarded by the German Government as cognate. The most embarrassing of them was that of war guilt.

It was made clear that what chiefly worried the German

Government was the fear that in signing the proposed Security Pact she should at the same time be in effect signing again the Treaty of Versailles. That was an unnecessary fear, because it has never been thought either by the British or the French or the Belgian Government that the Pact had anything whatever to do with the Treaty of Versailles. It was something wholly outside the Treaty. That consideration, indeed, was mainly responsible for the British contention that the question of the Cologne evacuation – another of the points raised in the German Note – could not be co-ordinated with that of the Pact, for Cologne was a matter directly arising out of the Treaty.

It was officially announced from the Foreign Office on the afternoon of September 26 that the text of the German Note would be issued for publication in the papers of the following Tuesday morning. It was decided on the Monday however not to publish the Note, the reason being, as there seems to be no harm now in disclosing, that, on the one hand it would be difficult, if not misleading, to publish the Note without publishing the verbal statement which accompanied it, and on the other hand, the publication of the full dossier might have the undesirable effect of precipitating awkward discussions which ought to be reserved for the Locarno Conference itself. It was, therefore, decided not to publish anything.

On the following day, however, it was learned that the substance of the German Ambassadorial statements – for they were made indentically in London, Paris, and Brussels – were already being given out semi-officially in Berlin. The British Government, whose only concern in this whole business was to prevent any slip between the

cup and the lip and not to jeopardize the Locarno prospect by premature controversy in the countries concerned, found itself in a difficulty. On the afternoon of September 29, it decided to publish the whole dossier, including the verbal statements, and preparations were made for issuing them that night, the argument in favour of such a course being that a clean breast was better than partial disclosure. On further consideration, however, it was decided to publish only the formal German Note, which was a simple and unconditional acceptance of the Allied invitation, and the British answer. The verbal explanations of the German Ambassadors were on that line of argument regarded as Germany's affair.

The German Note ran as follows:–

'Sir.– By instruction of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the following.

The German Government have the honour to state, in reply to the Note of September 15 communicated by the British Chargé d'Affaires, that they entirely share the desire of the Allied Governments not to protract the negotiations for the conclusion of a Security Pact. They also trust that the final settlement of the problems under discussion will be expedited by a meeting of the members of the Governments of the States concerned, and they therefore, in accordance with their Note of August 27 last, agree to the proposal that this meeting should take place immediately.

They suggest October 5 as the date for the meeting planned to take place in Switzerland.– I have, etc.,

STHAMER.'

Now the British Government's answer to that Note could not be understood except in the light of the German 'verbal' memorandum which accompanied the German Note. The memorandum was not published officially, but was as follows:–

'At a moment when the Ministers of the interested Powers are about to meet for important conversations to consolidate peace between their countries, the German Government considers it necessary to inform the

British Government in full frankness of its attitude towards two questions which are most closely concerned with the purpose of those conversations.

In the former correspondence the Allied Governments have made the conclusion of a security Pact conditional on Germany's entry into the League of Nations. While the German Government has not challenged the linking together of the two problems, it is forced thereby to revert to a point which effects the question of German entry into the League of Nations, and which has already been mentioned in the German memorandum of September, 1924, addressed to the Governments represented on the Council of the League. The German Government now repeats the declaration made in that memorandum to the effect that the eventual entry of Germany into the League of Nations is not to be construed as a recognition of the allegation which was made to establish Germany's obligations, which implies a moral charge on the German people, and is made the foundation of Germany's international obligations. The German Government considers that the public notification (*see* annex) in that sense issued by the then German Government on August 29th, 1924, is of assistance to the object of an understanding and a sincere reconciliation between the nations, and for its part the German Government identifies itself with that proclamation with the express purpose of creating the condition of mutual esteem and true equality of rights such as is essential for the success of the confidential conversations now contemplated.

Moreover, the understanding and the reconciliation which are the objects in view would be prejudiced if before the entry of Germany into the League of Nations and before the conclusion of the Security Pact it were not found impossible to dispose of a dispute which still separates Germany from the Allies. The dispute referred to is that about the evacuation of the North Rhenish zone and the final settlement of the disarmament question. As long as the present situation continues – that is, as long as there continues the occupation of a large tract of German territory which is felt by the German people to be an injustice – there can be no faith in that peaceful development on which depends the efficacy of the contemplated international agreements. The German Government trusts that the British Government will accept these observations in the same spirit and loyalty in which they are made, and that it will recognise in them a sincere determination to smooth the way for the realisation of of the great work of peace now to be begun.'

ANNEX.

'Extract from the German Press, August 30 1924.

THE RECALL OF THE RESPONSIBILITY LIE

On the occasion of the passage of the Dawes legislation the Chancellor issues the following declaration in the name of the Government.–

The Government wishes to express its thanks to all the members of the

Reichstag who have contributed to this result. They have all had to overcome grave scruples and personal convictions before they could vote for acceptance. The Government cannot allow this important occasion, whereon they assume heavy responsibilities under the Treaty of Versailles to pass without defining its attitude to the question of responsibility for the war in clear and unambiguous terms.

The declaration (imposed on us by the Treaty of Versailles under the pressure of overwhelming force) that Germany caused the outbreak of the world-war by her aggression is contrary to historical fact. The Government of the Reich therefore asserts that it does not accept that declaration. The demand of the German people to be emancipated from the burden of this false accusation is a just demand. Until that has been done, and so long as a member of the community of nations is branded as a criminal to humanity, a real understanding and reconciliation between the peoples is impossible of realisation. The Government will take steps to bring this pronouncement to the knowledge of Foreign Governments.'

In the British Government's answer (September 29) to the German formal note, some outspoken observations were made on the informal memorandum.

'Your Excellency (it ran)–His Majesty's Government have received with pleasure the acceptance by the Government of the Reich of the proposal for a Conference on October 5 at Locarno. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the acceptance is given without reserve.

In reply to the declaration which your Excellency made to me at the same time, I have the honour to take note of the assurance of your Excellency that the questions therein raised do not constitute conditions preliminary to a meeting of Foreign Ministers. These questions have, in fact, no relation to the negotiations for a Security Pact, and have formed no part of the preliminary exchange of views.

As regards that part of the declaration which deals with Germany's entry into the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the German Government raise no objection to this essential condition of any mutual pact. The question of Germany's responsibility for the war is not raised by the proposed Pact, and His Majesty's Government are at a loss to know why the German Government have thought proper to raise it at this moment. His Majesty's Government are obliged to observe that the negotiation of a Security Pact cannot modify the Treaty of Versailles or alter their judgment of the past.

As regards the evacuation of the Cologne zone, I have the honour to repeat that the date of that evacuation depends solely on the fulfilment of Germany's disarmament obligations, and that His Majesty's Government

will welcome the performance of those obligations as permitting the Allies at once to evacuate the northern zone.'

Thus the British Note.

Fortunately, however, no storm arose. Mr. Chamberlain accompanied by his private Secretary, Mr. Walford Selby, his legal expert, Sir Cecil Hurst, and two experts from the Central European department of the Foreign Office, Mr. Miles Lampson and Mr. Sterndale Bennett, left London for Locarno on Saturday, October 3, and the conference began on the following Monday. On leaving Victoria Station Mr. Chamberlain made the sardonic remark, 'Wish me well, but don't expect too much.'

Within a fortnight he reaped a success beyond all expectations.

October 16, 1925, was the dual occasion of the initialling of the Locarno treaties and – appropriately enough – of Mr. Chamberlain's birthday. It was a historic occasion. On that day the Rhineland Pact, or as it is officially called, the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, together with the four arbitration treaties, between Germany on the one side, and Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other, were initialled, although the signing ceremony was deferred till December 1, to take place in London. The psychological effect of the Locarno treaties is of far greater moment than the mechanism of their detailed contents. To be in Locarno and to talk with the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned was to be convinced beyond doubt of the sincerity of the pacifism to which Locarno is now a monument. The word 'allies' was never used by any member of any delegation from the beginning to the end of the conference, and the word has now been deleted from the

vocabulary of European post-war diplomacy. Since the conference ended Mr. Chamberlain and other leading protagonists have dotted the 'i's' by pointedly speaking of 'former allies' and 'former enemies'.

The striking feature of diplomatic thought at Locarno was that goodwill was regarded as a realistic instrument, whereas treaties, conventions, pacts, covenants were in themselves regarded as worth little more than the paper they are printed on, except in so far as they are made potent by goodwill. It would be easy to find loophole after loophole in the Locarno texts for future war, just as it would be easy to find loopholes in any texts for any purpose whatever. So far as the diplomatic opinion of the seven countries is concerned, the only important thing done at Locarno – but it is all important – is that those countries have openly committed themselves to a pacifist policy in the future. For the first time in diplomatic history Great Powers have surrendered their historic 'right to make war' – the famous paradox of international law, *les droits de guerre* – and it will be next to impossible for them to recapture, even if they wanted to recapture, so dangerous a 'right.' The value of Locarno may be put in this way. Hitherto the mass of sensible people have longed for peace, but fear and stupid tradition have made them disbelieve in it, and the whole conception of international relations has been based on the hypothesis that there would be war, somewhere at some time. The difference now is that, whereas national honour in the past was bound up with war, it is now bound up with peace. After Locarno war is synonymous with national dishonour. The plunge has been taken in favour of pacifism, for the first time in European history.

It is common ground among all the diplomatists with whom one has discussed the matter that with the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, the door will be shut on the past ten years, and no matter how successfully the timid ones may look for the possibilities of war in the texts of the Locarno treaties, their discoveries will be of no avail, for those texts themselves will be of as great, and of as little, importance to the new order in Europe as the chrysalis is to the butterfly. After October 16, 1925, it became an anachronism to talk of the Polish difficulty, or of any of the stock difficulties of European diplomacy, as we have known them for the past seven years. They have vanished like mist.

Locarno was, as M. Vandervelde said to me in his room at the Grand Hotel in Locarno, not only an achievement but a beginning. For the first time since the War the ex-Allied nations met the Germans at the opening of a conference and on a footing of complete equality. No seats were marked out in the conference room; the delegates sat as accident disposed. The Dawes Conference of 1924 made a great advance in this sense, but at that conference the Allies met first and kept the Germans waiting until they reached an agreement. When the German delegates were invited to the conference room in London they found three sides of the table occupied and one side reserved conspicuously for themselves. They were handed the text of the Allied agreement and invited to withdraw and consider it. That occasion, it is true, was the first time since the War when the Allies asked something of Germany which Germany had a right to refuse. It was a great advance. At Locarno, however, the ground had been cleared by an exchange of notes

in which the initiative had come from Germany. The old Adam, it is true, had a long lease of life while the Allies co-ordinated their own ideas, but before the Locarno conference met, there had been held the jurists' conference in London at which Dr. Gaus, the German jurist, not only discussed but criticized the Allied drafts. When the delegates met at Locarno, they had before them a document which was known equally to them all, and it was not the same document as that originally proposed by Britain, France and Belgium. It was the document prepared by the jurists, including the German, who had made the suggestions which the other jurists had accepted as improvements. Within ten minutes of the formal opening of the Locarno Conference on October 5, the delegates were working on the jurists' draft as if it were an unopposed bill in the House of Commons. A week was taken in eliminating agreed clauses and reserving the more controversial clauses for further discussion. By the time the second week was reached the reserved difficulties had shed their terror. The delegates had become imbued with the desire and the determination to succeed, and, therefore, agreement was reached smoothly and without difficulty. At Genoa in 1922 everybody was threatening to go home all the time. At Locarno in 1925 no one could go home before success was reached. Success therefore was easy. It was the psychology of Locarno that was a big thing in European history.

Dr. Benesh, with whom I had a conversation in Locarno just before the treaties were initialled on October 16, summed up the achievement with his usual precision in this way:

'The importance (he said) of what has been accomplished to-day will alter the whole spirit of European affairs. In particular it will have the following affects:

(1) It will wipe out in a certain degree the past. The facts of the present situation are accepted by all parties as the basis on which Europe is to enter on a new life.

(2) A definite pact has been signed whereby the signatories undertake (*a*) not to make war (*b*) to respect the inviolability of the frontiers of Germany, France and Belgium. Therefore for the first time since the war the four Great Powers say the same thing. It is a tremendous advance on anything that has yet been accomplished. In one sense it is a partial Protocol, for whereas the Protocol aimed at the universal outlawry of war, the Pact outlaws it so far as one particular danger spot is concerned. For the first time in diplomatic history nations have renounced their sovereign "right to make war." That facts brings with it an entirely new conception of international war and peace.

(3) Arbitration treaties have been concluded which provide for arbitration on all points. It is an unexampled and tremendously important thing that Great Powers have agreed on arbitration for all questions without exception. The arbitration treaties are conceived in such a way that they restrict the possibility of war to such war as may be prescribed in fulfilment of Article 16 of the League Covenant.

(4) In spite of the fact that there is no Eastern Pact to balance the Western Pact–the seriousness of which is that Eastern conditions are hardly as stable as Western–yet the moral importance of the Western Pact will be a powerful influence for peace in the East.

(5) Central Europe will be consolidated. Settled peace on the Rhine means settled peace on the Danube.

(6) Russia will inevitably be drawn into the European system again, for it will no longer be possible for her either to maintain her isolation or to play on the differences of the Western Powers.

(7) In the United States, too, the established fact of a European consolidation of nations will have great influence in the future both as regards her general conception of European affairs and her own relations with Europe.'

CHAPTER SIXTEEN – MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S SHARE OF THE GLORY

The Locarno Treaties were largely the result of Mr. Austen Chamberlain's personal determination. It is true that the original proposal came from Germany, but the vagaries of Europe during the following eight months were such that the proposal could not have led to achievement had not Mr. Chamberlain persisted against all odds in working for it. Good work deserves its tribute. Mr. Chamberlain has made his mark on the world's history. Whether or not the European nations will remain true to the pacifist vows they made at Locarno – and it certainly seemed as if they might – Mr. Chamberlain's monument is that he was primarily responsible for inducing the nations, for the first time in history, to put their faith in pacifism and not in militarism. Pacifism is a philosophy which is much misunderstood. Its simplest definition is that it amounts to a realization that war, far from being an incident of a country's glory, is a form of imbecility, and is as disastrous (and rightly so) to the victor as to the vanquished. It is a difficult thing, as Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. MacDonald before him both found, to be a pacifist, because the human sheep of the world are terrified of everything, including security against terror. Men, therefore, wanting peace, are prepared to fight for it, and do not recognize therein their own fatuity. In an emergency no nation has yet risked its fortunes on the maintenance of peace. At Locarno seven nations undertook to do so, and it was the British Foreign Secretary who was acclaimed as the hero of the occasion. There was no formal president of the conference, but everyone referred to Mr. Chamberlain as president; he in practice led the conference; it was he

to whom difficulties were taken for advice and treatment. It was in a word Mr. Chamberlain's personal efforts, his simplicity of character, and his faith in the ideal, that directly produced the Locarno accomplishment.

After his return to London Mr. Chamberlain made the following statement to the British press (October 23):–

'I have been profoundly moved by the reception accorded to me and by the appreciation expressed by my sovereign, my colleagues and my country. I am deeply grateful for the kindness, which exceeds anything that I feel I can deserve. But I confess that I am a little frightened by so generous a recognition of the work done lest it should lead to exaggerated expectations, and I have for myself, personally, very present at the moment the warning that was addressed to those of whom all men speak well.

Let me say first and foremost that those of us who were at Locarno, and who had not represented our own countries, throughout all these difficult years, would be the first to recognise what we owe to the work of our predecessors, to their successes, and even sometimes to their failures. We were in many respects fortunate in the time and circumstances of our meeting and in the condition of public opinion that prevailed in our different countries. If we have merit, it is that we knew how to use the opportunities which came to us, and which had not occurred to others, and that we were true exponents of the great mass of feeling in our different countries.

Of my colleagues in that Conference I shall always have the warmest memories. Some were old friends. Some, I hope, will be friends henceforth. All animated by the same determined will to pull Europe out of the rut of suspicion and hate and fear in which she has lain these ten, and, indeed, for a good many years past, and to bring–if it were within the power of Ministers and Governments to do so–rest and appeasement to our much-tired people.

We were able without great difficulty to come to agreements, not only in regard to the situation in the west but also in regard to the situation in the east: agreements which do not indeed make war impossible–no human undertaking or human foresight can do that–but which render war infinitely less probable that it would otherwise have been, for the nation which disturbed the peace of consent made at Locarno would draw down upon it the execration of the world.

And nothing since my return has given me greater satisfaction than to see how the work of the nations represented at Locarno is welcomed by the rest of the world. There have in the past been many international agreements and alliances. I am not sure that this is not the first of comparable character of which it could be truly said, and is almost universally felt,

that while it gives security to those immediately concerned, while it reconciles old enemies without impairing old friendships, yet that it threatens no one, but helps to create peace and security.

I feel, therefore, a great underlying confidence that Locarno has made a real contribution to the peace of the world. The British Government, like the other Governments which were there represented, means to give full force to these agreements, and to draw their natural consequences from them. We have confidence in our own work. We shall be prepared to show that confidence. I hope that the confidence born among the Ministers sitting at Locarno, shared now by the Governments to which they have reported, will spread in ever widening circles among our people.

If the world and we ourselves are to draw the full advantages of these treaties we must put away some old memories, think of the past rather to avoid a repetition of old mistakes than to remember the mistakes of others, and face the new world, face the prospects that are open to us with confidence and trust in the loyalty of all the other nations, and in the faith that we have pledged.

I say with some confidence that as we get away from it Locarno will be seen to be the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace.'

The success of Locarno will be measured by the extent to which it leads to disarmament. The nations will disarm when they are no longer afraid of each other. Fear is the beginning and the end of war, of the militarism which leads to war, of the military discipline on which war depends for its conduct. It was a German Field-Marshal who made the sound and classic observation that Fear and Love are the two instruments by which the soldier must be governed, and that unfortunately Fear has to perform the lion's share. Fear is a hopeless motive from the start, and makes men produce the things they fear. Nations have spent their wealth and energies in training their citizens for war in self-defence: the only certain thing they have achieved has been war and catastrophe. In 1919 the man who repeated parrot-like the idiotic proverb *si vis pacem, para bellum* was set down simply as the idiot he was. In 1919 a British General made the popular emendation *si vis bellum, para bellum.*

Once a war is started, it is beyond the control of anybody to stop it at will. The Great War would have been stopped in 1916, when Germany made her first peace offer, if patriotism or common sense on either side had decided the issue. Millions of lives would have been saved, and much of the wreck of the European economic structure. Lord Lansdowne had the courage and the patriotism to be openly pacifist in 1916, because he realized that dead Englishmen are of less use to England than live ones, and that a national debt of something like £2,000,000,000 with the prospect of an almost unbearable income tax were not, on their merits, desirable. The motive of those who reviled Lord Lansdowne was, of

course, not evil. They said and believed that the German Government was insincere in its 'peace offensive' of 1916 that Germany merely wanted to escape the threatened retribution. It is all too easy to admit the danger there was in ending the war in 1916, the danger, that is, of a renewed war on terms more favourable to Germany. But what was the actual alternative? Two more years of war, of the bloodiest war in history, the slaughter of a whole generation of English boys and the boys of other nations, and economic ruin all round. To avoid the risk of more war, what did men choose? They chose more war. As if a man, for fear of drowning, should throw himself into the sea for the precise purpose of drowning! Fear works odd things.

After the war many so-called Conservatives realized that their practise hardly tallied with their principles. As Conservatives it was their business to conserve what was best in the old order, to safeguard tradition in so far as it was a good tradition, to maintain peace and prosperity and to prevent bloody revolution. There are Conservatives, real Conservatives, consistently pursuing their admirable ends. They are few. They are one and all pacifists, of course. Most of the crowned heads of Europe, all the aristocracies belong to that category. The aristocrats and the uneducated labourers are alike in many ways, for extremes meet, and they are alike in having no interest in war, and no misguided feelings of patriotism about war. Both classes are insignificant both in number and in influence on affairs. It is the bourgeois, that vast mass of middle-class people, embracing everybody except the bedrock labouring class and the blue aristocracy, that heterogeneous mosaic of conflicting

tempers, conflicting ambitions, conflicting qualities – it is the bourgeois who rule the world, and who have been responsible for the political hell we have lived through. The Russian Lenin was original in this, that, being a bourgeois himself, he diagnosed the evil that is done by the bourgeoisie of all countries; but being bourgeois, of course, he proceeded to act accordingly and to replace one hell by another.

The curse of so-called 'Conservatism' in Great Britain comes from those all-important bourgeois of every trade and of every profession who give their support, as they think, to the Conservative party, and who never did and never will understand what Conservatism means. Both in England and in Germany during the war the backbone of the war spirit was provided by the bourgeoisie. One remembers the German professors, and wonders why their intellect could not save them from themselves. It is incredible, but it is true, that from 1916 to 1918 the bourgeois of all countries, calling themselves Conservatives, clamoured for war to the end. What did they effect? Bolshevism in Russia; the fall of the Emperor of Germany, of the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, Bolshevism in Hungary and in Italy, followed in the last-mentioned case by that inverted form of Bolshevism, Fascismo; and the first Labour Government in the history of Great Britain. One takes off one's hat to the first Labour Government in Great Britain: but that is not the point. The point is that the Conservative and Liberal bourgeoisie who formed the ruling class in 1914 did not aim at abdicating their power to a Labour party, any more than their counterparts elsewhere aimed at Bolshevism. The social revolution was the work of

fools who called themselves Conservatives – Conservatives who, wanting to conserve, succeeded only in destroying; who, wanting security against revolution plunged into the bloodiest form of revolution, international war. Why? Because they were afraid. Fear is the death of common sense. British Conservatives were afraid of Germany. Contrast their behaviour with that of the aristocrats and the labourers. Both those classes hated the war, and felt no illusion of patriotism. From 1916 onwards the aristocrats of Europe, enemy and allied alike, were intriguing in Switzerland to stop the War at all costs. The labourers went like driven oxen, driven by the bourgeoisie, to the slaughter-house of Flanders, and the strains of the National Anthem touched no responsive chord. Theirs was the dogged suffering of dumb, injured animals, incapable of expressing their suffering. In the meantime bourgeois journalists, bourgeois doctors, bourgeois parsons, bourgeois school-masters insanely shouted for war. The special conventions of war-time feeling, in which the very criterion of bourgeois good form was a man's capacity for acting like a soldier, and a woman's for acting like a snake-haired virago; all this was fairly typical of the bourgeois spirit. 'Peace at any price' was the cry of the true aristocrat, as of the true Conservative, while the muddled-headed bourgeois persuaded himself that 'national honour' could be satisfied only by national suicide. 'What is the true obstacle to a cause?' wrote Ronald Burrows; 'the stupidity of its followers.' It is the bourgeois, however, who have to be won over to common sense. They are the only people who matter politically. They are the people most susceptible to fear; and they are the people who are

trying hopelessly to win security while retaining armaments, who would rather be shot dead in a ditch than confess to pacifist feelings. Locarno gives them their opportunity. Unless Locarno is followed by disarmament, it will have failed after all. It is as impossible to avoid war between armed nations as it is to avoid drunken brawls between drunkards, and it is a serious dilemma which has made the nations want peace and yet to be so afraid of each other as to take war for granted and thereby to make war certain.

At Locarno the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland undertook never again to provoke a war. That was good diplomacy, for in diplomacy one has to be thankful for elementary things. Philosophically it is odd that there should have been any difficulty in reaching an agreement not to precipitate a war. The thing is on about the same philosophical level as would be a solemn attempt to agree not to lie across the railway lines when an express is dashing along. Practically, however, it is a difficult thing for the nations to agree not to exterminate each other, for diplomacy is still in a primitive stage, and the diplomats quarrel outrageously about matters of the most palpable simplicity and common sense. It is not primarily their fault, of course; but of the 'public opinion' which largely guides them, or cripples them. Seven years after the Great Slaughter, for instance, 50,000 people were going to Wembley every night for the pleasure of gazing at a military spectacle, the essential purpose of which was not to revolt people against war, but to arouse enthusiasm over military precision and drill. As if to pervert perversity still further, that unbelievable enter-

prize began with the parade of a child and ended with the singing of a hymn; and people's minds were encouraged to cherish and to perpetuate the delusion that war is an incident of patriotic sacrifice, whereas every serious man, woman and child knows that his country could suffer nothing worse than war, whether victorious or not, in any cause whatever. One knows the traditional argument that to be prepared for the worst is not the same thing as to want the worst: 'we don't want to fight, but by jingo . . . .' The unfortunate thing, however, is that to be prepared for war is to make war certain. Mr. Chamberlain, then, went to Locarno while the British public went to the Stadium at Wembley, and that epigram – for it is an epigram – being reproduced in different forms in France, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland, partly explained why it was that the diplomats had been beating about the bush for a whole year.

The determination and even enthusiasm shown by Mr. Chamberlain since Germany proposed the pact of Security at the beginning of the year is a matter on which the present British Government is to be congratulated by a grateful people. Whether, in fact, the people are grateful or not is a matter of doubt which is as illustrative of the muddle in human affairs as is the British Government's own inconsistency in other fields. Can it be believed that the same Government should be willing, even anxious, to sign a security pact, but should refuse to sign a treaty of 'all-in' arbitration with, for instance, Switzerland? Yet this matter has been put to the test, and the Government has refused. The British type of arbitration treaty operates for all questions except those

which affect the honour or the vital interests of the country. In other words Great Britain has concluded some 200 arbitration treaties for the purpose of settling disputes by arbitration instead of by war, but excludes from their field of operation precisely those disputes which most certainly lead to war. Suppose Mr. Chamberlain or Mr. Baldwin were to commit a murder in private life, as against in public life (that is in war), and they appeared before the magistrate and pleaded in this way: 'My lord, I accept the validity of our common law as the arbiter in all disputes in which I may become involved. But I make exceptions, and so far as those exceptions are concerned, I have no use for the law. The exceptions are these: where my personal honour is concerned or my vital interests, I reserve the right to commit murder without being interfered with by the police. In the present case the man I murdered was one whose existence threatened my vital interests. He was in fact an income-tax collector. I, therefore, murdered him, and I refuse to be answerable to any authority except my own Honour and my own Vital Interest.' What would happen? The jury would no doubt be dismissed pending a medical examination of the defendants by nerve specialists.

Lest it be thought that the allegation here made that the British Government's attitude to international law is in gross conflict with the individual attitude of its members to English law, be a misrepresentation, it is well to explain exactly what the position is.

The question of arbitration is not a new one as it affects the British Government. There happens to be a definite British policy on the subject, a policy that has been

recently reaffirmed as a result of a certain test case. When Mr. MacDonald supported and partly evolved the Geneva Protocol his main object was to institute a system of universal arbitration. Mr. Chamberlain, in rejecting the Protocol last March, and in other public declarations, has stated the present Government's case against 'all-in' arbitration. The two points of view were well summed up in letters from Mr. Chamberlain on the one side and from Mr. MacDonald on the other, published in the Press in the last week of September. The issue is best illustrated by the actual case in point, which was referred to above, namely by that of Anglo-Swiss relations. Switzerland was one of the many countries with which Great Britain had an arbitration treaty of a uniform pattern. All the arbitration treaties to which Great Britain is a party, including that with Switzerland, and numbering some 200, have been published, and their common feature is that the reservation is made that they shall not apply to issues which affect either the vital interest or the national honour of Great Britain. The Anglo-Swiss Arbitration Treaty was renewable every five years, and when it fell due for renewal some five years ago the Swiss Government proposed that its character should be altered by the elimination of the reservation clause – in other words that it should be made an 'all-in' arbitration treaty. As the British Government did not accept that proposal, both the proposed new treaty and the old existing treaty fell through. Since then the Swiss Government has renewed the proposal for an 'all-in' arbitration treaty, with the same result.

The reasoning which underlay the British Government's

attitude in 1920 and underlies that of the present Government is that, although in the case of Switzerland it is difficult to see what occasion could arise for arbitration, either on juridical points or on points which affect the national honour or vital interests, the acceptance of an 'all-in' arbitration treaty with any one country would establish a precedent. The old type of arbitration treaty would thereby become an anachronism, and it would be a matter of time only before all the other treaties were re-adjusted to the new pattern.

Mr. Chamberlain has explained the Government's inability to accept universal and compulsory arbitration and its preference for Article 15 of the Covenant as it originally stands. Similarly, the German Government in its many arbitration treaties provides for arbitration on juridical issues, but for political disputes goes no further than an advisory and conciliatory machinery. France, on the other hand, has concluded an 'all-in' arbitration treaty with Switzerland. The small Powers solidly favour universal compulsory arbitration. They point to the Corfu precedent as an illustration of the inadequacy of the present League machinery and of the differentiation it may lead to between big and small States. The principle of compulsory universal arbitration is one of bedrock importance, and its adoption by the world in general must precede any settled prospect of peace. The British Government has not yet seen its way to adopt it, but it seems reasonable to expect that after Locarno it will.

Now what conceivable purpose can be served by a refusal to adopt, as France has adopted, the whole-hogger arbitration type of treaty? Mr. Amery, conducting the British case at Geneva in the Mosul dispute,

waxed indignant, and rightly so, against the Turkish refusal to be bound in advance by an arbitral decision. Yet is there any difference between the particular Turkish attitude to arbitration as manifested in the case of Mosul and the general British attitude to the principle of arbitration? It may be conceded that while the British Government refused to accept the catholic principle of arbitration, it had no hesitation in applying the principle in the concrete case of Mosul. That is to the credit of the British Government. Yet harm is done to the cause of the world's progress when a Power of Great Britain's standing hesitates to take the plunge in advance and for all occasions. There can be no law, either within the boundaries of a State or in the international sphere unless that law be binding universally and without exception. A leading article in the *Manchester Guardian* hit the nail on the head when it argued that Mr. Chamberlain's refusal of an 'all in' arbitration treaty with Switzerland simply amounted to this, that he insisted on reserving to Great Britain the right to go to war with Switzerland, even though ingenuity could not devise any conceivable cause of war between the two countries.

Security, disarmament and universal compulsory arbitration are the three objects which diplomacy must achieve if the world is to have peace. Mr. Chamberlain has deserved well of his generation by achieving the first. He has, at any rate, induced the nations to recognize pacifism as an ideal. Until that was done, disarmament and universal arbitration were idle dreams. They are now practical possibilities.

Those men who believed in a war to end war – and they were in the majority – were responsible for what they

got. As in nature generally, so in human nature, we reap what we sow. The only consoling thought in the frightfulness of life is that effect follows cause, and that therefore wisdom may at some time or other come to us. The classical Greek tragedians two thousand four hundred years ago hammered on this theme. The appalling thought is that the process of achieving wisdom has to be counted, not in years nor in generations, nor even in centuries, but in thousands of years.

πολλῷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας
πρῶτον ὑπάρχει· χρὴ δ' ἐς τὰ θεῶν
μηδὲν ἀσεπτεῖν· μεγάλοι δὲ λόγοι
μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραὐχων
ἀποτίσαντες
γήρᾳ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν.

Thus the wise Chorus at the end of Sophocles' *Antigone*. 'The greatest part of happiness by far is wisdom. We must not slight the gods. Big words spoken by the insolent are punished by big blows, which in old age teach us to be wise.' Locarno may prove to be a historic landmark on the long road to chastened wisdom.

APPENDIX ONE – THE PRELIMINARY TEXTS

(1) THE GERMAN PROPOSAL (Translation)

Memorandum communicated on February 9, 1925, by the German Ambassador in Paris to M. Herriot, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Strictly confidential)

In considering the various forms which a pact of security might at present take, one could proceed from an idea cognate to that from which the proposal made in December, 1922, by Dr. Cuno sprang. Germany could, for example, declare her acceptance of a pact by virtue of which the Powers interested in the Rhine – above all, England, France, Italy, and Germany – entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be eventually defined more specifically) *vis-à-vis* the Government of the United States of America as trustee not to wage war against a contracting State. A comprehensive arbitration treaty, such as has been concluded in recent years between different European countries could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared to conclude analogous arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts with all other States as well.

Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status ('gegenwärtiger Besitzstand') on the Rhine would also be acceptable to Germany. The purport of such a pact could be, for instance, that the interested States bound themselves reciprocally to observe the inviolability of the present territorial status on the Rhine; that they furthermore, both jointly and individually ('conjointement et séparément'), guaranteed the fulfilment of this obligation; and, finally, that they would regard any action running counter to the said obligation as affecting them jointly and individually. In the same sense, the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of the obligation to demilitarize the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken in Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. Again, arbitration agreements of the kind defined above between Germany and all those States which were ready on their side to accept such agreements could be combined with such a pact.

To the examples set out above still other possibilities of solution could be linked. Furthermore, the ideas on which these examples are based could be combined in different ways. Again, it would be worth considering whether it would not be advisable to so draft the security pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to include all States along the lines of the 'Protocole pour le Règlement pacifique de Différends internationaux' drawn up by the League of Nations, and that, in case such a world convention was achieved, it could be absorbed by it or worked into it.

(2) FRANCO-BRITISH CORRESPONDENCE

(*a*) French Memorandum of May 12

As they have informed the German Government in their Note of February 20 last, the French Government have studied, in common with their Allies, the suggestions contained in the Memorandum forwarded to them on February 9 by his Excellency M. von Hoesch.

The French Government and their Allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own.

Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantee of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace.

Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German Note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government, because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations:–

I

The Memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations.

Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace.

The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League.

This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations dated March 13, 1925.

II

The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties.

The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses.

Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the rights to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them.

III

The Memorandum of February 9 contemplates first of all the conclusion between 'the Powers interested in the Rhine' of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles:–

(1) Repudiation of all idea of war between the contracting States.
(2) Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States.
(3) A guarantee by the contracting States of the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarization of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty [of Versailles], of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war (an undertaking which, moreover ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States.

Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German Memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested.

It also goes without saying, and further results from the silence on this point of the German Memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the Treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.

IV

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts.'

France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present Note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact.

V

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the object aimed at by the pact could not be attained nor the peace of Europe completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

The arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in Paragraph IV, and would be backed by the same joint and several guarantee.

VI

In the opinion of the French Government the general guarantee of security necessary or the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively assured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole.

They consider, therefore, that all the agreements, the observance of which should in each case be guaranteed by the signature of the same Powers, ought to be co-ordinated in a general convention registered by the League of Nations, placed under the auspices of the League and capable of forming, as suggested in the German memorandum itself, the nucleus of a still more general pacific *entente*.

Finally, it goes without saying that if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realized, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The Allied Governments would be glad to receive a reply on this subject, which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

(*b*) French Answer of May 25, to certain British Objections of May 19.*

In the first place Mr. Chamberlain desired to know whether it was the intention of the French Government that the Note should be an expression of the views of the French Government alone, or, as the draft suggested, a communication to the German Government from the French Government, acting in concert with and in the name of the

* *The Times* summary.

interested Allies. To this question the French Government replied that its intention was not to reply in the name of its Allies, but in its own name in agreement with its Allies, and that it was prepared to alter the text of the Note in such a way as to leave no doubt in this respect.

Mr. Chamberlain asked for an explanation of what he considered to be an ambiguous reference to the third paragraph of the preamble to the Allies' desire to give the interested States supplementary guarantees of security 'within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles.' The French Government explained that it meant to specify that the pact proposed by Germany could not in any way contradict, infringe, or weaken the Treaty, and represented an offer of complementary guarantees.

In reply to Mr. Chamberlain's request for further light on the second and third paragraphs of Section II, the French Government explained that the object of the section was to state a reservation of general scope concerning the whole of the clauses of the League of Nations' Covenant and the Peace Treaty, especially those concerning frontiers and those which do not directly concern the Allied Powers. It was intended to cover Austria and Sleswig. 'Taking account of German public opinion and certain susceptibilities, the French reply expressly makes no mention by name of Austria, Poland, etc., as, according to German politicians and diplomats, such mention would have made it impossible for Germany to continue the negotiations.'

With regard to the word 'arbitration,' of which Mr. Chamberlain desired the French Government's definition, it was explained that the word had been taken in the most general sense of an attempt to exclude solutions by force. 'As to the means of attaining this object, it is only during the negotiation of eventual agreements that it will be possible to define them.' There was no question of encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Council of the League of Nations, for which procedure of settlement has been laid down by the Covenant.

Mr. Chamberlain made the following observations: 'The French draft contains the phrase that the arbitration treaties "should leave no room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated." But even in the latter case the French Government can hardly contemplate actual coercive action without a preliminary reference to some procedure for peaceful settlement, such, for example, as the Council of the League of Nations, in accordance with the general provisions of the Covenant?'

To this the French Government replied:–

'It is necessary to distinguish two cases:–

(1) Failure to observe the conditions of treaties or agreements, other than treaties of arbitration, existing between the parties. In this case failure to observe the conditions of these treaties or agreements

cannot give rise *ipso facto* to coercive action except in virtue of a special provision of the aforesaid treaties and agreements contemplating such action.

(2) Failure to observe arbitration treaties: the object of these is assuredly, as has been said above, to exclude solutions by force; but if such treaties are not observed it is necessary to recognise that their violation appears to be a possible justification for coercive action appropriate to the nature of the violation.'

In reply to the questions what exactly was meant by the phrase 'the joint and several guarantee' to be given to the arbitration treaties, what actual obligation would devolve on the guarantor, and would the guarantors be obliged to resort to force, and, if so, in what circumstances, the French Government explained that the guarantee would be given by all the signatories, who must in principle act together, but each individual signatory would be bound to act even if one or several of the others defaulted.

'A distinction must be drawn between a territorial guarantee and a guarantee given to an arbitration treaty. The first applies in case of the violation of a territory and necessarily involves resort to force in defence of that territory. The guarantee of an arbitration treaty, on the other hand, does not necessarily take that form. It infers any means, diplomatic or other, appropriate to the nature of the violation. We have purposely avoided defining its nature or extent. It goes without saying that in such a case each of the guarantors acts in such measure as he is able.

If, for example, Germany were to violate the Arbitration Treaty with Poland, Great Britain could not be automatically drawn in to a greater extent than is involved, in the first place, by the guarantee which she has given to the Arbitration Treaty under the conditions laid down above, and, in the second place, by her capacity as a member of the League of Nations. In return, France could not be deemed to violate the Rhineland Pact if she should be called upon to help Poland.

This very example demonstrates the necessity of making simultaneous the eventual conclusion of a Rhineland Pact with the conclusion of arbitration treaties between Germany and the neighbouring Allied States, as indeed Germany herself proposes.'

As for the reference to the existing rights and obligations of the Allied Powers under the Covenant of the Treaties of Peace, if arbitration treaties were not concluded between Germany and the Allies who did not participate in the Rhineland Pact, this latter pact might be invoked by Germany to impede any assistance given to those Allied States in conformity with the Covenant of the League.

The French Government explained that in placing the whole of the guarantee pacts and agreements under the auspices of the League of

Nations, it was not its object to create for the other members of the League of Nations the same obligations as for the signatories of the agreements. The intention was merely to place the agreements under the high moral authority of the League in order to enable the League, in case of need, to establish the legitimacy of action undertaken in accordance with the terms of the agreements and the conformity of such action with the Covenant, and the principles on which the Covenent rests.

(*c*) Chamberlain Memorandum of May 28.*

In his Memorandum of May 28, Mr. Chamberlain set out first of all the point of view from which the British Government had itself approached the German proposals and the principles by which it had been guided in examining both those proposals and the suggested French reply.

In accordance with the principles laid down in his own speeches to the Council of the League of Nations on March 12 and in his speech in the House of Commons on March 24, any new obligation which the British Government undertook must be specific and limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement on the western frontier of Germany. The British Government was not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon it as a signatory of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Peace Treaties. At the same time, it did not itself question, or give any encouragement to others to question, the other provisions of the treaties forming the basis of the existing public law of Europe.

Mr. Chamberlain went on to express the British Government's appreciation of the conciliatory tone of the French draft, but he declared that the substance of it went in certain respects considerably beyond what his Government could endorse consistently with the principles enunciated above. For instance, the British Government, which, in view of the position of the British Empire, with its world-wide responsibilities, was bound to regard the question of participation in arbitration treaties of the kind contemplated from a different point of view to that of Powers whose interests lay mainly or exclusively in Europe, felt that, while for the continental Powers concerned the conclusion of the suggested arbitration treaties formed, as was stated in the French draft reply, the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact, this was not equally the case with Great Britain. Although the British Government was of opinion that it would be in the best interests of peace if the Rhineland Pact and the various arbitration treaties between Germany and her neighbours were to come into force simultaneously, it could not support the French proposal that all such arbitration treaties and the Rhineland Pact should form an indivisible whole and be co-ordinated in one general convention.

* *The Times* summary.

'Nevertheless, though His Majesty's Government are not prepared to go so far as the French Government suggest, yet they are prepared *in principle* (and, of course, subject to a careful examination of the actual terms ultimately proposed) to give a guarantee, flowing logically from the territorial guarantee of the Rhineland, to arbitration treaties which may be concluded between Germany and her Western neighbours, signatories of the pact. The type of guarantee which they have in mind would operate in the event of a failure on the part of one of the parties to refer a dispute to arbitration (using the term in its widest sense to cover both judicial awards and conciliation tribunals) or to carry out an award, if such failure were coupled with a resort to hostilities. The guarantee would be, so to speak, defensive; it would not entail upon His Majesty's Government – as they conceive it – any obligation to resort to force elsewhere than in the areas covered by the proposed Rhineland Pact; and would not operate in any event in favour of the party which had refused arbitration or had refused to give effect to an arbitral award.

'It is clear from the four preceding paragraphs that the French draft as it stands cannot be accepted as accurately conveying the extent and character of the obligations which His Majesty's Government are ready to assume and that its terms require amendment if they are to express not merely the views of the French Government but, as the French Government suggest, the common policy of the Allies.'

Instead of suggesting that the form of the Note should be changed so as to make it clear that it committed the French Government alone to the views and proposals contained in it, the British Government, recognizing to the full the great value and importance of an agreed statement of views common to the Allied Powers, strongly recommended that an effort should be made so to amend the draft as to achieve agreement. It had therefore ventured to remodel the French draft in such a way as to confine it to such a statement of policy as it believed was common to both countries and thus to avoid raising particular points of principle in which Great Britain could not *ab initio* concur. Mr. Chamberlain laid emphasis on the fact that his object had been to produce a statement of general principles without in any way committing either the British Government or its Allies to exact phraseology or to particular proposals whose exact shape could only be determined when the time was reached for considering a draft instrument to give effect to those general objects.

The preamble and the first three sections of the French draft, he went on to say, remained unaltered in the revised version. But while accepting them as they stood, the British Government felt bound to point out that they were couched in terms so wide that it must reserve its liberty to define more precisely at the proper time the interpretation which was to be placed upon them. This of course necessarily applied to the

whole document; with this general reserve, the British Government only desired to make two specific remarks concerning the first three sections.

First, it was understood that the effect of Section I was that Germany's entry into the League was an essential but not a prior condition of the agreement contemplated. The agreement would, however, be so framed that it would only become operative on Germany joining the League.

Secondly, the British Government desired specifically to endorse the observation in Section III that Belgium ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested. This was so self-evident that the omission of Belgium's name from the German proposals could only have been due to an oversight, as, indeed, the German Government had since explained.

The proposed British alterations to the late sections may be seen from the following extract from the parallel drafts:–

IV	IV
The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts.'	The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States, parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts.'
France considers that such arbitration treaties would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that they should apply to all disputes of whatever nature, and should not leave room for coercive action save in case of failure to observe the provisions of the various treaties and agreements contemplated in the present note. To give full effect to these treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers who participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact.	France considers that *an arbitration treaty of the kind proposed* would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that *as between herself and Germany it would* apply to all disputes of whatever nature and should not leave room for coercive action *save where such action may be taken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties. It is hoped that the Belgian Government will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty.*

To give full effect to these *two* treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, *so as to*

ensure that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring the guarantee into immediate operation. In the absence of a resort to hostilities, the Council of the League shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

V

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the object aimed at by the pact could not be attained nor the peace of Europe completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

The arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in paragraph IV and would be backed by the same joint and several guarantee.

VI

In the opinion of the French Government the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively assured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole.

V

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, *towards which the pact is an essential step, could not be* completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

VI

Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note would affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the covenant.

They consider therefore that all the agreements, the observance of which should in each case be guaranteed by the signature of the same Powers, ought to be co-ordinated in a general convention registered by the League of Nations, placed under the auspices of the League and capable of forming, as suggested in the German memorandum itself, the nucleus of a still more general pacific *entente*.

Finally, it goes without saying that if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realized, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The Allied Governments would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

VII

The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously.

Finally, it goes without saying that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realized, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The *French* Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

(*d*) Briand Note of June 4.*

The French Government considered that its anxiety to maintain the general peace and the liberty of all the nations of Europe as well as the exigencies of its own national defence precluded it from limiting its preoccupations to solicitude for its own security alone. Its view was that any attempt to modify by force the state of affairs created by the treaties would constitute a menace to peace to which France could not remain indifferent. That was why, in its draft reply to the German proposals, it considered it essential to preserve its liberty to go to the assistance of States to which it deemed it necessary to grant its guarantee without

* *The Times* summary.

the provisions of the proposed Rhineland Pact being able to block its way and thus be turned against it. The verbal explanations which have reached it from the British Government have given it a firm assurance of this. In French eyes this was an essential condition of the proposed pact; and in view of the capital importance of this reservation for the maintenance of peace it was indispensable that it should be clearly expressed in the reply to Germany; to keep silence on this point would be to risk giving rise to wrong interpretations of the Rhineland Pact and encouraging dangerous aspirations. Such is the object of the new wording proposed for Paragraph 2 of Section IV and of the restoration of Paragraph 4 of Section V, appropriately amended.

M. Briand enclosed the text of the British amendments and the French modifications, which were very few, in two columns, as follows:–

SECTION IV

British Amendments	*New French text*
Paragraph 1.–Unchanged.	Paragraph 1.–Unchanged.
Paragraph 2.–France considers *that an arbitration treaty of the kind proposed* would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that as *between herself and Germany* it would apply to all disputes of whatever nature and should not leave room for coercive action *save where such action may be taken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties. It is hoped that the Belgian Government will be disposed to enter into a similar treaty.*	Paragraph 2.–France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact. But it must be understood that as between France and Germany such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties [or in the case of failure to observe a treaty guaranteed by the parties or by any one of them.] An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary.
Paragraph 3.–To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which (also) participate in the territorial guarantee contained	Paragraph 3.–To give full effect to these two treaties their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained

in the Rhineland Pact, *so as to ensure that any failure to refer a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an award would, if coupled with a resort to hostilities, bring the guarantee into immediate operation. In the absence of a resort to hostilities the Council of the League shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the Treaty.*

in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measure.

Where one of the contracting parties without resorting to hostile measures fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the Treaty.

SECTION V

Paragraph 1.–Unchanged.

Paragraph 1.–Unchanged.

Paragraph 2.–The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, *towards which the Pact is an essential step, could not be* completely guaranteed.

Paragraph 2.–The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that, in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact tends to consolidate and of which it is to constitute an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed.

Paragraph 3.–Unchanged.

Paragraph 3.–The Allied States, in fact have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves; nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present Note can affect these rights and obligations.

Paragraph 4.–Entirely omitted.	Paragraph 4.–These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in Section IV. The powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and of the proposed Rhineland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties.

SECTION VI

Paragraph 1. – *Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present Note would affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant.*	Paragraph 1.–The British paragraph should be omitted since the idea which it expresses is more appropriately placed in paragraph 3 of Section V, which has been extended in this sense. Section VII of the British amendments thus becomes once more Section VI.

SECTION VII

Paragraph 1.–The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured *unless all the agreements aimed at in the present Note come into force simultaneously.*	Paragraph 2.–The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present Note come into force simultaneously. These agreements, in conformity with the Covenant, ought to be registered by the League of Nations and placed under its auspices.
Paragraph 2.–Unchanged.	Paragraph 3.–Unchanged.
Paragraph 3.–Unchanged.	Paragraph 4.–Unchanged.
Paragraph 4.–The *French* Government in place of 'Allied Governments.'	Paragraph 5.–The English text accepted.

(*e*) CHAMBERLAIN LETTER TO BRIAND, GENEVA, JUNE 8

'Your Excellency,

Shortly before my departure for Geneva the French Ambassador in London, acting on your Excellency's instructions, was good enough to

communicate to me a copy of a dispatch, dated June 4, which he had received from you concerning the proposals for a pact of security made by the German Government to the French Government on February 9 last.

'This document has been carefully examined by His Majesty's Government, who note with pleasure that the French Government are ready to accept in the main the modifications in the French draft reply to the German proposals suggested in my dispatch to Lord Crewe of May 28, a copy of which was handed to you by his Excellency. The effort which this acceptance represents on the part of the French Government to achieve the greatest common measure of agreement between themselves and His Majesty's Government is highly appreciated. His Majesty's Government, fully alive to the advantage of dispatching the reply to Germany at the earliest possible moment, are happy to find that the further amendments now proposed by the French Government are of such a nature that their consideration need not delay matters. For their part, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept them, with only one exception. The French Government suggest that Section VI of the British counter-draft should be omitted. This section stipulated that nothing in the proposed treaties should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant. The view of the French Government appears to be that this section is rendered unnecessary by the sentence which they now propose to add to the third paragraph of Section V, which, in effect, stipulates that nothing in the proposed treaties should affect the rights and obligations of the Allied Powers under the Covenant of the League and the peace treaties. But if the amended Section V is carefully compared with Section VI of the British counter-draft, it will be seen that they do not quite cover the same ground. For, whereas the latter is widely drawn so as to safeguard all rights and obligations under the Covenant, the former is restricted to the rights and obligations of the Allied States. His Majesty's Government therefore desire that Section VI in their counter-draft should be retained. They are inclined to agree with the French Government that it is superfluous to retain both Section VI and the amended third paragraph of Section V, since the idea conveyed in the latter is contained in a wider form as regards the Covenant of the League of Nations in Section VI, and as regards the peace treaties in Section II. At the same time, if the French Government prefer to retain the third paragraph of Section V, His Majesty's Government have no difficulty in accepting it.

'There is only one other point raised in your Excellency's dispatch to M. de Fleuriau to which His Majesty's Government desire at this stage to refer. The French Government are right in assuming that His Majesty's Government recognize that the proposed Rhineland Pac

cannot operate as a barrier to prevent France from taking action in conformity with such guarantees as she may have given to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany's neighbours and they therefore concur in Section IV of the proposed reply as at present drafted. His Majesty's Government, in fact, regard this proposition as self-evident and as applicable equally to all States signatory of the proposed pact. It is one to which, if rightly understood, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the ready assent of any of the parties concerned, for it is a particular application of the general theory which, in the interests of all the parties, must be at the base of the mutual settlement now in contemplation. It would clearly be inequitable that the proposed Rhineland Pact should in any circumstances operate in favour of any signatory Power which subsequently broke the treaty obligations into which it had entered. The Pact and its cognate agreements must necessarily be so drafted that, on the one hand, they will give the fullest possible security to all the Powers concerned so long as they abide by their treaty undertakings, and that, on the other hand, they cannot be invoked by a guilty Power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful breach of its treaty obligations.

'It is subject to this statement of principle, which not only appears to His Majesty's Government right in itself, but also, as I am happy to think, expresses the views and intentions of France, that His Majesty's Government welcome the present proposal and concur in the terms in which it is now expressed.

I have, etc.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.'

(3) THE FRENCH REPLY (Translation)

Note from the French Government to the German Government handed to Herr Stresemann by the French Ambassador at Berlin on June 16, 1925.

As they have informed the German Government in their note of February 20 last, the French Government have studied, in common with their allies, the suggestions contained in the memorandum forwarded to them on February 9 by his Excellency M. von Hoesch.

The French Government and their allies regard the step taken by the German Government as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own.

Wishing to give to all the States concerned supplementary guarantees of security within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, they have examined the German proposals with all the attention that they merit in order to judge what elements they may afford for the consolidation of peace.

Before embarking, however, on an examination in detail of the German note, it has appeared desirable to set out clearly the questions which it raises, or may raise, and on which it is important to know the views of the German Government, because a preliminary agreement concerning them appears to be the necessary basis for any future negotiations:–

I

The memorandum only mentions incidentally the League of Nations. Now the Allied States are members of the League of Nations and are bound by the Covenant of the League, which involves for them clearly defined rights and obligations with the object of maintaining general peace.

The German proposals no doubt lay claim to the same ideal, but no agreement could be achieved unless Germany on her side assumes the obligations and enjoys the rights laid down in the Covenant of the League.

This agreement, then, can only be conceived if Germany herself enters the League of Nations under the conditions laid down in the note from the Council of the League of Nations, dated March 13, 1925.

II

The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the Peace treaties.

The agreements to be concluded ought not, therefore, either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses.

Thus the Allies cannot in any case give up the right to oppose any failure to observe the stipulations of these treaties, even if the stipulations in question do not directly concern them.

III

The memorandum of February 9 contemplates first of all the conclusion between the 'Powers interested in the Rhine' of a pact which might be inspired by the following principles:–

(1) Repudiations of all idea of war between the contracting States.
(2) Strict respect for the existing territorial situation in the Rhineland, with a joint and several guarantee by the contracting States.
(3) A guarantee by the contracting States for the execution of the obligations concerning the demilitarization of the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken under Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The French Government do not fail to appreciate the value of the cause of peace, side by side with a renewed affirmation of the principles inscribed in the Treaty of Versailles, of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war

(an undertaking which, moreover, ought not to contain any time-limit) between the contracting States.

Those States must clearly include Belgium, who is not expressly named in the German memorandum and who ought to be a party to the pact as a State directly interested.

It also goes without saying, and, further, results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.

IV

The German Government next declare themselves prepared to conclude with France and with the other States parties to the Rhineland Pact, arbitration treaties guaranteeing 'a peaceful settlement of juridical and political conflicts.'

France considers that an arbitration treaty of the kind which Germany proposes would be the natural complement of a Rhineland Pact, But it must be understood that, as between France and Germany, such a treaty ought to apply to all disputes, and ought not to leave room for coercive action save where such action shall be undertaken consistently with the provisions of treaties in force between the parties, or of the Rhineland Pact or in virtue of the guarantee given to an arbitration treaty by the parties or by any one of them. An arbitration treaty of the same kind between Belgium and Germany would be no less necessary.

To give full effect to these two treaties, their observance ought to be assured by the joint and several guarantee of the Powers which also participate in the territorial guarantee contained in the Rhineland Pact, so as to bring this guarantee into immediate operation, if one of the parties, refusing to submit a dispute to arbitration or to carry out an arbitral award, resorts to hostile measures.

Where one of the contracting parties, without resorting to hostile measures, fails to observe its undertakings, the Council of the League of Nations shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the treaty.

V

In their memorandum the German Government added that they were ready to conclude with all States who were so disposed arbitration treaties of the same kind.

The Allied Governments note this assurance with satisfaction. They even consider that in the absence of such agreements between Germany and those of her neighbours who, without being parties to the suggested Rhineland Pact, are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace of Europe, which the Rhineland Pact tends to consolidate and of

which it is to constitute an essential element, could not be completely guaranteed.

The Allied States, in fact, have, under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Peace, rights which they cannot possibly give up and obligations of which they cannot possibly divest themselves.

These arbitration treaties thus conceived would have the same scope as those contemplated in Section IV. The Powers signatories of the Treaty of Versailles and of the proposed Rhineland Pact would have the option, if they so desire, of constituting themselves the guarantors of such arbitration treaties.

VI

Nothing in the treaties contemplated in the present note should affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations under the Covenant of the League.

VII

The general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be completely ensured unless all the agreements aimed at in the present note come into force simultaneously.

These agreements, in conformity with the Covenant, ought to be registered by the League of Nations and placed under its auspices.

Finally, it goes without saying, that, if the United States were to find it possible to associate themselves with the agreements which would thus be realized, France would be only too happy to see the great American nation participate in this work of general peace and security.

Such are the principal points on which it has appeared necessary to obtain precise knowledge of the views of the German Government.

The French Government would be glad to receive a reply on this subject which will permit the opening of negotiations with the object of concluding agreements which will constitute a new and effective guarantee of peace.

(4) THE GERMAN NOTE OF JULY 20

The German Government have thoroughly examined the reply to the German Memorandum of February 9, which was delivered by his Excellency the French Ambassador, M. de Margerie, on June 16. They gather from it with satisfaction that the French Government and their Allies are disposed in principle to co-operate with the German Government for the consolidation of peace by way of mutual understanding and to enter into an exchange of views about the matter.

Before, however, embarking on an examination in detail, the Allied Governments wish the questions touched upon in the German Memorandum to be further elucidated, and for their part make a number

of concrete proposals, upon which they ask the German Government to state their view. Although these proposals are based on the suggestions of the German Memorandum, yet they give them another direction on important points and also add to them new constructions. The German Government animated by the same spirit of goodwill and peaceful understanding which prompted their own suggestions, will state their opinion about the Allied proposals as follows. In doing this, however, they believe that they should confine themselves to a general statement on some questions of principle and reserve their attitude on points of detail for the final negotiations to come:–

I.–The Allied Governments, in their Note of June 16, emphasize that the settlement of the question of security must not involve a modification of the Treaties of Peace. The German Government cannot clearly make out from what is said in the Note about this point what the intentions of the Allied Governments are. The conclusion of a Pact of Security as outlined in the German suggestions does not represent a modification of existing treaties. There should, therefore, be no need for special statements in this respect. The German Government consider as self-evident that it is not meant to exclude for all future time the possibility of adapting existing treaties at the proper time to changed circumstances by way of peaceful agreement. They may point out that even the Covenant of the League of Nations allows for such necessities.

If the Allied Governments emphasize, for instance, that the Pact of Security must not affect the treaty provisions in force concerning the military occupation of German territories, it is correct that the German Memorandum has not made the conclusion of the Pact dependent on a modification of those provisions. But should the Allied Governments intend to set those provisions up as sacrosanct for the future, the German Government would, in answer to this, like to point out that the conclusion of a Security Pact would represent an innovation of such importance that it could not but react on the conditions in the occupied territories and the questions of occupation in general.

II.–Under the system outlined by the Allied Governments for the Security Pact in their Note of June 16 a prominent part is assigned to the treaties of arbitration which Germany would have to conclude with her neighbour States who are signatories of the Treaty of Versailles The construction of the treaties of arbitration within this system leaves room for considerable doubts, which need further elucidation. The German Government contemplated treaties of arbitration such as have been concluded during the last few years by Germany as well as by a number of other Powers. Treaties of this kind, modelled on the corresponding terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exhaust, in the opinion of the German Government, the possibilities existing under the present conditions of bringing about, with prospects of practical

results, the arbitral settlement of conflicts among States. The Allied proposals appear to contemplate a different system. What chiefly attracts attention are the cases of exception provided for by the Allied Governments in which coercive action by one State against another State is to be permitted. In this respect the German Government, judging by the terms of the Note of June 16 and the correspondence published between the French and His Britannic Majesty's Governments, cannot but assume that in those cases, in the opinion of the Allied Governments, coercive action can take place, without any regular procedure laid down in advance either by arbitral or some other international procedure.

If this is correct, the result would be that the Allied Governments, for instance, would not wish to subject the decision on the question of the admissibility or inadmissibility of reprisals on account of reparation obligations to a regular procedure, but would leave the decision to their own unilateral discretion. A further result would be that the German Government would by treaty have to concede to the Allied Governments the right to take military measures against Germany without any preceding regular procedure, whenever they are of opinion that Germany had infringed the provisions regarding the demilitarization of the Rhineland.

Just as serious would be the consequences which might result from the form, as proposed by the French Note, of the guarantee for the treaties of arbitration, the conclusion of which is suggested. Although the intervention of the guarantor would be dependent upon definite conditions, he would nevertheless be entitled to decide on his own free judgment whether in the case under consideration these conditions in fact exist. This would mean that, should a conflict arise, it would be for the guarantor to decide which of the two contracting parties to the treaty of arbitration is to be considered the aggressor, and he would have the right to decide, even if he were bound to one of the contracting parties by a special alliance.

It is quite clear that the system of guarantees would by such constructions be invalidated to the sole detriment of Germany. Real pacification as aimed at by the German Government in concert with the Allied Governments would not be reached. The German Government, therefore, hope that their misgivings concerning these points can be removed by the Allied Governments. They believe that they can all the more expect this, as otherwise the guarantee system could not be brought into harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Whereas, according to the Covenant, the question whether a disturbance of peace exists has to be decided by a carefully regulated procedure, and the application of coercive measures is subject to conditions which have to be conclusively established, all these decisions, according to the system outlined in the French Note, would be put

into the hands of one of the contracting parties. Such a system would not maintain peace and might even give rise to the danger of serious complications.

III.– According to the opinion of the German Government the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations would not be a necessary condition for the realization of the fundamental ideas of the German Memorandum. The Allied Governments, however, on their part, are of the opinion that the Security Pact, as suggested in the German Memorandum, is only conceivable if Germany enters the League of Nations. In view of the great importance which the German Government attach to the solution of the security question, they will in principle not raise any objection against the linking up of the two problems. They must, however, draw attention to the fact that the question of Germany's entry still needs to be carefully cleared up.

The standpoint of the German Government in this question is known to the Allied Governments from the Memorandum handed to them in September last, as well as from the German Note addressed to the League of Nations on December 12 last. The Note of the Council of the League of Nations of March 13 last mentioned in the French Note, has not removed the objections that have been expressed by Germany against the acceptance of the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant. Even after the explanations by the Council of the League of Nations, the danger remains that Germany as a disarmed country, surrounded by strongly armed neighbours, in a central position, having been in history repeatedly the theatre of great wars, would after entering the League of Nations be exposed without limitation to the danger of being involved in the armed conflicts of third countries.

Germany, as a member of the League of Nations, can only be considered as enjoying equal rights when her disarmament is followed by the general disarmament provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, if the immediate entrance of Germany into the League of Nations is to be rendered possible, a solution has to be found to tide over the time till general disarmament has become a reality. This solution would have to pay due regard to the special military and economical as well as to the special geographical situation of Germany.

With regard to the contents of the Note of June 16, the German Government wish to confine themselves for the present to these remarks. In spite of the doubts and apprehensions indicated, they are able to note that on essential points a significant *rapprochement* of the views of the two sides has already taken place. The interested Governments are in principle unanimous in the earnest desire to settle the security problem by a Guarantee Pact, as suggested by Germany, and by further development of the system of arbitration treaties. Where there still exist doubts and differences of opinion concerning the details of such a settlement,

these also can be overcome, if the Governments keep their eyes fixed firmly on the goal to be reached, and do not lose sight of the indispensable requirements of equality and reciprocity. The German Government, therefore, believe they are justified in hoping that further discussions will lead to a positive result. They would heartily welcome an acceleration of these discussions, so that the urgent desire of the nations for reliable guarantees of peace and peaceful development, as well as for the restoration of the world's normal economic relations destroyed by the war, may soon be satisfied.

(5) FRENCH REPLY, AUGUST 24

The French Government have given careful consideration to the German Note of July 20, 1925. They are glad to observe the community of views which exists between the two Governments, and to realize that the German Government are as anxious as they are themselves to see the peace of Europe based upon an understanding which will ensure to the several countries supplementary guarantees of security. They note with satisfaction that the German Government, after careful study of the French Note of June 16 express their conviction that an agreement is possible.

The French Government, desirous of not delaying such an agreement, will confine themselves to such observations as an examination of the three essential points of the German Note have suggested to them in common with their Allies. The German Government, in passing over in silence certain questions raised by the French reply of June 16, desire apparently to intimate that they see no objection of principle thereto, but wish only to reserve their right to discuss points of detail.

I

The French Government are happy to note that the German Government do not seek to subordinate the conclusion of a pact of security to a modification of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.

The German Government, however, twice draw attention to the eventual possibility of concluding agreements under which the existing treaties might be adapted to changed circumstances and invoke, moreover, certain provisions of the Covenant. They also suggest the hypothesis of a modification of the conditions of the Rhineland occupation.

The French Government are well aware of the provisions of the treaty to which the German Note makes reference, nor, in their respect for international undertakings, have they any intention of evading any of the provisions of the Covenant. They would, however, remind the

German Government that the Covenant is itself primarily founded on a scrupulous respect for the treaties which form the basis of the public law of Europe, and that it defines as the first condition of the entry of a State into the League of Nations a sincere intention on the part of that State to observe its international obligations.

In agreement with their Allies, the French Government consider that the Treaty of Peace and the rights which Germany as well as the Allies possess thereunder must not be impaired; nor can the guarantees of its execution and the provisions which govern the application of those guarantees (and in certain cases contemplate their alleviation) be modified by the proposed agreements, any more than the Treaty itself can be modified.

However liberal the spirit, however pacific the intentions, with which France is ready to pursue the present negotiations, she cannot surrender her rights; and it is for this reason that the French Note of June 16 specified that the security pact could not 'affect the provisions of the treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.' The French Government, however, hereby renew, in so far as they are concerned, the declaration already made by the Allies to the effect that they intend scrupulously to observe their obligations.

II

The Allies are convinced that membership of the League of Nations would provide Germany, once she has entered the League, with the most efficacious method of establishing her requirements as other States have done in regard to their own interests. The entry of Germany into the League of Nations is the only solid basis for a mutual guarantee and a European agreement. It is not, in fact, from outside that a State can properly express reservations, which would thus assume the character of conditions; it is from within that it can submit its wishes to the Council in the exercise of a right common to all the States members of the League. It is thus with regret that we have read the reservations in the German Note declaring that the question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations required to be further elucidated on the ground that the Note dated March 13, 1925, from the Council of the League of Nations had not, according to the German Government, removed their objections.

The French Government are not qualified to speak in the name of the League of Nations. The Council, having had before them the reservations formulated by Germany, have acquainted the German Government with their decision. This decision was based on the principle of equality between nations, an equality which implies neither exception nor privilege in favour of any one of them.

So far as they are concerned, the Allied Governments can only adhere to their former statements and repeat that the entry of Germany into the League of Nations under the same conditions as are prescribed for everybody remains in their opinion the basis of any understanding on security. It is precisely the absence of such security which has hitherto blocked the initiation of that process of general disarmament which was provided for in the Covenant, and to which the German Note alludes.

III

The German Government have formulated certain reservations regarding the scope and character of the arbitral conventions to be concluded between Germany, on the one hand, and, on the other, either France or Belgium, signatories of the Rhineland Pact, or Germany's other neighbours, signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. These reservations are of such a nature as to limit the obligatory character of these conventions by conforming them to the treaties of arbitration which Germany has already concluded with some of her neighbours. These treaties simply resort in all cases to a permanent conciliation board, but the actual arbitral settlement provided for thereunder, while applying to the generality of cases, does not cover the most important, *i.e.*, those of a political nature, which are precisely those most liable to lead to war.

By such a procedure the provisions of the original German memorandum of February 9, 1925, which contemplated the conclusion of arbitration treaties which would guarantee the peaceful solution of political as well as juridical disputes, would be dangerously restricted. In the opinion of the Allies, an arbitration convention thus limited, in that it would not apply to all disputes between limitrophe Powers, would not be of sufficient value as a guarantee of peace; it would still leave open certain opportunities for war. Our primary object is to render impossible, under the conditions formulated in the Note of June 16, any fresh resort to force. We feel that this object can only be attained by means of some obligatory pacific settlement applying to all the issues which may arise. In our opinion, the principle of compulsory arbitration thus conceived is an indispensable condition for any pact of the nature proposed by the German Government in their Note of February 9.

The apprehensions which the German Government betray on the subject of the guarantee of an arbitration convention will scarcely withstand objective criticism. Under the system contemplated, the guarantor does not decide autocratically and unilaterally who is the aggressor. The aggressor defines himself by the very fact that, instead of submitting to a pacific solution, he resorts to arms, or violates either the frontier, or, in the case of the Rhine, the demilitarized zone. It is obvious that the guarantor, who will have the greatest interest in preventing such violations from whichever side they come, will, at the

first sign of danger, be sure to exercise all his influence for that purpose. Moreover, it will be the business of the limitrophe States themselves to see to it that this system of guarantee, conceived for their mutual protection, does not work out to their disadvantage. As for the system of guaranteeing an arbitration convention, it proceeds directly from an idea which was pronounced consistent with the spirit of the Covenant by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its last session at Geneva.

It would not seem impossible to establish provisions adapting the operation of the guarantee (whoever be the guarantor and whether the guarantee applies to frontiers or to arbitration) to the nature of the violation and to the circumstances and degree of urgency which might necessitate the immediate execution of this guarantee. In this connection an examination might be made whether some means could not be found of safeguarding the impartiality of the decisions come to, without diminishing the immediate and efficacious operation of the guarantee itself.

To sum up, on the three essential points of the German Note of July 20, 1925, the French Government, in agreement with their Allies and without claiming to evade the legitimate application of any of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, can only confirm their earlier remarks on the need for the scrupulous respect of the treaties. They are not qualified to discuss questions concerning the admission of Germany into the League of Nations, on which the Council of the League have come to a decision; finally, they trust that the proposed guarantees are capable of being laid down in terms both just and reasonable, and such as will not expose them to interpretations and applications which may be improper and unjustified.

The French Government, in agreement with the Allies, are conscious of the difficulties and of the delays involved in the continuation, by the exchange of Notes, of negotiations on such delicate questions. It is for this reason that, while again drawing attention to their Note of June 16, they confine themselves to these general observations without going into further details.

Such are the preliminary explanations which the French Government have to offer; they are tendered in all sincerity and their purpose is to remove all possibility of misunderstanding. The French Government, in agreement with their Allies, have now the honour to invite the German Government to enter into negotiations on this basis – negotiations which they for their part earnestly trust will result in the conclusion of a definite treaty.

(6) GERMAN NOTE OF AUGUST 27

The German Government have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the French Note of August 24.

They entirely share the opinion expressed at the end of the above Note that a continuation of the correspondence is scarcely calculated to lead to further elucidation of the questions connected with the conclusion of a security pact, and in their Note of July 20 they had given expression to the desire that discussions might be expedited as much as possible. The German Government, therefore, welcome the suggestion made verbally by his Excellency the French Ambassador that the legal experts of Germany, Belgium, France and Great Britain might meet as soon as possible in order to afford the German experts the opportunity to become acquainted with the views of the allied experts regarding the legal and technical aspects of the problems under discussion.

In these circumstances the German Government, having in the Note of July 20 defined their attitude concerning a number of the most important matters, now consider it advisable to refrain from further written elucidation of these matters and from stating their views in regard to the observations made in the French Note.

APPENDIX TWO—THE LOCARNO TREATIES

(1) THE FINAL PROTOCOL

The representatives of the German, Belgian, British, French, Italian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments, who have met at Locarno from October 5 to 16, 1925, in order to seek by common agreement means for preserving their respective nations from the scourge of war and for providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might eventually arise between them, have given their approval to the draft treaties and conventions which respectively affect them and which, framed in the course of the present conference, are mutually interdependent:

Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy (Annex A).
Arbitration convention between Germany and Belgium (Annex B).
Arbitration convention between Germany and France (Annex C).
Arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland (Annex D).
Arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia (Annex E).

These instruments, hereby initialled '*ne varietur*,' will bear to-day's date, the representatives of the interested parties agreeing to meet in London on December 1 next, to proceed during the course of a single meeting to the formality of the signature of the instruments which affect them.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France states that as a result of the draft arbitration treaties mentioned above, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have also concluded at Locarno draft agreements in order reciprocally to assure to themselves the benefit of the said treaties. These agreements will be duly deposited at the League of Nations, but M. Briand holds copies forthwith at the disposal of the Powers represented here.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain proposes that, in reply to certain requests for explanations concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations presented by the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, a letter of which the draft is similarly attached (Annex F) should be addressed to them at the same time as the formality of signature of the above-mentioned instruments takes place. This proposal is agreed to.

The representatives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that in strengthening peace and security in Europe it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

They undertake to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realization thereof in a general agreement.

Done at LOCARNO, October 16, 1925

(*Signed*) Luther, Stresemann, Emile Vandervelde, Arisde. Briand, Austen Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini, Al. Skrzynski, Edouard Benes

(2) THE SECURITY PACT

The text of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (Annex A of the Final Protocol) reads:

The President of the German Reich; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; the President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Ialy;

Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which animates the peoples upon whom fell the scourge of the war of 1914-1918;

Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralization of Belgium, and conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European conflicts;

Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties in force between them;

Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;——

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.– The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 or 43 of the said Treaty concerning the demilitarized zone.

Article 2.– Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.

This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of:

(1) The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous

paragraph or to a flagrant breach of Article 42 or 43 of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary;

(2) Action in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(3) Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.

ARTICLE 3.– In view of the undertakings entered into in Article 2 of the present Treaty, Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy.

Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties undertake to comply with such decision.

All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation commission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settlement are the subject of special agreements signed this day.

ARTICLE 4.– (1) If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation of Article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

(2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present Treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.

(3) In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or of a flagrant breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the Party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed

forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the Parties which have engaged in hostilities.

ARTICLE 5.– The provisions of Article 3 of the present Treaty are placed under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided by the following stipulations:–

If one of the Powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 shall apply.

Where one of the Powers referred to in Article 3, without committing a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision, the other Party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken; the High Contracting Parties shall comply with these proposals.

ARTICLE 6.– The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Treaty of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto, including the agreements signed in London on August 30, 1924.

ARTICLE 7.– The present Treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 8.– The present Treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other of the High Contracting Parties notified to the other signatory Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties; the Treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year from such decision.

ARTICLE 9.– The present Treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof.

ARTICLE 10.–The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva in the archives of the League of Nations, as soon as possible. It shall enter into force as soon as all the ratifications

have been deposited and Germany has become a member of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at LOCARNO, October 16, 1925.

(*Signed*) LUTHER, STRESEMANN, ÉMILE VANDERVELDE, A. BRIAND, AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, BENITO MUSSOLINI.

(3) ARBITRATION TREATIES

(*a*) GERMANY AND BELGIUM

The following is the text of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium:

The undersigned duly authorized, charged by their respective Governments to determine the methods by which, as provided in Article 3 of the Treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, a peaceful solution shall be attained of all questions which cannot be settled amicably between Germany and France, have agreed as follows:

PART I

ARTICLE 1.– All disputes of every kind between Germany and Belgium with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present convention and belonging to the past.

Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between Germany and Belgium shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those conventions.

ARTICLE 2.– Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure or to procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the

dispute may, by agreement between the parties, be submitted with a view to amicable settlement to a permanent international commission styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present convention.

ARTICLE 3.– In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according to the municipal law of one of the parties, falls within the competence of the national courts of such party, the matter in dispute shall not be submitted to the procedure laid down in the present convention until a judgment with final effect has been pronounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent national judicial authority.

ARTICLE 4.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission mentioned in Article 2 shall be composed of five members who shall be appointed as follows, that is to say: the German Government and the Belgian Government shall each nominate a commissioner chosen from among their respective nationals and shall appoint, by common agreement, the three other commissioners from among the nationals of third Powers; these three commissioners must be of different nationalities and the German and Belgian Governments shall appoint the president of the commission from among them.

The commissioners are appointed for three years, and their mandate is renewable. Their appointment shall continue until their replacement, and in any case until the termination of the work in hand at the moment of the expiry of their mandate. Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation, or any other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the manner fixed for the nominations.

ARTICLE 5.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be constituted within three months from the entry into force of the present convention. If the nomination of the commissioners to be appointed by common agreement should not have taken place within the said period, or, in the case of the filling of a vacancy, within three months from the time when the seat falls vacant, the President of the Swiss Confederation shall, in the absence of other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointments.

ARTICLE 6.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be informed by means of a request addressed to the President by the two parties acting in agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, by one or other of the parties. The request, after having given a summary account of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the Commisson to take all necessary measures with a view to arrive at an amicable settlement. If the request emanates from only one of the parties, notification thereof shall be made without delay to the other party.

ARTICLE 7.– Within 15 days from the date when the German Government or the Belgian Government shall have brought a dispute before the Permanent Conciliation Commission either party may, for the examination

of the particular dispute, replace its commissioner by a person possessing special competence in the matter.

The party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other party; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within 15 days from the date when the notification reaches it.

ARTICLE 8.– The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of inquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it, and lay down a period within which they are to make their decision.

At the close of its labours the Commission shall draw up a report stating, as the case may be, either that the parties have come to an agreement and if need arises terms of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement.

The labours of the Commission must, unless the parties otherwise agree, be terminated within six months from the day on which the committee shall have been notified of the dispute.

ARTICLE 9.– Failing any special provision to the contrary, the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall lay down its own procedure, which in any case must provide for both parties being heard. In regard to inquiries the Commission, unless it decides unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 3 (International Commissions of Inquiry) of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

ARTICLE 10.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall meet, in the absence of agreement by the parties to the contrary, at a place selected by its president.

ARTICLE 11.– The labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission are not public except when a decision to that effect has been taken by the Commission with the consent of the parties.

ARTICLE 12.– The parties shall be represented before the Permanent Conciliation Commission by agents, whose duty it shall be to act as intermediary between them and the Commission; they may, moreover, be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for that purpose, and request that all persons whose evidence appears to them useful should be heard. The Commission on its side shall be entitled to request oral explanation from the agents, counsel, and experts of the two parties, as well as from all persons it may think useful to summon with the consent of their Government.

ARTICLE 13.– Unless otherwise provided in the present convention the decisions of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be taken by a majority.

ARTICLE 14.– The German and Belgian Governments undertake to facilitate the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission, and particularly to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their territory and in accordance with their law to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or experts, and to visit the localities in question.

ARTICLE 15.– During the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission each commissioner shall receive salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the German and Belgian Governments, each of which shall contribute an equal share.

ARTICLE 16.– In the event of no amicable agreement being reached before the Permanent Conciliation Commission the dispute shall be submitted by means of a special agreement either to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by its Statute or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

If the parties cannot agree on the terms of the special agreement after a month's notice one or other of them may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application.

PART II

ARTICLE 17.– All questions on which the German and Belgian Governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision as provided in Article 1 of the present convention, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conventions in force between the parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty it shall be to propose to the parties an acceptable solution and in any case to present a report.

The procedure laid down in Articles 6–15 of the present convention shall be applicable.

ARTICLE 18.– If the two parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 19.– In any case, and particularly if the question on which the parties differ arises out of acts already committed or on the point of commission, the Conciliation Commission, or, if the latter has not been

notified thereof, the arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its Statute, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. It shall similarly be the duty of the Council of the League of Nations, if the question is brought before it, to ensure that suitable provisional measures are taken. The German and Belgian Governments undertake respectively to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial to the execution of the decision or to the arrangements proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and in general to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute.

ARTICLE 20.– The present convention continues applicable as between Germany and Belgium, even when other powers are also interested in the dispute.

ARTICLE 21.– The present convention shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratifications of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy. It shall enter into and remain in force under the same conditions as the said Treaty.

The present convention, done in a single copy, shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, the Secretary-General of which shall be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the two contracting Governments.

LOCARNO, October, 16, 1925.

(*b*) GERMANY AND FRANCE

The Arbitration Convention between Germany and France (Annex C of the Final Protocol) is identical *mutatis mutandis* with the arbitration between Germany and Belgium.

(*c*) GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia reads:

The President of the German Empire and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries, declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals, agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent, and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving without recourse to force questions which may become the cause of division between States, have

decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect and have named as their plenipotentiaries the following:——who, having exchanged, their full powers found in good and due form, are agreed upon the following articles:

Part I

Article 1.– All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past.

Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those conventions.

Article 2.– Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure or to procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the parties, be submitted with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present treaty.

Article 3.– In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according to the municipal law of one of the parties, falls within the competence of the national Courts of such party, the matter in dispute shall not be submitted to the procedure laid down in the present treaty until a judgment with final effect has been pronounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent national judicial authority.

Article 4.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission mentioned in Article 2 shall be composed of five members who shall be appointed as follows, that is to say: The High Contracting Parties shall each nominate a commissioner chosen from among their respective nationals and shall appoint, by common agreement, the three other commissioners from among the nationals of third Powers; these three commissioners must be of different nationalities and the High Contracting Parties shall appoint the president of the commsision from among them.

The commissioners are appointed for three years, and their mandate is renewable. Their appointment shall continue until their replacement, and, in any case, until the termination of the work in hand at the moment of the expiry of their mandate.

Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation, or any other

cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the manner fixed for the nominations.

Article 5.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be constituted within three months from the entry into force of the present convention. If the nomination of the Commissioners to be appointed by common agreement should not have taken place within the said period, or, in the case of the filling of a vacancy, within three months from the time when the seat falls vacant, the President of the Swiss Confederation shall, in the absence of other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointments.

Article 6.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be informed by means of a request addressed to the Presdient by the two parties acting in agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, by one or other of the parties.

The request, after having given a summary account of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the Commission to take all necessary measures with a view to arrive at an amicable settlement. If the request emanates from only one of the parties, notification thereof shall be made without delay to the other party.

Article 7.– Within 15 days from the date when one of the High Contracting Parties shall have brought a dispute before the Permanent Conciliation Commission either party may, for the examination of the particular dispute, replace its commissioner by a person possessing special competence in the matter. The party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other party; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within 15 days from the date when the notification reaches it.

Article 8.– The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of inquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it, and lay down a period within which they are to make their decision.

At the close of its labours the Commission shall draw up a report stating, as the case may be, either that the parties have come to an agreement and if need arises terms of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement.

The labours of the Commission must, unless the parties otherwise agree, be terminated within six months from the day on which the Committee shall have been notified of the dispute.

Article 9.– Failing any special provisions to the contrary, the Permanent Conciliation Committee shall lay down its own procedure, which in any case must provide for both parties being heard. In regard to inquiries

the Commission, unless it decides unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 3 (International Commissions of Inquiry) of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

ARTICLE 10.– The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall meet, in the absence of agreement by the parties to the contrary, at a place selected by its president.

ARTICLE 11.– The labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission are not public except when a decision to that effect has been taken by the Commission with the consent of the parties.

ARTICLE 12.– The parties shall be represented before the Permanent Conciliation Commission by agents, whose duty it shall be to act as intermediary between them and the Commission; they may, moreover, be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for that purpose, and request that all persons whose evidence appears to them useful should be heard. The Commission on its side shall be entitled to request oral explanations from the agents, counsel, and experts of the two parties, as well as from all persons it may think useful to summon with the consent of their Government.

ARTICLE 13.– Unless otherwise provided in the present treaty the decisions of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be taken by a majority.

ARTICLE 14.– The High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission, and particularly to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their territory and in accordance with their law to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or experts, and to visit the localities in question.

ARTICLE 15.– During the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission each Commissioner shall receive salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the High Contracting Parties, each of which shall contribute an equal share.

ARTICLE 16.– In the event of no amicable agreement being reached before the Permanent Conciliation Commission the dispute shall be submitted by means of a special agreement either to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by its Statute or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

If the parties cannot agree on the terms of the special agreement after a month's notice one or other of them may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application.

Part II

Article 17.– All questions on which the German and Czechoslovak Governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision as provided in Article 1 of the present Treaty, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conventions in force between the parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty shall be to propose to the parties an acceptable solution and in any case to present a report. The procedure laid down in Articles 6–15 of the present Treaty shall be applicable.

Article 18.– If the two parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

General Provisions

Article 19.– In any case, and particularly if the question on which the parties differ arises out of acts already committed or on the point of commission, the Conciliation Commission or, if the latter has not been notified thereof, the arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its Statute, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. It shall similarly be the duty of the Council of the League of Nations, if the question is brought before it, to ensure that suitable provisional measures are taken. The High Contracting Parties undertake respectively to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial to the execution of the decision or to the arrangements proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and in general to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute.

Article 20.– The present treaty continues applicable as between the High Contracting Parties even when other Powers are also interested in the dispute.

Article 21.– The present treaty, which is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not in any way affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the League of Nations, and shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article 22.– The present treaty shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as

the ratifications of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

It shall enter into and remain in force under the same conditions as the said treaty.

The present treaty, done in a single copy, shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, the Secretary-General of which shall be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

LOCARNO, October 16, 1925.

(*d*) Germany and Poland

The Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland is identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with that between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(4) GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE

Allies' Collective Note

The following is the text of the draft collective Note to Germany in regard to Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Annex F of the Final Protocol):–

The German Delegation has requested certain explanations in regard to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

We are not in a position to speak in the name of the League, but in view of the discussions which have already taken place in the Assembly and in the Commissions of the League of Nations, and after the explanations which have been exchanged between ourselves, we do not hesitate to inform you of the interpretations which, in so far as we are concerned, we place upon Article 16.

In accordance with that interpretation the obligations resulting from the said Article on the members of the League must be understood to mean that each State member of the League is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account.

(5) FRANCE AND HER EASTERN ALLIES

Treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia

The text of the treaty between France and Poland follows :—

The President of the French Republic and the President of the Republic of Poland, equally desirous to see Europe spared from war by a sincere observance of the undertakings arrived at this day with a view to the maintenance of general peace, have resolved to guarantee their benefits

to each other reciprocally by a treaty concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the treaties existing between them.

And have to this effect nominated for their plenipotentiaries . . . . who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:–

Article I.– In the event of Poland or France suffering from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at this day between them and Germany with a view to the maintenance of general peace, France, and reciprocally Poland, acting in application of Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to lend each other immediately aid and assistance, if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms.

In the event of the Council of the League of Nations, when dealing with a question brought before it in accordance with the said undertakings, being unable to succeed in making its report accepted by all its members other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, and in the event of Poland or France being attacked without provocation, France, or reciprocally Poland, acting in application of Article XV, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, will immediately lend aid and assistance.

Article II.– Nothing in the present treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the League of Nations, or shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article III.– The present treaty shall be registered with the League of Nations, in accordance with the Covenant.

Article IV.– The present treaty shall be ratified. The ratifications will be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratification of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, and the ratification of the treaty concluded at the same between Germany and Poland.

It will enter into force and remain in force under the same conditions as the said Treaties.

The present treaty done in a single copy will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-General of the League will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

Done at LOCARNO, October 16, 1925.

The treaty between France and Czechoslavakia is identical *mutatis mutandis* with the treaty between France and Poland.

INDEX

A

Alsace, 15.
Amery (and Mosul), 138.
Arbitration (British Government and), 135–9.
Austria, 13, 17.
Austrian - Czechoslovak Treaty (Lana), 105.

B

Baldwin, Stanley, 23, 90, 94.
Balfour (Lord), 90 94.
Barthou, 22.
Benesh, 31; (on German proposals) 43–4, 45-7; 101 *seq.*, 105; (statement at Locarno), 125–6.
Bennett, 122.
Boulogne (Lloyd George–Poincaré conference), 22.
Bourgeoisie (Evil of), 131–4.
Braun, 52.
Briand, 19–21, 31, 51–2; (golf at Cannes), 52; (and German offer), 59–69; (London conversations with Chamberlain), 94–100.
British General Election, 2.
British Government: (Franco-British exchanges over German Pact offer), 59–69; (and German Note of July 20), 85–93; (and War guilt), 121-2.
British opinion on Pact, 81–2.
Burrows, Ronald, 133.

C

Caillaux, 51, 109.
Canada (and United States), 97.
Cannes Conference, 7, 20–1.
Carson (Lord), 98.
Chamberlain, Austen: (beginning at Foreign Office), 1–3; (Russian policy), 2, 3, 4, 5; (and Geneva Protocol), 3, 10; and League, 3, 10; (visit to Rome), 3; (and occupation of Cologne), 6, 7, 9–10, 56; (original hypothesis of security policy), 12–32; (on German proposals), 39–42; (exchanges with France), 59–69, 76–84; (and German disarmament), 70–5; (London conversations with Briand), 94–100; (and Locarno Conference), 117–29; (statement after Locarno), 128–29.
Churchill, Winston, 34.
Clémentel, 33–4.
Cologne, Occupation of: (Chamberlain's initial attitude), 6; (Allied attitude), 7–10; (Allied Note of January 5), 8, 56; (Allied Disarmament Note), 70–5, 118.
Cologne Gazette, 38.
Conservatism and Pacifism, 131 *seq.*
Corfu, 24, 138.
Crewe, Lord, 57, 90.
Cuno, Dr., 27.
Curzon, Lord, 109.
Czechoslovakia, 17; (and Poland), 45–7; (and Italy), 105, 108; (alliance with France), 107.
Czechoslovak - Austrian Treaty (Lana), 105.
Czechoslovak-Jugoslav Agreement, 103–4.
Czechoslovak-Polish Agreement, 104.
Czechoslovak - Rumanian Agreement, 103.

D

D'Abernon, Lord, 7, 54.
Danzig, 18–19.
Dawes Conference, 124.
Dawes Plan, 6, 13, 91, 109.
Debts (inter-Allied), 17.
Denmark 25.
Die-Hards (and Russia), 2.
Diplomatic Tangle, The, 101–08.
Disarmament (Allied Note), 70–5.
Dominions (British) (and Protocol), 11, 25; (and Pact), 69.

E

East Prussia, 18.
Eastern Powers (and Pact), 45–7, 95.
Ebert, 52.
Egypt: (Murder of Sir Lee Stack), 2, 5–6.

F

Fleuriau, M. de, French Ambassador (intervention), 34–5; 42–3.
Foch, Marshal, 14, 16–18, 107.
France: (and security), 13, 58–69, 76–84; (and Germany), 14; (population), 14; (new allies), 16; (coloured troops), 17; (and Little Entente), 17–18, 105–08; (and Poland), 19; (Easter crisis), 33; (and German Note of July 20), 85–93.
Franco-Polish Treaty, 37, 95; (summary of text), 106–07.
Franco-Czechoslovak Alliance, 107.
Fromageot, 116.

G

Gaus, 115.
Geneva Protocol, *see* Protocol.
Genoa Conference, 7, 22.
George, Lloyd: (as pacifist), 15; (and France), 15–16;(and Silesia) 19-20; (and Russia), 20; (Genoa), 21–2, 39, 109.
German Ambassador, 38, 39, 40.
Germany: (occupation of Cologne), 6–10; (and security), 13, *et seq.*; (Pact offer), 27, 85–93; (and Austria), 13; (and France), 14; (and Poland), 19; (elections), 52–5; (powers of President), 54–5; (and League), 57, 92, 111, 119–20, 124; (Allied disarmament demands), 70–5; (and War guilt), 120–21.
Goldman, Emma, 5.
Greece, 18; (and Jugoslavia), 108.

H

Held, 52.
Hellpach, 52.
Herriot, 23, 28; (resignation), 33; (policy), 48–50.
Hindenburg, 46, 52 *et seq.*
Holland, 25.
Hungary, 13.
Hurst, Sir Cecil, 115, 122.

I

Isolationists (British), 24.
Italy, 17; (and Czechoslovakia), 105, 108; (and Jugoslavia), 107–8.

J

Jarres, 52.
Jugoslavia, 17-18; (and Italy), 107–08; (and Greece), 108.

Jugoslav-Czechoslovak Agreement, 103–04.
Jugoslav - Rumanian Agreement, 104.
Jurists' Conference, 109–16.

K

Kaiser, 55.
Kiedron, 46.

L

Lampson, 122.
Lana, Treaty of, 105.
Lansdowne, Lord, 130.
Lasocki, Count, 47.
Law, Bonar, 23.
League of Nations: (Mr. Chamberlain as British representative), 3; (Chamberlain's attitude), 10, 24; (Disarmament conference), 11, 18; (and Poland), 19.
Lenin, 132.
Liberal Party (British) and Pact, 96–7.
Little Entente, 17, 101 *seq.*; (and France), 105–08.
Locarno (Conference), 117–26; (and Pacifism), 134 *seq.*; (Treaties) (full texts), 168–82.
Lorraine, 15.
Ludendorff, 52.

M

MacDonald, Ramsay, 1, 2; (and League), 3; (and Germany), 6, 7, 12-3, 23, 45, 137.
Manchester Guardian, 139.
Marx, Chancellor, 7, 52-3.
Masarzk (President), 103.
Mussolini, 105.

N

Negotiations leading up to Locarno (texts of correspondence), 141–67.
North Sea Ports, 25.

P

Pacifism, 99; (at Locarno), 123, 127, 130 *seq.*; (and Conservatism), 131 *seq.*; 134–35.
Painlevé, 51.
Pilotti, 105.
Poincaré, 21–3, 109.
Poland, 17-8; (and Danzig), 19; (and Upper Silesia), 19; (and Czechoslovakia), 45–7, 64; (and France), 105–08; (Treaty), 106–07.
Polish corridor, 14, 18, 24.
Polish - Czechoslovak Agreement, 104.
Polish-Rumanian Agreement, 105.
Politicians and public opinion, 85–6.
Ponsonby, 54.
Prinkipo, 20.
Protocol (Geneva), 3, 10, 18, 24, 25; (Mr. Chamberlain's funeral oration), 30.
Public opinion and Politicians, 85–6.

R

Rafallo Treaty, 22.
Rakovsky, 4.
Rhine (French attitude, 1919 and 1925), 14; (Lloyd George's 1919 commitment), 15; (demilitarization), 15-16.
Rollin, 105.
Ruhr, 23.
Rumania, 17.

Rumanian - Czechoslovak Agreement, 103.
Rumanian - Jugoslav Agreement, 104.
Rumanian-Polish Agreement, 105.
Russia (*see also* Chamberlain): (propaganda), 5; (British attitude) 2–5, 12–13; (Lloyd George and), 20–1, 24.

S

Scotland (and England), 97.
Security, schemes: (Franco-British-American, 1919), 15; (Lloyd George–Briand), 20; (Cannes), 21.
Security Pact (German Proposal), 27; (Franco-British Exchanges), 58–69; (publication of papers), 76–84, 85–93; (Briand and Chamberlain conversations), 94–100.
Selby, 122.
Sforza, Count, 105.
Silesia, *see* Upper Silesia.
Skirmunt, 45.
Skrynski, Count, 28.
Sophocles' *Antigone*, 140.
Stack, Sir Lee, 2, 5.
Status quo (value of), 99.
Stresemann, 38.
Switzerland (and Great Britain *re* arbitration), 135–39.

T

Thaelmann, 52-3.
Theunis, 33.
Trotsky, 5.

U

United States (and Canada), 97.
Upper Silesia, 14, 19, 24.

V

Vandervelde, 124.
Vilna, 29.

W

War (Origins of), 97 *seq.*
Warsaw Conference (Czechoslovakia and Poland), 45–7.
Weimar Constitution, 54–5.
Wembley Tattoo, 134–35.
Wilson, President, 15-16.

Z

Zinoviev affair, 2.

Date Due

MAY 4 '67			
JAN 25 '88			
FEB 16 '89			
~~MAR 12 '89~~			
~~MAR 17 '89~~			
~~APR 05 '91~~			

PELLETIER LIBRARY, ALLEGHENY COLLEGE
3 3768 00545 2266

55987

341.1
G462f